Introduction
Since September 11, 2001, first responders have made significant progress strengthening capabilities needed to defend the nation against the threat of WMD. The DHS national guidelines developed and implemented nationwide have provided a durable framework for multi-agency coordination and cooperation. This is important because terrorist attacks or major disasters often are beyond what a single jurisdiction can respond to effectively. However, whether levels of preparedness are adequate at all levels of government may prove difficult to assess. Many emergency response and management professionals believe that the nation is better prepared than it was prior to11th September 2001, but still has plenty of room for improvement. For example, priority missions identified in Homeland Security Strategic Plans have associated capabilities taken from the DHS Target Capabilities List. Each capability must reach target levels of performance if an adequate level of preparedness is to be achieved. It is clear that the emergency response community benefits from national standards that allow response entities to coordinate more effectively than before. However, to reiterate, is this level of preparedness where it needs to be? If not, what are the shortfalls and how should they be addressed? The biggest challenge for achieving an appropriate level of preparedness nationwide remains the need for continued strengthening of multi-agency capabilities. “Multi-agency preparedness, in terms of multi-agency capabilities achieving target levels of performance, is critical for safeguarding the country.”
Disaster preparedness
The rescue and recovery efforts soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the twin towers was a big challenge not only to the emergency responders but also to the federal government. This was the first ever kind of terror attack of a unique magnitude ever witnessed in the history of the United. Such big disasters have posed a lot of challenges both to responders who may not be fully prepared and to the victims who find it extremely difficult to protect themselves under such situations (Auf der, 1989). This is why a state of preparedness should always be in place owing to the fact that such extreme disasters may negatively impact on people for instance through death apart from affecting large areas. Additionally, there may be need for extensive response activities which may take long period of time. In most cases, high level disasters can cause more than one type of secondary effect in which further damage or loss is encountered in which a wide range of response systems is required. Some local response organizations do not routinely check their systems to ensure optimum efficiency when responding to disasters. Besides, a major disaster is more likely to cause serious damage to established infrastructure like transport systems, communication and general social amenities. The capacity level of these disaster responders may equally be hampered as a consequence of a major disaster. On the overall, these disaster characteristics heighten the ease with which responders can handle their safety requirements when responding to emergencies (Auf der, 1989).
Risk assessment
The main role of emergency responders during the 9/11 tragedy was to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts. For instance, the Fire Department of New York moved fast and set forth the rescue exercise by coordinating more nearly two hundred units from its fire fighting reserve. Their work was inherently cumbersome and risky as well. Along with the associated risk, their safety during disaster management operations was put at great risk. Handling safety matters on disaster spots need to be addressed by policy makers especially by analyzing the likely gains of a responder’s activity and the dangers involved while executing such noble duty. The risk management procedure is utterly important and can be categorized into three main functional areas namely data collection over the incidence, assessing the available alternatives, and deliberating on key decision areas and finally implementing all the decisions made.
First responder safety
The emergency responder organizations who were operating at the scene of the 9/11 attacks for example the NYPD unit which deals with aviation attempted to disseminate information to the authority in order for the people to vacate the buildings but with little success. The warnings were not transmitted promptly and this revealed the low level of disaster preparedness in terms of handling disasters. Nevertheless, in unique, disorderly and complicated cases, some procedures may lack pragmatism culminating into even bigger challenges towards rescue efforts to the victims. In order to enhance responder level of safety when major calamities strike, proper strategies must be instituted to permit quick and secure management of any form of disaster which has stricken a country (Maniscalco & Christen, 2001). Viable systems and abilities have been instituted in order to safeguard emergency responders. In some cases though, the degree and complexity of the disaster in question may hinder the response units from getting all the vital data needed. For instance, small scale responder organizations may have problems in identifying, weighing and invigilating unique hazards. This can be compounded with the glaring challenge of maintaining and harnessing the evadible information on persons who attempt to respond especially from other organizations. In addition, the ability to collect and disseminate prompt information regarding injuries, sicknesses, exposure to poisonous substances and other potential risks may be a real impediment.
Information gathering
There was a notable poor coordination of the emergency responders at the site of the 9/11 attacks which was blamed on poor radio response. As a result, the emergency responders ended up performing elusive search for civilians. Gathering data on the existing and probable risks in places where main disasters have stricken is a very important procedure towards disaster safety management skills. Those officials who have been mandated to mange safety during disasters require prompt, clear and straightforward information to enable them make raid but well informed decisions before relevant actions can be taken. In spite of this, most major disasters usually present innumerable complexities which make it quite difficult for a coherent line of action to be taken. Moreover, the information collection process during major disasters is commonly marred with confusion and lack of clarity. Heavy causalities have been reported in the past like in the case of September 11 attacks where over two thousand civillians lost their lives mainly because most response organizations do not have capabilities which is required to monitor a wide array of potential risk s which commonly accompany the disasters. In some cases, more response agencies can chip in to offer their aid, a situation which has complicated rescue efforts in the past.
Action plan
The September 11 brought a lot of safety questions in terms of the country’s state of preparedness. The nation came into realization of various aspects of disaster and its management moiré than before. New competences were learnt despite the heavy material and humanitarian losses encountered. One of the action plans which followed immediately after the disaster courtesy of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and Science and Technology Policy Institute was to arrange for a conference which would d seek ways of safeguarding response workers bearing in min d that they are the most significant individuals when disasters are on. During the deliberations, individuals pointed out the need of adopting safety practices whenever there are disasters. In order to achieve the highest degree of success on disaster management, more practical measures must be adopted in the current times. In most cases, responder organizations usually make use of the highly tense and chaotic surrounding to make last minute rash decisions on managing a particular disaster. This should not be the case at all. Working out procedures and guidelines in readiness for disaster management should be an on-going continuous process due to the changing dynamics of the nature of disasters experienced in modern times. In addition, standardized systems and logically sound procedures cannot be evaded to achieve a desirable disaster or crisis management platform.
Major disasters pose quite distinctive characteristics which even calls for thorough state of preparedness. There are multiple risks which are usually involved in key disasters hence lack of preparation is a real recipe for unnecessary secondary impacts which can be avoided in totality. Major disasters can be varied in terms of magnitude, potential threats as well as economic losses. Usually, the response agencies are conducted to conduct very important prerequisite activities. If such disasters are to be managed well and to the point of satisfaction, then vital resources are needed. The different forms through which major disasters occur also require a variety of ways to manage the disaster. Since major disasters are not so common, the emergency responders may not adequately assess the viable risks and dangers. Similarly, they may not take prior preparative steps towards complex disaster management. For this reason, training which is barely based on events which have happened makes a huge assumption that indeed all is well. This is the reason why our disaster management capabilities need to be strengthened at all costs in spite of the popular belief that the country is now more prepared to handle disasters after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The fact that major disasters require more than one responder organization to act, there souls also be a common understanding in the coordination of activities during major disasters. Each emergency response agent need to be assigned particular roles to avoid duplication of roles during the short intense rescue time for disaster victims. There are several agencies which have pledged to co-work in order to provide a nationwide policy that will put all the states at a state of preparedness in case of emergencies. One such organization is the National Incident Management systems the magnitude and the nature of many agencies required to manage a disaster is a complicated process. As a result, the manner in which information is gathered, analyzed, interpreted and disseminated is vital. This inevitably calls for the need of standing information systems in place. All information management tools will work towards harmonizing safety management during and even after disasters (Kipp & Loflin, 1996). Safety managers have the responsibility of ensuring that information gathered from other organizations is well utilized by invigilation efforts and also giving comparison to the available data to make it viable for use. The information obtained from the hazard is significant in evaluating the degree and urgency of the disaster. Disaster response activities often occupy large areas of operations which might pose further challenges to emergency responders due to more resource utilization in the process. Management tools can be utilized in this case as a safety management tool. At the same time, it is imperative to offer assistance while protecting the safety of emergency responders. During the process of attending to disaster victims, emergency responders may comprise of not only the multi agency organizations but also volunteering individuals who willingly offer their support. However, the procedure of accounting for these willing individuals is equally very cumbersome. They are not organized to facilitate easy gathering of relevant information. It is therefore difficult to integrate the required safety management procedures (Lewis, 1993). Information on disasters provides the basis for assessment o f the potential risk s involved. Safety managers in this case are obliged to input necessary available options. Hence, a well thought out judgment is necessary. In some instances, there may be several people who have been affected by the disaster. This may come in different forms like death, injuries and being maimed. Due to this huge number, it is often challenging to establish the level of success even as the rescue plans is in progress. The rescue and recovery line s of operation are clearly differentiated. However, making a clear cut difference during certain disaster rescue operations may be a real challenge. Moreover, identifying the extraordinary cases is much easier. For example, the scene of the September 11, 2001 attack and the Crash Flight 93 which took place in Shanks Ville were easily identified promptly. It was also easy to establish that nobody survived. Such immediate feedback enables decision makers to reach at relevant decision making points and take required actions. This is one level of response mechanism that is required if our nation will have to be in a state of optimum preparati0on just in case an inevitable disaster strikes (Greene, 2002). Likewise, response operations which took place at the site of the World Trade Centre immediately after the terrorist attacks are a vivid indication of a complicated scenario. This is because the authorities could not make a defining line between the recovery and rescue plans. They were unable to do so due to the prevailing circumstances. Such hindrances should be dealt with well in advance in an attempt to eliminate slow response mechanisms. Although a wide rage of multi agency help is needed during disasters, the participation of a series of agencies at the site of the disaster can complicate response abilities. In the first place, different organizations have varying ways of responding to emergencies. These differences may be due to several factors like the nature of their operations (Auf der, 1989). For instance, the strategy which a law enforcing agency will use when responding to an emergency is not the same as the one used by a health organization in tackling a similar disaster. In order for our country to be able to deal with disaster preparedness and effective risk management procedures, safety managers are supposed to be armed with suitable and working decisions which aim at seeking protective alternatives rather than embracing curative approach in handling disasters. These managers need information which can be easily accessed. The very information should have a high degree of accuracy (Pangi, 2002). Other responding agencies may supply additional safety apparatus. In particular, the federal agencies should have sufficient cache supply so that a fully integrated program is put into place. Another responsibility which should be shouldered on the safety managers is to make early arrangements with the private institutions to provide for any deficits which may be there in regard to supply. As an essential ingredient to remain in a state of readiness in case of any disaster, responder agencies need to keep clear records which contain their important materials as well as those from outside. The earliest sessions during the process of responding to an emergency are vital because it will the set the right pace and methodology rolling. Furthermore, there is need to employ the skill and competence from emergency experts (Maniscalco & Christen, 2001). This expertise knowledge will assist in developing the most applicable strategies to adopt in handling the disaster parameter. Having considered and explored all the above disaster preparedness tools, what then should disaster mangers do to attain the best protective or preparedness status? Although these managers may have the abundant information at their disposal, it may not necessarily lead to positive effect as far as safety is concerned. There is need for effective communication on the procedures and standards to be used when setting disaster preparedness guiding principals. The response agencies have the duty of creating and pursuing some form of standard initiatives while the relevant authorities are mandated to enforce decision s which is considered safe by experts in reference to disaster preparedness and management. Nevertheless, if the said safety procedures are implemented at the site of the incidence, the whole situation becomes much more complex and difficult to overcome the prevailing challenges. Safety management in line with disaster preparedness has not been fully distinguished especially when major disasters have to be dealt with. This is indeed one area which has exhibited serious flaws in our disaster preparedness and management. The main role of the Incident Commander is to control all the operations of the First responders. However, the commander is limited in his line of duty in the sense that he cannot exercise express authority over all of them. Moreover, the higher the number of First responders alongside actively participating volunteers who have divergent views and own standards of operations complicates the smooth and more coherent functioning of the Incident commander (Jackson et al., 2002). Individual First responder agencies mainly maintain the responsibility of safeguarding the safety and sound health for their groups only. As a result, there are no centrally harmonized strategies which can adequately address the safety and health needs of other responding groups. Some responders may not have the necessary requirements which deal with protection. This, among other eminent challenges may sometimes make rescue efforts to be a scary and unpalatable experience to engage in.
Even as the federal government strives to institute a variety of measurable goals and workable institutions to deal with disaster outbreak, there are other factors which continue to hamper disaster rescue plans whenever there is need to. A case in point is the large geographical area to be covered whenever a disaster occurs. This factor has continued to make it very difficult for disaster managers to respond sufficiently on disaster zones. In retrospect, it will also be challenging to cater for safety of First responders as required or appropriate Maniscalco PM (Christen, 2001).
Conclusion
In summing up this paper, it is indeed imperative to observe that disaster preparedness strategies need to created, enhanced and developed if our country is to attain some degree and sense of security on matters pertaining to safety measures and risk management during disasters. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack was a tip of the iceberg on how the federal government may not have evolved the right measures and mechanisms to deal with prevention rather than reacting to the aftermath of a devastating disaster. Furthermore, there are some disasters which are inevitable. Within such provisions, there has been both intensive and extensive government involvement in the restructuring process in regard to safety procedures and risk management. The most debatable question here has been the safeguarding of first responders who may be in form of organizations and volunteers. Similarly, lack of a common procedure of handling disaster emergencies when these agencies take charge has equally complicated the risk and safety principles needed during such operations.
Reference
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