The account by Erik Larson of the catastrophic hurricane that hit Galveston in September 1900 is a riveting investigation into what caused this storm to be so destructive. With between 6,000 and 12,000 fatalities, the Galveston hurricane is still regarded as the greatest natural disaster in American history. Despite his shortcomings as a scientist, Isaac, rather than his brother, is remembered as the Paul Revere whom alerted villagers to evacuate before the hurricane hit. Larson is a famous American non-fiction journalist, and the story of the hurricane is his real-life study. The author’s intended purpose is to show readers bureaucratic stupidity in times of disaster. The author explains this by saying that bureaucratic squabbles led to the fact that the meteorologist left the city without warning of the extent of the storm, which led to a significant disaster. By examining the superiority complex of the directors of the U. S. weather bureau towards the Cuban weather forecasters, the Weather Bureau’s disregard to ship captains’ concerns, and Isaac Cline’s over self confidence in forecasting the weather, Erik Larson argued “the hubris of men led them to believe they could disregard even nature itself.”
Erik Larson contended the Weather Bureau’s directors’ superiority complex toward the Cuban Meteorologists. They ignored the concerns expressed by ship captains and trusted Isaac Cline’s overconfidence in weather forecasting (Larson 22). In Larson’s view, which he clearly expresses in his book, human pride has eclipsed common sense and allowed people to think that they can safely ignore nature (Larson 34). Although Larson makes a point of blaming the men who could and should have foreseen the storm’s course and could have prevented thousands of deaths, even if these claims are unquestionably true. The overarching message of Isaac’s Storm is undoubtedly that human hubris will inevitably lead to their destruction. Isaac Cline, the head of the Galveston station of the United States Weather Bureau, is the focus of the narrative. Cline, a prominent meteorologist and college professor, was frequently taken at his word on weather patterns and forecasts (Larson 9). However, in 1891, Cline made the terrible error of allowing his own conceit to stand in the way of saving the city (Larson 13). This led to a massive disaster, which he remembers to this day.
The story describes the scientific basis for hurricane forecasting and the occurrence of this particular type of tropical storm. It discusses the peculiar environmental characteristics of Texas in 1900, explaining how they facilitated the tragedy (Larson 23). Larson first posits theories on the potential driving forces behind storm’s genesis. Larson claims that Cuban meteorologists have provided the most accurate data on a possible hurricane (Larson 47). He does this on the basis of telegrams and letters created after the disaster and describing the mistakes of scientists. Cuban meteorologists made a valiant effort to persuade the US Weather Bureau that a hurricane was likely to form, move toward southern Texas, decimate any communities in its path, and then dissipate further inland. Cuba’s information was disregarded by the Weather Bureau because they thought the storm would bend more sharply and approach Florida’s western coast after losing a lot of its momentum abroad.
Larson continues by reenacting what a number of Galveston residents would have gone through the night just before disaster. Sources claim that as the storm neared, it began to softly flood the streets (Larson 23). It annoyed the locals but appearing to be nothing out of the usual because such tropical storms were frequent in the late summer. The locals took minimal health or safety precautions because Isaac’s false assurances that the storm would roll over rather harmlessly had already calmed them down.
After a few hours, the amount of rain and wind started to pick up. Cline himself had stated in an article from 1891 that “the coast of Texas is according to the general laws of the motion of the atmosphere exempt from West India hurricanes (Larson 34). Nine years later, he was unaware that the steady rise in sea level and the sharp decline in the barometer were the signs of something more than a typical Gulf storm approaching Galveston. The Weather Service in Washington, which was run with an iron fist by Willis Moore, an ambitious administrator who disliked breaking bad news, encouraged his ignorance.
Larson claims he thought the tension in the brother’ relationship was general knowledge and he had no literary reason to twist the facts: It would’ve been an equally fantastic narrative if they have not been enemies, but you’ve resorted to calling them like you see them. Larson claims that one powerful specialist, Neil Frank, dubbed the Babe Ruth of storms by Fincher revealed the competition to him. When asked where he got his information regarding the brothers’ legendary silence, he replied to Frank and a story in the Southwestern Quarterly.
Neither is mentioned as a basis for the material in the book. Larson claims that he, in Fincher, closely examined both men’s writings but also that the tensions are palpable (Larson 31). There was a constant tension between Isaac and Joseph, which he convincingly showed through the use of curt phrases, averting glances, and implicit accusations. The disaster established a standard that influenced meteorological science in the future and sparked political support for the precise surveillance and reporting of the weather and climate dynamics. Larson closes the book on a positive note, noting that Galveston was able to raise its basic sea level and largely restore the city to its pre-revolutionary state. Although Houston subsequently replaced it as the principal commercial port city in Texas, the tale of its comeback has become a well-known representation of American tenacity.
In the years following the terrible storm, Galveston saw a rapid municipal transformation. The US Army’s Corps of Engineers built a seawall that is 17 feet tall. The city started a large-scale grade-raising. A large Catholic church, among the 2000 remaining buildings, was lifted up and had sand pumped underneath them. The grade-raising and the seawall were both recognized as modern engineering wonders. On Galveston Island, no one ever brought up the storm of 1900 for decades. Former state senator Babe Schwartz, a renowned figure in Galveston, observed that the individuals who escaped the storm were somewhat of like those who survived a war.
The book has some factual errors, but in general, it reflects the exact data of what happened, which fits it into the framework of the story. As a result of this tragedy, the policy of reaction to possible catastrophes was revised. From the lectures, I learned to look at historical events through the prism of real facts and interviews. Since few people were in charge of the city’s politics during the storm, it was a mistake to overlook the magnitude of the disaster. As a result, emergency response groups began to form after the hurricane. The book was a good guide and showed that during this hurricane the authorities reacted worse than during Harvey, where measures were taken immediately. The authorities are learning from the past and improving the system and information agencies provide more open data without trying to hide the extent of the tragedy. Thus, Larson showed how dangerous it can be to decide to wait out a hurricane without preparation.
References
Larson, Erik. Isaac’s storm: A man, a time, and the deadliest hurricane in history. Vintage, 2000.