One of the rights granted by the Constitution of the USA is the right to free association between individuals and groups (Batchis, 2012). Even though this right is stated to be technically absent in the Constitution, it is legally protected by the First Amendment. This was confirmed in several Supreme Court decisions, for instance, in its decision in the case N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) (Vance, 2012). However, there appears to exist a dilemma pertaining to the restrictive professional standards imposed on representatives of various professions; these standards seemingly violate the named right. In this paper, arguments will be offered that restrictive professional standards do not violate the freedom of association, and are not unjust towards a professional.
Before discussing whether the professional standards violate one’s right to free association, it is paramount to clarify the exact meaning of “the right to free association.” According to Vance (2012), the right to free association means that one has the right to decide which person or organization they desire to associate with, and the right to do so, providing that this person or organization is willing to associate with the named person. In addition, any person or organization also has the right not to associate with anyone with whom they do not wish to associate (Vance, 2012).
When an individual becomes a member of a profession, it seems justified to state that they decided to associate with the professional collective of that profession, and, therefore, to accept the rules existing for that collective. Consequently, it was that person’s own choice to become a member of that profession and to accept the rules this entails, including the restrictive professional standards. Furthermore, an individual who is currently a member of a certain profession is, or should be, free to leave that career and start pursuing a different one. Therefore, if one, for instance, works as a medic, and wishes to free oneself from the restrictive professional medical standards, they can quit their job as a medic and become, for example, a biology teacher.
Of course, there seemingly exists another problem: even if one quits their profession, they still have to comply with certain professional standards; for instance, a medic will have not to uncover the information about their former patients to others. However, it is noteworthy that the obligation to protect the privacy of one’s patients was accepted while one was still working as a medic, and, therefore, while that person did not deny one’s agreement to adhere to the respective professional standards. It was known to that person that once they accept a patient, they are obliged to protect that customer’s private information ever since, according to the restrictive standards. Therefore, one took upon oneself that obligation willingly, which means that this professional obligation does not contradict the right to free association.
Restrictive professional standards also should not be considered unjust, for being a member of a profession entails responsibility associated with that field of activity. Therefore, when one becomes a member of a profession, they also accept the responsibility related to it, and they should realize that working in that sphere and not being responsible for one’s actions is impossible. Thus, restrictive professional standards should not be considered unjust, for the person also adheres to them willingly, realizing that they will be obliged to follow these standards and bear certain responsibility for their actions.
Therefore, while the right to free association, which is legally protected by the U.S. Constitution (Batchis, 2012; Vance, 2012), might seem to contradict restrictive professional standards, it should be not considered contradictory to them. This is because when one becomes a representative of a profession, they willingly accept the responsibilities associated with doing so. Should one decide they do not desire to adhere to these professional standards any longer, they are free to leave the professional association, and they will not have to agree to comply with new demands of these standards in the future.
References
Batchis, W. (2012). Citizens United and the paradox of “corporate speech”: From freedom of association to freedom of the association. Review of Law & Social Change, 36(1), 5.
Vance, L. M. (2012). Does the First Amendment protect the freedom of association? Web.