Introduction
An abortion belongs to one of the most controversial issues discussed in modern society. Many philosophers, researchers, and scientists have explored the question of whether it is morally just to kill a fetus and other topic-related problems. Judith Jarvis Thomson who is a US philosopher and member of the American Philosophical Society has also contributed to the discussion of abortions. In her article A Defense of Abortion, Thomson has managed to write on this serious theme with wit and humor making it interesting to read and easy to follow. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the philosopher’s position and the argument in favor of the claim as well as to analyze them.
Author’s Position
At the beginning of the work, Thomson dwells on the views of opponents of abortion. For most of them, the main task is to prove that a fetus is a human being from the moment of conception. The further logic chain is clear and understandable for those who are against performing abortions. However, it does not seem to be simple and obvious for the philosopher (Thomson 39). According to her, the topic is complicated and needs closer examination (Thomson 39). Even the idea that a fetus might be regarded as a human being from conception seems vague to the author. She compares the development of a set of human cells into a newborn baby with acorns and oak trees (Thomson 40). Although an acorn can grow into an oak, it does not mean that these two things are the same (Thomson 40). Thus, admitting that the theme is difficult and involves many additional issues, Thomson expresses herself in favor of abortions.
Reconstruction of the Argument
The author begins proving her claim by demonstrating the weakness of her opponents’ main argument. By reverse of logic, the philosopher pretends to accept the idea that performing abortions is impermissible because a fetus is a person and has a right to live (Thomson 41). Then, Thompson gives the following example: after getting pregnant, a woman learns that she has a cardiac condition and in case of carrying the baby to the term, she will die. Following the logic of those who demand to prohibit abortions, this woman should not have the pregnancy terminated for the fetus has the right to life. However, as the lady is a human being, it is just to say that she should live, too. Hence, Thomson states that they both have equal rights for living.
Moreover, it is generally accepted that women are allowed to decide what happens in and to their bodies. Since pregnancy develops in a female’s organism, it belongs to such issues. Therefore, it turns out that the woman from the above example has more rights than the fetus; the author wonders ironically if they should be summed. This is how the philosopher ruins her opponents’ major premise against abortion and shows that in certain situations, claims that seem to be true are inapplicable.
Reaction to the Argument
In my opinion, the argument described above might be seen as a strong one because it supports the author’s position. Indeed, many people striving to prove that a fetus should live to forget that a pregnant woman is also a human being, hence, she has the right to live, too. Furthermore, it might be claimed that a female’s life is in some sense, worthier than a fetus’s one because a lady has relatives and friends who would mourn her if she died. A woman might also work and thus, be useful to society. Even if terminating a pregnancy is not a question of a female’s death or life, it should not be forgotten that every person has the right to decide on what happens to her body.
Conclusion
To sum up, Judith Jarvis Thomson expresses herself in defend of abortions. She argues that not only the life of an unborn child but also that one of the pregnant women matters. In addition, the philosopher supported the position by reminding of the fact that each woman can make independent decisions on her body issues. This argument seems to be strong for it supports the author’s claim.
Work Cited
Thomson, J. J. (1976). A defense of abortion. In Biomedical ethics and the law (pp. 39-54). Springer, Boston, MA.