Introduction
In the seminal case of Berghuis v. Thompkins, the United States Supreme Court dealt with Miranda rights’ nuances, mainly as applied to a suspect’s silence during an interrogation. What went to the heart was whether the invocation of the right to remain silent had to be explicit or whether silence itself could at once invoke it. In an undividedly 5-4 decision, the Court held against silence as inherently invoking the right (Justia Law, 2010).
Argument Against the Majority’s Decision
The judgment on the immediately available for citation brings focus to the fact that to have an invocation of the right to silence is valid. It means a suspect aware of the right to remain silent but who does not explicitly articulate or waive these rights and, after that, voluntarily answers police questioning has waived his right to remain silent.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor led the dissent, expressing a divergent opinion calling for a stronger showing of waiver of constitutional rights, especially in cases where there was an extended interrogation, and the accused was entirely silent and then decided to make the self-incriminatory utterance. This view emphasizes the need to protect constitutional rights under pressure of interrogation explicitly. It finds its basis in the Miranda v. Arizona landmark decision, where it was put to rest that statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the suspect is informed of their rights (Cornell Law School, n.d.). The Court has concluded that police interrogation is an inherently coercive activity. Therefore, the existence of Miranda rights is necessary to guarantee a free and informed choice of the suspect whether to speak or keep silent.
A minority argued against Berghuis v. Thompkins, stating that it might weaken the fundamental protections intended by the Miranda ruling. The dissent concerns the necessity for a clear and explicit waiver of rights, other than only inferring from an accused’s silence or ultimate response that there was a valid waiver of the admonitory, especially in lengthy interrogations. Such a view supports the underlying principles of Miranda that were developed to prevent police demand for inquisitions.
Conclusion
The majority’s position here unreasonably imposes a clarity burden on the people being questioned to assert their rights, thus potentially whittling down the protection sought by Miranda (Cornell Law School, n.d.). Such an approach would disproportionately harm people either unaware that they needed to explicitly invoke their rights or were intimated by the interrogation, subverting the protective ethos of Miranda rights.
References
Cornell Law School. (n.d.). Miranda and its aftermath. Legal Information Institute. Web.
Justia Law. (2010). Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). Web.