Clausewitz was a notable general and a strategist who theorized about war and its essential elements. He focused on such aspects as defense, offense, and combat, actively using Buonaparte as an example due to them being contemporaries and enemies at one point (Clausewitz, 2020). The theorists suggested several new concepts related to warfare, such as moral forces, the fog of war, and the center of gravity (COG) (Clausewitz, 2020).
Despite those being approximately two centuries old, they remain relevant, although their significance is operational rather than strategic (Echevarria II, 2016). The COG also retains military planning importance, evident by the US Army rediscovering the concept and applying it to modern-day warfare (Coker, 2017). This paper will discuss the original understanding of the idea and its current perception.
Clausewitz references the COG throughout his signature work, On War. First, he describes the battle, or the conflict, as the “true center of gravity” (Clausewitz, 2020, p. 248). That definition may be incongruent with how Clausewitz explains the concept later but does not directly contradict it. The COG’s essence is revealed when Clausewitz (2020) discusses a victory’s effect, which is ultimately dependent on how massive and mobile the conquered enemy troops are. Using an analogy from mechanics, the theorist refers to that mass concentration as the COG and concludes that a blow against it will be the most effective (Clausewitz, 2020).
However, those centers of gravity manifest for both sides, meaning that an army will employ its center against the enemy’s, potentially determining the war’s outcome (Clausewitz, 2020). Meanwhile, attacking smaller parts could be a waste of force, and it tends to happen due to limitations associated with assaulting the COG (Clausewitz, 2020). Overall, the COG is the highest concentration of one’s own and enemy force and movement.
While discussing offense, Clausewitz attempts to integrate the concept into the best strategy. He believes that a crucial part of military planning involves identifying the opposing side’s centers of gravity to consequently reduce their number to one (Clausewitz, 2020). For instance, France’s centers are Paris and the military force, so conquering the former or defeating the latter several times in battle will leave a singular COG (Clausewitz, 2020).
Performing both actions will ideally result in France’s defeat because the implication is that the army is divided between the two, so no one will continue waging war from the French side (Clausewitz, 2020). However, the strategy ignores a nation’s plans regarding its enemy, which may not necessarily imply total destruction, and the fact that the military force could be spread across the country (Clausewitz, 2020). Additionally, Clausewitz (2020) infers that if reducing the adversary’s centers of gravity proves impossible, the army is likely participating in two wars, each possessing its unique goal. This understanding brings one to the first definition of the COG as the conflict itself and justifies it.
Clausewitz’s ideas do not apply to every war in existence. Some wars are waged to reach a settlement, and the COG may not occur due to insufficient pressure from both parties, meaning that they purposefully avoid great risks and sacrifices (Clausewitz, 2020). Applying the COG to non-combatant operations, which are common nowadays, would also be challenging, but the same is true for reconceptualizing it to adjust to modern-day warfare.
After rediscovering Clausewitz’s theory, the US military started applying it to various operations worldwide. A notable example would be the Iraq War, where the use of COG was openly considered (Eikmeier, 2017). However, its application was a failure, as evident by the eventual disbandment, meaning that the American forces failed to target the correct COG (Coker, 2017). According to Eikmeier (2017), the choice was between the government and population, and by selecting the former, the US military only provoked more insurgence among the people. The event implied two possible conclusions: Clausewitz’s COG is no longer applicable to modern-day warfare, as the forces acted according to the original concept, and the fact that it requires a different reading considering the altered circumstances.
As previously established, Clausewitz focused on the massiveness of force and movement while describing the COG. However, he could have implied that the focal point is spiritual instead of strictly material, as Russia, for instance, sacrificed its capital and still prevailed in the war against Napoleon (Coker, 2017). Therefore, while the past, which Clausewitz managed to discuss in terms of his concepts, appeared absent of nuance, the contemporary events were more ambiguous, and the current times are radically different. According to Eikmeier (2017), many people criticize the COG, despite its supposed utility. Some believe that the concept has too much ambiguity, which is detrimental to building military plans and advancing the doctrine (Eikmeier, 2017).
Simultaneously, they are also attempting to clarify the COG’s definition and factors contributing to reaching objectives and impacting the operational environment (Eikmeier, 2017). Others deny that the concept has utility and find it completely outdated, not serving any purpose nowadays (Eikmeier, 2017). Out of the two, the former point at least acknowledges some ambiguity, while the latter takes the concept literally and removes nuances associated with COG’s maturity throughout the centuries.
Both positions reflect the current issue with the COG, but abandoning it altogether, as the second one suggests, does not seem sensible. Many military concepts developed by those who predated Clausewitz by centuries, such as Machiavelli and Sun Tzu, remain relevant, although the environment where they were conceived and the present one have nothing in common (Eikmeier, 2017). The same could be said in the COG’s defense, as the idea appears simple – the adversary can be defeated by focusing on a certain point (Echevarria II, 2016). While in the past, the options were limited (the capital or the military force), they can be expanded or rewritten to reflect the new reality.
The failed attempt in Iraq reveals the failure to grasp and apply the concept because the US military did not consider long-term consequences rather than its inherent faultiness. Therefore, reworking the COG may benefit future operations considering the extant utility.
In conclusion, Clausewitz’s COG is a crucial element in warfare, playing a significant role in determining a conflict’s outcome. While originally it was the battle itself or a concentrated mass manifested in the military force or the capital, the concept can be subject to expansion, as evident by more recent wars. Sometimes the COG may be absent due to the scale being small or the goal not pursuing total destruction. Nowadays, the idea is more nuanced than ever, and following Clausewitz’s words literally might be reckless. The concept is still updating but whether it will be required to perform staggering operations in the future remains a mystery.
References
Clausewitz, C. von. (2020). On war. Sanage Publishing House.
Coker, C. (2017). Rebooting Clausewitz: ‘On War’ in the twenty-first century. Oxford University Press.
Echevarria II, A. J. (2016). Strategic thought: The relevance of Clausewitz. In G. Kassimeris & J. Buckley (Eds.), The Ashgate research companion to modern warfare (pp. 17-30). Routledge.
Eikmeier, D. C. (2017). The center of gravity: Still relevant after all those years? Army University Press. Web.