The United States and Japan were at conflict long before the attack of Pearl Harbor by Japan on December 7, 1941. 1 In particular, there existed conditions that were multiple at different levels that merged to form potential rivalry between the United States and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s. The new world had undergone important changes in power distribution of power within the international system especially in the first two decades of the 20th Century. The end of First World War brought about structural changes that were rapid and of different forms. For instance, the new world after the WW I experienced de-concentration of power as the hegemony held by Great Britain ceased to exist. The new system moved towards a multi-polar system consisting of several great powers with relatively equal influence, thereby, causing potential conflict over global leadership. This paper describes the conflict between the United States and Japan before the Second World War, and the ongoing negotiations that preceded the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.2
The United States and Japan experienced unprecedented rivalry at the end of World War II. The rapid structural changes that the world experienced meant that several countries especially the United states and Japan to undergo critical points in the power cycles. These changes brought about increased; uncertainty, anxiety, perceptions, and propensity for risk taking. 3 On this note, Japan was considered by the United States as the only nation that could threaten it after the end of World War I. Therefore, there were a number of reasons that conflict between the U.S. and Japan, hence, culminating to Pearl Harbor attack on December 7th, 1941 by Japan. Prominent these reasons, was due to intractable territorial issues especially the occupation of Manchuria and China by Japan. Intransigence on territorial matters resulted to the use of tactics of coercive bargaining by both sides. This led to the hardening of positions by both sides, hence, enhancing the use of more coercive bargaining behavior and greater risk taking. The main conflict between the U.S. and China centered over the issue of China. 4 As the conflict continued to escalate over the decade between 1931 and 1941, both countries learnt that a resolution of war was the only option.
United States had done little as of1940 except trying to attain two objectives in the Far East, those of splitting the axis and of halting Japan’s advance southward through mild economic pressure and political protests. The U.S. had not contemplated going to war with Japan by the end of 1940. In 1941, Roosevelt unveiled a new component in its Far East foreign policy, that is, the independence of China. In addition, he followed this shift in political emphasis by hardening its economic policy towards Japan. This policy was endorsed by the Economic Defense Board of the U.S. in mid-September 1941. 5 These actions in all likelihood made Japan regard the total embargo as an incitement to war. Moreover, the American public opinion was in agreement with this shift in policy. Nevertheless, more concern to Roosevelt was that the public opposed a unilateral declaration of war against Japan unless the country was attacked.
Roosevelt, having unwittingly introduced economic actions that might provoke Japan to wedge a war, and understanding that the public opinion was on his side, directed his Secretary of State, to compound the situation in private negotiations with Japanese representatives in Washington. The first meeting took place between Hull and Nomura on November 1941. In this meeting, knew the terms Nomura would present because the U.S. had broken the Japanese code. He took advantage of the Japanese ambassador poor English to dismiss the two reports that he had presented.
Footnotes
- Cimbala, Politics of Warfare (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press), 109.
- Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Maturation (New York: Routledge), 45
- Cimbala, Politics of Warfare (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press), 108.
- Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Maturation (New York: Routledge), 45
- Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Maturation (New York: Routledge), 45