Introduction
Judith Jarvis Thomson is a philosophy professor who actively advocates for abortion and giving mothers control over their bodies. In her arguments, she mainly starts from the concepts of morality that underlie the choice of each individual. Since this topic is quite controversial, the professor’s position raises significant societal discussions. Therefore, this paper analyzes the examples provided by Thomson to justify her position and evaluates possible counterarguments.
The Use of Examples in Arguing in Support of Abortion
To argue his position, Professor Thomson uses various examples and allusions. One example is a scenario in which a famous violinist with kidney disease requires a blood transfusion (Thomson 71). Moreover, only the blood of one specific person, to whom he will be connected for nine months, is suitable for him. This example challenges the personality argument that is common among abortion opponents. This concept implies that the fetus is a separate person, which means that deliberately ending its life is morally wrong and amounts to murder. Thomson recognizes that the fetus is a person and that all people have the right to life (Thomson 70). However, one individual’s use of another as a source of life raises moral questions.
It adheres to the principle that every person has the right to life, and at the same time, everyone has the right to make their own moral choices. The professor argues that despite the kindness it would be to help the violinist, staying connected is not morally necessary (Thomson 72). In other words, it is morally permissible to say “no” and go offline, which means that doing so will not be considered morally wrong.
The right to life does not imply the right to receive life support from another person. In this example, the violinist is a fetus that uses the mother’s vital resources for nine months. At the same time, Thomson emphasizes that a woman has the right to independently decide whether to preserve the fetus and whether to continue its “blood supply,” considering potential complications. This argument may seem very convincing since it does not imply viewing abortion as murder but as a person’s right to independently dispose of his own body.
Another notable factor in this example is that blood donation was not a conscious decision by the individual. In the scenario proposed by the professor, the Society of Music Lovers decided that the correct solution was to use one individual to ensure the viability of another (Thomson 71). It can be compared with society’s position regarding pregnancy and the woman’s role in it. Moreover, neither the violinist nor the donor is an active agent in this situation, reflecting the restrictions others impose.
At the same time, positioning the woman as a passive element in this scenario may raise objections to Thompson’s violinist example. One example is voluntary pregnancy, when a woman consciously assumes responsibility and moral obligations for the life support of the fetus. In this view, a voluntary commitment creates a moral obligation to fulfill agreed-upon obligations, and withdrawal of support may be seen as violating that obligation. In this case, the decision to become pregnant is not imposed by society, and the fetus ceases to be an unfamiliar “violinist,” which raises more moral issues.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the example given by Professor Thomson is quite illustrative. It emphasizes the relationship between woman and fetus, for which the mother’s body acts as a source of life support. However, the “violinist” example demonstrates a scenario in which the woman does not actively participate and does not consent to another individual’s connection to her circulatory system. Therefore, in the case of voluntary pregnancy, this example is more controversial since it is associated with greater moral responsibility.
Work Cited
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion.” Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics (5th ed.), edited by Ronald Munson, Belmont; Wadsworth 1996, pp. 69-80.