It is widely known that a characteristic feature of U.S. constitutional law is its doctrinal inconsistency. To help those interested in constitutional law, Stearns (2020) published his article on conflicting premises in U.S. constitutional law. The author explains that the inconsistency is due to dual prerequisites found in most U.S. legal institutions, whether the separation of powers or the right to equal protection. He does not speculate about when these inconsistencies will end but offers readers a critical look at the cause-effect mechanism of such discrepancies (Stearns, 2020). The author addresses how the Supreme Court’s decisions using the black letter doctrine exemplify inconsistencies (Stearns, 2020). Moreover, the source shows how the inconsistencies in free speech provisions, the Commerce Clause, and other instances can be resolved depending on who is in power.
By getting acquainted with the selected source, the audience will develop a more detailed understanding of the inconsistencies and inter-precedent connections. Since the abandonment of precedents is a rare phenomenon, every student needs to know the fundamental interplay between the older and newer provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The selection of issues addressed in the article is vast, ranging from conflicting premises in race-related, equality, and structural law to the so-called constitutional hybrid cases, allowing readers to develop an understanding of how constitutional-level law intersects with the other fields of law (Stearns, 2020). This study will be helpful to students who want to understand what causes several doctrinal inconsistencies in constitutional law thoroughly (Stearns, 2020). No specialized knowledge in the legal field is necessary to comprehend the article in its entirety. It is common for students to develop adequate legal inconsistency identification skills after completing the first year of study, so the source is appropriate for this audience.
Reference
Stearns, M. L. (2020). Constitutional law’s conflicting premises. Notre Dame Law Review, 96(2), 447-512.