Introduction
Amphibious warfare is a military operation that encompasses elements of land, sea, and air power. The development of this operation in the US started in the early 1900s, but its potential was only witnessed during the Second World War. Since then, trillions of dollars have been invested in the military over several decades to perfect it as a means to project American power globally.
Pioneered by the Navy-Marine Corps team, amphibious warfare was first put to use by the British during the First World War in their attempts to capture Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) from the Ottoman. The lessons from the failure of the British during that operation provided greater impetus for technological innovation that made amphibious warfare successful in later decades. Thus, amphibious warfare has evolved from an untested concept during the First World War to an indispensable military technique utilized by the world’s premier superpower to project military might globally.
Amphibious Warfare and World War 1
By today’s standards, amphibious warfare can be defined as a complex coordination of elements of air, land, and sea warfare to launch attacks on territories held by an enemy or an occupying force. This form of warfare has its root in ancient times but its perfection as a technique of warfare was done in the 20th century. In particular, the Second World War saw massive use by the Allies, and especially the United States, to defeat the Japanese and the Nazis in France. Despite its success in later years, amphibious warfare would have likely been abandoned if the challenges it encountered during the interwar period were not resolved.
Specifically, an operation to surprise the Central powers led by Germany in Constantinople by the allies led by the British went horribly wrong when they attempted an amphibious landing. In particular, in 1915, the Allies designed the Gallipoli Campaign to force the Ottoman Empire (modern-day Turkey) out of the War. This operation was to begin with a naval landing by the British by first navigating the 38-mile-long Dardanelles channel. Military leaders had been against the plan, fearing massive casualties, but an appeal by Grand Duke Nicholas from Russia forced the British authorities to consent to the start of the operation. Comprising mostly British and French naval assets, the operation commenced with a naval bombardment in February, with pauses in between due to bad weather. However, despite landing almost unopposed, the enemy sunk three battleships and damaged another three, leading to the abandonment of the operation.
The arrival of reinforcements and several landings later did little to overcome Turkish resistance. By September, it was clear to the Allies that the operation had bogged down with little progress to show despite massive loss of life and military equipment. By some measures, the campaign was seen as a success as it pulled massive Turkish forces from the border with Russia. However, the failure of the landing operation became a cautionary tale for military strategists who sought to overcome the difficulties the Allies encountered during that operation. In particular, military scientists recommended innovative approaches and meticulous planning and coordination were necessary for success in further amphibious landing operations.
The US Military and its Embrace of Amphibious Warfare
A hand-off approach to foreign policy during much of the First World War meant that the US did not participate in any massive military campaigns during most of the War. However, military leaders in the Departments of Defense were eager to learn from the mistakes of others with the view of perfecting amphibious warfare. The US Marine Corps was especially keen on adapting amphibious warfare for several reasons. One of these reasons was geopolitical considerations by the military leaders. The US had several territories in various areas of the globe that it was keen to protect. As such, an ability to project power into diverse coastlines was viewed as existential. Thus, the lesson of World War 1 showcased the need for specialized forces with the capability and capacity to execute complex amphibious landing operations.
Additionally, strategic and foresighted leaders in the US Department of Defense anticipated that the US needed to perfect amphibious warfare. Individuals such as Major Earl Hancock Ellis, aware of the belligerent nature of the Japanese empire, advocated for the adoption of this fighting technique as a way to project American power in the Pacific. Following his recommendations, training, and exercises on the same became a central focus of the Marines, giving them a reputation for being an expeditionary force that was highly efficient in its amphibious assaults.
Another reason for the increased focus on amphibious warfare by the US military in the 1920s and 30s was advances in technology. During the Gallipoli Campaign, mostly outdated vessels and landing craft were utilized. However, the development of better and technologically superior landing craft, aircraft, and other naval vessels made amphibious assaults feasible and strategic. As tension in the World continued to increase due to military build-up by the Germans and other provocative tension, the need to harness amphibious warfare increased. The efforts in the 1920s and 30s bore fruit when the US finally entered the Second World War where Japanese and German forces struggled against amphibious warfare employed by the US during the entirety of the War.
The German High Command and Opposing School of Thought
The first years of the Second World War saw Germany concur with much of Western Europe and press Eastward with a campaign against the Soviet Union. This victory would be short-lived as the Allies planned and carried out a successful counteroffensive across the entire frontline. One notable counteroffensive that concerned the German high command the Operation Overlord, which is commonly known as D-Day. Nervous about possible landings in France, two schools of thought on how to counter such moves led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt emerged. These German generals had distinguished themselves in various campaigns during the Second World. As such, the task of preparing France for defense fell on them.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was a highly successful field commander who had shown his tactical prowess in the North African theater. Accordingly, he advocated for a one-on-one defense of the beaches in France to prevent the Allies from establishing and securing a bridgehead. Additionally, he was very specific about the need for a mobile reserve force, concentrated armor, and rapid response to any landing attempts by the Allies.
On his part, Field Marshal Gerd advocated for a broad defensive strategy. Compared to Rommel, Gerd was more traditional and experienced having seen and participated in warfare in the First World War. His approach envisioned the holding back of elite German divisions and reserves inland due to an expectation that the Allies would open multiple fronts. Additionally, he believed that it would be strategic to allow the Allies to commit fully and then counterattack them as they moved deeper into France. Eventually, elements of both strategies were adopted, but inherent problems among the Germans allowed the securing of a bridgehead in Normandy, marking the turning point of the War.
Japanese Islands Defense Tactics
As the noose tightened around the Japanese Imperial army following the summer defeat in the Battle of Saipan, Japanese military leaders changed their defensive tactics. Previously, the Japanese had adopted a strategy of defending every inch of territory on their hands. However, as the allies approached the shores of Japan, they adopted a strategy that came to be known as “island by-pass.” This strategy entailed a concentration of military resources on critical islands only to create and the creation of a ring of defensive networks to halt the advance by the Allies. They also adopted guerilla tactics and kamikaze attacks to stop the amphibious landings by the Allies.
Despite the shift in their defensive tactics and strategies, the unrelenting campaign and superior fighting techniques allowed the Allies to capture key Islands and expose Japan proper to bombardment by naval assets. Despite causing significant casualties for the Allies, the defensive tactics could not prevent the defeat of the Imperial Japanese army and the final victory.
Conclusion
Amphibious warfare played a defining role in the victory of the Allies during the Second World War. Despite its unremarkable initial application in large-scale warfare, the US Amerine Corps, supported by an improvement in technology, perfected and adopted it as their primary fighting technique. This type of warfare combines air, land, and naval assets to overcome and defeat enemies on land. In the years since the Second World War, the US military has relied on its amphibious capabilities to project power globally and ensure freedom of navigation in some of the tense regions in the world.
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