Introduction
The exponents of plea bargaining assert that it is an innate component of the criminal justice system. However, this assumption is misleading. Plea bargaining has continuously received a hostile reception because people postulate that it handles the accused too indulgently. Scholars often argue that it handles defendants too casually or cruelly as the accused concede to the demands of the bargaining under duress. Exponents support plea bargaining based on a penological foundation, which is unpersuasive. Opponents have raised solemn doubts concerning the assumption that those who prefer bargaining normally deserve a minimized trial or they are reformed to good people once they go back to society. Plea-bargaining, which is stimulated by government indulgence accounts for close to ninety percent of how the American criminal justice system solves cases. However, opponents remain steadfast in opposing the practice. The arguments presented in this paper second the critics by maintaining that plea-bargaining undercuts the U.S. Criminal Justice System, viz. it should be discouraged because it is unconstitutional.
How Plea Bargaining Undermines the Criminal Justice Systems in the US
In a bid to explain how plea bargaining demoralizes the criminal justice system, this paper will focus on three suppositions. First, shielding the fallaciously accused is wrong for the justice system to either incarcerate or punish an innocent individual. Second, in shielding of the culprits by issuing an impartial as well as reliable punishment, viz. those who perpetrate analogous delinquencies should receive sentences of similar magnitude. The final postulation deals with safeguarding society. The criminal justice system should be structured in a way that depresses both first-time and perennial offenders from proceeding with their evils (Lippke, 2011).
Shielding the Fallaciously Accused
Through promoting phony affirmations, the bargaining practice undercuts the efforts of shielding the innocent. Though there are no tangible facts to explicate why innocent people may decide to plead guilty, statistics show that many innocent individuals resort to such an option. One of the popular writers against plea bargaining, Kenneth Kipnis, equated agreeing to plead guilty in return for some offers from a prosecutor to obliging to the demands of a gunman in return for one’s life. He argued that such acceptances were made involuntarily and could be easily interpreted as threats (Gorr, 2000).
It is intricate to assume why a defendant would prefer to plead guilty; however, it might be prompted by the fact that s/he fears losing a case. Nevertheless, the challenges witnessed when filing absolving evidence are vivid. For instance, it is difficult to convince the court that forensic evidence can be used to acquit an accused; moreover, there exist administrative barriers. Certain states demand that a person must relinquish other procedural rights before getting the consent to file particular evidence. However, regardless of the reason that propels innocent individuals to confess falsely that they are guilty, if this practice is exacerbating the problem of false admission, then plea bargaining is nothing more than an affront to the process of safeguarding the fallaciously accused (Lippke, 2011).
Nonetheless, even if it might not influence an individual to false admission by simply compelling one to plea bargain, it typifies the failure of the justice system to shield the individual from the abuse of his or her self-respect. In essence, the practice is simply a technique of luring a defendant to trade his or her constitutional right with a limited sentence or reduced charges. It is important to note that when the subject of negotiation becomes personal, then the probability that either of the participant’s dignities might be tainted is high. This assertion confirms that as one falsely confesses for being responsible for committing given delinquency, his or her conscience remains disturbed. Hence, the unwarranted assault of the dignity of an innocent person indicates that the practice undermines the shielding of the blameless.
Shielding of the Guilty
Plea bargaining derails the process of impartially punishing the guilty as stipulated by the Law. By creating a platform whereby the guilty can negotiate how they are punished, plea-bargaining interferes with the practice of ensuring that culprits of similar crimes are issued with corresponding sentences. The U.S. has federal policies that try to reduce the probability of discrimination through issuing the utmost sentence diminution of not more than 15 percent (Kobor, 2008). Nevertheless, by giving the guilty the liberty to bid on how their charges can be minimized or terminated, prosecutors largely minimize the punishments or at times abolish them, and thus breach the constitution. Although this might be deduced as a success in shielding those who get such offers of massive reduction, it deprives the right of those who do not receive such offers (Lippke, 2011). Moreover, since it promotes extensive discrimination in the punishments of the guilty, it typifies a collapse in the practice of protection of all the culprits.
The discrepancy created by plea bargaining has a perilous effect on the impartiality principles of the criminal justice system. Since the plea bargaining process is highly influenced by the monetary capability and individual qualities of the accused, it is vulnerable to socio-demographic inequities. Although one may argue that these prejudices may exist in other sectors, plea bargaining espouses inequities in a more direct way (Kobor, 2008). In its absence, acquiescence is most often founded on ethical issues than on monetary or personal attributes. These types of agreements based on ethical issues are the ones that coincide with the guidelines of the justice system.
Safeguarding the Society
By promoting a system whereby sentences are altered by considering the negotiation capabilities of the accused, plea bargaining fails to discourage culprits from indulging in subsequent crimes, and thus endangers the lives of innocent citizens. When a deliquescent, through plea-bargaining, gets his or her sentences reduced or terminated, it raises the chances of committing crime again. Furthermore, defendants who have to succeed in the practice have sufficient information about plea bargaining and thus they cannot be barred from immoral behaviors by using conjectural methods of punishment (Gorr, 2000). They are aware that they can simply get absolution by collaborating with prosecutors.
The practice allows criminals to start viewing the arbitration and sentencing process as one that they can acquit themselves through the availability of resources and bargaining knowledge. This notion of perennial criminals viewing the court system in terms of relativist ideas is an affront to the criminal justice system. If the practice is inculcating false ideas to upcoming criminals that there exist methods they can use to avoid justice, it is also indicating that plea-bargaining is creating a society that cannot be protected by the court systems (Kobor, 2008). Probably, this aspect explains why the practice is receiving massive criticism throughout the globe.
It is reasonable to argue that it is not only plea-bargaining that contributes to the repetition of crimes in American society, and thus other factors in the criminal justice that are contributing to this challenge. Moreover, it is impossible to quantify the magnitude under which the practice influences first-time offenders. However, with almost ninety-five percent of cases being settled through plea-bargaining, one can infer that the larger part of the prevention impact of the justice system is analogous to the punishments altered through bargaining. In addition, the unaltered punishments have the finest prevention potential; hence, the minimized sentences are effective in utterly preventing the reoccurrence of first-time offenses. This aspect reconfirms the fact that plea bargaining is damaging the criminal justice system’s principle of safeguarding society (Lippke, 2011).
The arguments presented by the proponents of plea bargaining are not convincing. One of the arguments is that plea bargaining promotes efficiency (Gorr, 2000). This argument is deceptive because it fails to define the meaning of efficiency and the intention of efficiency. If the intention is to reduce the time taken to resolve the numerous cases in the courts take, then the argument would be reasonable. However, the U.S. criminal justice system policies stipulate an initiative that should incorporate more than merely reducing the number of cases in a given time. Although it is indisputable that in the absence of plea bargaining the justice system might be inept, this fact does not warrant the application of the process because other methods can be employed to increase efficiency in the courts; for instance, through modifying the forensic analysis process (Olin, 2002).
Conclusion
The debate on the impact of plea-bargaining on the functions of the criminal justice system is not anticipated to end soon. However, by interfering with the rights of the defendants and the society, plea-bargaining undercuts the core principles of the justice system. Although the exponents claim that it promotes efficiency, they have provided concrete arguments to substantiate their claims. It is thus important to note that irrespective of the conveniences, which the practice may introduce into the criminal justice system, it possesses several demerits that overshadow its benefits. Therefore, plea bargaining undermines the accepted functions of the US criminal justice.
Reference List
Gorr, M. (2000). The morality of plea-bargaining. Social Theory and Practice, 26(1), 129-151.
Kobor, S. (2008). Bargaining in the criminal justice systems of the United States and Germany: A matter of justice and administrative efficiency within legal, cultural context. Germany: Peter Lang.
Lippke, L. (2011). The Ethics of Plea Bargaining. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Olin, D. (2002). Plea bargain. New York Times Magazine, pp.29-30.