Singer, in his article, has a unidirectional goal that he tries to put across despite the numerous challenges it faces. He is very passionate about the welfare of other unfortunate humans like him and gives a vivid example with the refugees of East Bengal. Given the hardship that the dwellers of this hunger-stricken region, Singer feels that other people across the world are being morally incompetent by intentionally opting not to assist the dying men, women, and children (Preece, 2002).
Through his article, the singer has an objective in instigating a sense of responsibility and moral uprightness amongst the able people. He tries to harmonize efforts from across the globe in a bid to make other people feel their obligation of stopping a child in Bengal from dying of hunger whereas the filthy rich spend loads of cash on luxuries alone. To some extent, he manages to validate his arguments by using real-life experiences as examples. For instance, he states that it is a moral obligation of a person to help a drowning child inconsiderate of whether his clothes will be drenched. He says that drenched clothes are not as much damaged as a dead kid. The innuendo behind this is that there are sacrifices worth taking if they would solve bigger problems (White, 2009).
One of the counter-arguments to Singer’s position is the fact that others think it is people’s moral obligation to work exhaustively to balance their misery and happiness. The author, however, believes in the exact opposite of this argument. He indicates that wearing himself self out makes him less effective and productive than he would have been. After making the necessary considerations, he argues that there is no point in doing all that we can in alleviating suffering while sacrificing a morally analogous significance (Brock, Brock-Moellendorf & Conference, 2005).
Another counter-argument is the notion that private donations to charity are bound to prompt governments to escape their obligations. It is an implication that governments will never be fully involved in providing aid if there are many private aids. On the contrary, Singer denies the assumption that the absence of private well-wishers will compel governments to actively engage in donations. He says that the deliberate refusal to provide aid is purposefully denying the responsibility of alleviating suffering.
The squabble that providing famine liberation postpones hunger is also another counter-argument. This is because people are not left to die of hunger in order to simplify the trouble in the future. Singer is against this because it relives people from performing their moral duties (White, 2009).
According to Singer, marginal utility is the extent at which, by providing extra help to the less fortunate, someone risks suffering as much as he would mitigate others’ suffering by giving. It is the point of transition at which giving more to charity would result to posing as much problems and suffering to his dependants or perhaps himself. From the Bengali example, exceeding one’s marginal utility would put him in a compromising situation that is hardly different form that in Bengali (White, 2009).
This concept relates very well with Singer’s arguments. He states that people of equal positions may be morally obliged to make equal contributions. However, they will only be sharing a moral responsibility if they do this simultaneously. Additionally, not everyone should make the same amount of contribution since people are of different positions in the social ladder. They should, on the other hand, analyze their marginal utilities so as to only satisfy their wants and contribute the rest to the campaign against deaths instigated by starvation and moral rejection.
The ideas of charity and duty are two distinct entities according to Singer’s article. In most occasions, giving to the needy is considered a charitable act although there in absolutely nothing wrong with failing to give at all. From Singer’s example of a drowning child, many may argue that saving the child is a charitable act but there is nothing wrong with failing to do so. But look at it this way, if the child dies because he or she was not saved them the blame in on whoever was in a position to save him. As a result, giving to charity ceases to become charity and becomes a duty or responsibility (White, 2009).
I undoubtedly agree with Singer in his arguments. People have for have, for a long time, been insensitive about other fellow human beings who are in dire need of urgent help. Many are willing to financially assist their immediate neighbors who could not be suffering as much as a hunger-stricken orphan in the famine-stricken sub-urban regions thousands of miles away. This is normally done with the sheer feeling of physical contact. Despite the fact that others who need more help are thousands of miles away, there are no morally arguable differences that would prompt people to assist those they see physically as opposed to those who are far away (Brock, Brock-Moellendorf & Conference, 2005).
In conclusion, it is imperative that humans recognize the fact that providing help to the needy is a moral obligation and not charity as purported. It is time that people prioritized others’ needs to their own wants (Preece, 2002).
References
Brock, G., Brock-Moellendorf, & Conference. (2005). Current debates in global justice. Dordrecht U.A.: Springer.
Preece, G. R. (2002). Rethinking Peter Singer: A Christian critique. Downers Grove, Ill: Inter-Varsity Press.
White, J. E. (2009). Contemporary moral problems. Australia: Thomson Wadsworth.