Ethnic identity stands as a constituent component of a person’s self-awareness, manifesting itself in acceptance, identification, and knowledge of their ethnicity. The ethnic or racial identity of a person can acquire various forms of expression in their life depending on their environment, upbringing, and social circle. However, the issue of Black identity is a little more complicated than that, as researchers have been asking specific questions such as “what constitutes Black identity?” and “what aspect should be considered superior in it?”. For example, Baylis (2003), in her essay Black as Me: Narrative Identity, comments on the study of genetic processes behind African genealogy, delving into the variety of environmental aspects that affect identity formation. Whereas Appiah (1990) in But Would That Still Be Me? Notes on Gender, “Race,” Ethnicity, as Sources of “Identity” tries to explain how the sense of identity is affected by gender and racial preconditions. This paper will contrast the views of the two authors and elaborate on which theory appears to be more plausible.
A person perceives the world through the prism of ideas, attitudes, and values that prevail in their native culture. That is, they conceive and plan their actions in accordance with specific, fairly stable cultural images, which become stereotypical for them. The formation and assimilation of stereotypes by a person occur with the first acts of socialization and enculturation, already in the family circle, by communicating with parents. Baylis (2003) builds her argument first on the familial heritage that the child grows up absorbing as one of the fundamental bases of racial identity. The author (2003) states that “while there are many ways of understanding racial identity, my own view is that lived experience inexorably shapes racial identity” (143). Identity here is a category through which norms, ideals, values, cultural legacy, and morality of representatives of those social groups to which a given individual belongs are acquired or assimilated. However, identity is made up exclusively of parameters predetermined by a specific society, which are possible only in it due to peculiar interpersonal relations existing in it.
From Baylis (2003) example, her overall Black identity is constituted from genetic, ethnic, cultural, and personal living experience as a daughter of oppressed Black woman identities. The latter she (2003) calls a “stakeholder identity” due to the fact that her upbringing and social environment affected her the most during the formation of her sense of self. Moreover, Baylis (2003) adds that she has to continuously negotiate and reshape her identity, specifically due to the fact that she was refused to be perceived as Black throughout her life due to her lighter skin tone. Baylis (2003) argues that others’ perception constantly affects the Black identity of people who do not appear as Black at first glance, demanding confirmation of their belonging to the group. Thus, Baylis (2003) contemplates how much identity-related confidence stems from the constant necessity to prove it to the social circle in which the person grows and lives in. Overall, Baylis’ (2003) main argument comes to this point: racial identity lies not in genetic predispositions but in the world, one lives in and the narratives one chooses to construct about oneself.
Appiah (1990) takes a fundamentally different route in exploring the issue of Black identity and its formation. He (1990) chooses three aspects that, in his opinion, carry the most weight in formatting identity: gender, race, and ethnicity, and reviews each in regard to their influence on identity. Appiah (1990) approaches the issue from a more philosophical point of view, implementing logical discussion and metaphysical constructions to support his arguments. First, the author (1990) states: “If you had asked Anglo-American philosophers 25 years ago what conditions someone has to meet to in order to be identical with me, they would consider it conceptual question” (493). In this claim, Appiah (1990), most possibly, refers to the colonial tendencies that are still present in the racial discourse occurring in Europe and America. Appiah’s (1990) way of determining identity is ultimately different from Baylis’ (2003), as it draws more on the implications aspects such as gender, race, and ethnicity bring into the discussion. For Appiah (1990), the discussion carries less personal meaning, and he applies conceptuality to the topic, supporting the value of his evidence through a consecutive chain of logical arguments.
Anthropological and civilizational markers, on the basis of which negative and sometimes hostile relations are constructed, gradually acquire important political meaning as they begin to participate in the processes of rationalizing racial inequality. As a result, they are often used to legitimize such social practices as exploitation and oppression, as well as generally affecting the attitude towards representatives of different races. In this regard, some identities, such as Black, become marginalized, which affects the formation of the sense of self in the people belonging to the group greatly.
Both Baylis and Appiah provide strong arguments on how identity is developed and affected by different aspects; each author uses specific methods to validate their claims. However, Baylis’ theory provides a more targeted, specific view of the Black identity and its formation, offering more personalized evidence for the matter. Appiah takes on a more detached approach, which is correct – but in the discourse about identity, it simply has less potential for the reader to relate with. This difference tips the scales of interest in Baylis’ favor, as she offers a compelling narrative substantiated by strong claims and research evidence rather than just a philosophical discussion.
Works Cited
Appiah, Anthony. “‘But Would That Still Be Me?” Notes on Gender, ‘Race,” Ethnicity, as Sources of ‘Identity.’” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 87, no. 10, 1990, pp. 493–499., Web.
Baylis, Francoise. “Black as Me: Narrative Identity.” Developing World Bioethics, vol. 3, no. 2, 2003, pp. 142–150., Web.