People often face various moral challenges, such as whether controversial acts like torturing someone can be justified under certain circumstances. Torture is the intentional and deliberate infliction of physical pain and is internationally prohibited by the Geneva Convention Against Torture (Berenpas 44; Dershowitz 116). Nonetheless, many countries find ways to utilize the practice in the name of the greater good, such as saving nations (Dershowitz 117). Accordingly, a moral premise here is that torturing people causes them immense pain, but some individuals must be tortured to save others’ lives. Nonetheless, one can argue that there is not a valid need for torture because the main reason is delusional, and torturing generates more harm.
To understand why there are no proper grounds for torture, one should consider why and how some people justify the action. In the modern world, torture is typically excused as a way of intelligence gathering in the “ticking time bomb” scenario when lives can be saved only by tormenting someone else (Luban 1436; Berenpas 45). Moreover, Dershowitz proposes that torturing terrorists may be a beneficial process if it is based on formally acquiring a judicial warrant (135). However, Luban argues that the ticking-bomb situation in a manner it is usually presented to justify torture is unlikely to happen and should not form the point of reference (1444). Berenpas states that the scenario is a “philosophical thought experiment” that does not reflect reality’s complexity and ambiguity but generates a false dichotomy (47). For instance, the proponents of torture claim it is necessary because the ticking-bomb case requires choosing between the terrorist and people’s lives, but real situations offer other options, such as evacuating the city (Berenpas 47). Consequently, the most widely way of excusing torture is impractical, thus making the need for the action worthless.
In addition to having no valid necessity to torture someone, one must consider that the process causes more harm than good. First, making a person, even a terrorist, suffer to obtain information is likely to be useless. For example, Aristotle argues that the truthfulness of evidence obtained from torture is questionable because one may lie in hopes of being sooner released from torment (Berenpas 45). Consequently, the torturer may not receive helpful knowledge but will violate basic liberties because torture disregards “the right to have the body” (Berenpas 44). Moreover, the process of torturing dehumanizes people because it is addressed to the animal nature of a person and turns the victim into “a terrified, defecating, urinating, screaming animal” (Murphy 233). Accordingly, torture also breaches Kant’s principle of never treating others as a mere means to an end, as the action degrades an individual and takes away their freedom (Berenpas 46; Murphy 233). Therefore, even if it may not cause physical death, torture damages the one undergoing the suffering and jeopardizes the morality of the one inflicting pain while not guaranteeing positive or useful outcomes.
To summarize, there is no valid reason for torture because the primary modern justification is unrealistic, and the process generates more drawbacks. The most commonly used contemporary excuse for torturing is based on the “ticking time bomb” scenario, but the case’s situation is unlikely to happen in real life where there are other options to save people. Moreover, tormenting someone to gain knowledge does not assure that the information will be trustworthy, but the torture process will violate human rights and undermine one’s identity. Therefore, torture cannot be properly justified and is not necessary for modern society.
Works Cited
Berenpas, Martine. “The Ethics of Torture.” Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource, edited by Noah Levin, NGE Far Press, 2019, pp. 44-49.
Dershowitz, Alan. Why Terrorism Works. Yale University Press. 2002.
Luban, David. “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb.” Virginia Law Review Association, vol. 91, 2005, pp. 1425-1461.
Murphy, Jeffrie. Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. D. Reidel Publishing Company. 1979.