Introduction
Human trafficking and kidnapping are severe crimes characterized by involuntary servitude and causing harm to a person or using an individual for forced labor. The cases of this crime are numerous since the decisions differ depending on the perspectives and interpretation of the laws. This critical analysis focuses on People v. Chessman, which represents a kidnapping case resulting in capital punishment. The decision in the People v. Chessman case is compared to an alternative ruling in the People v. Daniels case. It is argued that the interpretation of the potential harm caused by the movement of the victims and the implications of the movement for the crime predetermine the decision in kidnapping cases.
Facts
The case People v. Chessman entails a crime committed by Caryl Chessman in California. The man committed a robbery of a couple using a gun to threaten the victims. A man and a woman were held at gunpoint and robbed, after which Chessman forced the woman to walk to his car. There, he made her “submit to his sexual demands” (Diamond, 1985, p. 6). The distance that the robber forced the woman to walk to his car was 22 feet, which was the distance recognized by California criminal law as a sufficient distance for the forced movement to be considered kidnapping (Diamond, 1985). Thus, the facts of this case indicate the presence of such assaults as robbery, sexual violation, and kidnapping.
Decision
The decision, in this case, held that Caryl Chessman would be sentenced to death given the aggravated kidnapping. In this case, the decision was particularly predetermined by the presence of the kidnapping actions in the criminal’s demeanor. Indeed, according to Diamond (1985), “the ruling was quite significant since the robbery and sexual violations would not have permitted the court to impose capital punishment on Chessman” (p. 6). Since the original intention of the criminal was robbery, the lack of the victim’s movement would not lead to a death sentence. However, since kidnapping was considered a capital crime in California at the time of the case, the criminal was executed in 1960 (Diamond, 1985). The decision was made correctly based on the facts of the crime and the implications of Chessman’s actions. Indeed, since he forcefully moved the victim from the place of the robbery to his car at a distance recognized by law as sufficient for being labeled kidnapping, the crime was indicated correctly. Moreover, the harm of such forceful movement was caused since Chessman committed sexual assault against the robbed woman as a result of his kidnapping actions.
Alternative Solution
However, an alternative solution might have been made given the context of the criminal cases on similar offenses. Indeed, a relevant case for comparison of decisions might be People v. Daniels. In this case, the court decided not to impose the charges of aggravated kidnapping due to the lack of harm intended on the victim based on the forced movement. In particular, if victims’ movement is “incidental to the commission of the robbery and does not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself” (Diamond, 1985, p. 6). Thus, in Daniels’ case, the movement was not considered kidnapping since it was inherent in the robbery, while Chessman’s case contained intended harm external to the robbery. Therefore, such an alternative decision might have been applied if no sexual assault had been committed.
Conclusion
In summation, the critical analysis of the facts and decisions in the People v. Chessman case revealed the presence of kidnapping offenses under Californian law. The offender was sentenced to capital punishment, given the kidnapping and intentional harm as a result of it. However, the comparison with an alternative case of Daniels, where the forced movement was not considered kidnapping, demonstrates that the interpretation of harm intended by the forced movement of a victim might be decisive in sentencing.
References
Diamond, J. L. (1985). Kidnapping: A modern definition. American Journal of Criminal Law, 13, 1–38.