Analysis of the U.S. Nuclear Attack on Japan

Introduction

The attack of the U.S. on Hiroshima was one of the most devastating military actions in human history. Nowadays, the historians still discuss whether it was done in order to force Japan to surrender, or to intimidate the USSR. Different sources reflect different sides of the situations and present it from various points of view. The analysis of letters, minutes, memoirs, and radio speeches of people who took an active part in the planning of this action shows that it was not so necessary at that stage of war. Thus, if Japan would have surrendered anyways, the bombing had some other additional objectives.

The Necessity of Bombing

The necessity of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a question for discussion. On the one hand, Japanese troops were famous for their readiness to fight to death. Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of War, reported that Japan had a strong army, and only the complete destruction of its military force could lead to peace¹. Thus, a nuclear attack was aimed to reduce possible losses of the U.S. army, as long as the war could last for half a year more, according to the prognoses.

Petition of scientists

However, a range of sources reports that there was no real necessity to use nuclear weapons against Japan. It can be proved, for example, by the words of General H.H. Arnold, Commander of the American Army Air Force in the Second World War. He said that Japan was at the verge of collapse, “atomic bomb or no atomic bomb” ². According to the petition of the U.S. scientists who developed the nuclear bomb, it was an effective way to put the war to its end³. However, they did not support the usage of the nuclear bomb at that stage of war, as it seemed an unnecessary devastation of cities. The scientist also argued that the resort of the bomb by the U.S. would bring it to the responsibility for opening the era of nuclear wars. Thus, the usage of the bomb at such stage of war when it was obvious that Japan was going to surrender was considered to be an unnecessary and even harmful for the U.S reputation act.

USSR’s Reaction

If bombing was not as necessary for the Japan’s surrender as it could be, then there should have been other reasons for it. One of the main reasons that seems logical and is supported by some documents is the intimidation of the USSR. According to Dwight D. Eisenhower, President Truman should have carefully watched the balance of forces in Europe and Japan⁴. The Soviet aid in Japan did not seem to be really wanted by the U.S., as it could create the situation in which the interests of the U.S. in Japan would be interfered.

Truman and Churchill’s reflections on Stalin’s reaction

Eisenhower advised President Truman to prevent the getting of Soviet troops in Japan. Thus, some active measures should have been taken, which turned out to be nuclear bombing. This point of view was shared by Winston S. Churchill. In his recollections of news receiving during Potsdam Conference, he mentions that they “should not need the Russians” ⁵. He says that the U.S. also does not want the participation of the USSR in the Japanese campaign. Thus, before the bomb the victory in Japan depended on the Soviet troops, whereas the nuclear attack changed the force balance greatly, having made the U.S. independent from Russian aid.

However, some sources report that many U.S. representatives were fearing of hostility that could lie between the U.S. and the USSR in case if they do not inform them about the success of the Manhattan project. For example, among the people who shared this opinion there were the writers of the Frank Report and Scientific Panel. It seemed necessary to tell the USSR about the new weapon in order to increase the level of trust between the allies. It was done, although very little information was given to Stalin by Truman concerning the bomb. The eyewitnesses of their dialogue reported about the surprise that they felt seeing Stalin’s reaction. He did not ask any questions about the bomb and just wished luck with using it against Japan. Truman and Churchill as well as their interpreters reported that Stalin did not show any special interest concerning the weapon. Thus, on the other hand, the USSR was informed about the bomb, but from the point of view of Americans it seemed that at that moment the scale of its power was not fully realized by the politics.

Zhukov’s point of view

Nevertheless, Georgi Zhukov reported that Stalin fully realized the significance of the nuclear bomb discovery. Zhukov assumed that the U.S. developed the bomb in order to achieve its goals from the position of strength in the Cold war. Thus, although the American sources do not say it directly, the USSR perceived its actions as a hidden threat and as the beginning of a Cold war.

Bibliography

Arnold, Henry. Memoirs of General H. H. Arnold in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?, (1949).

Churchill, Winston. “British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s recollections of news received during the Potsdam Conference” in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?. (1953).

Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Recollections of a July l9th Meeting with President Harry S Truman” in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?, (1948).

Stimson, Henry Lewis. “The Decision to Use the Bomb” in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?, (1947).

U.S. National Archives. Szilard Petition, First Version in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure? (1945).

Footnotes

1. Henry Lewis Stimson. “The Decision to Use the Bomb” in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?, (1947), 2.
2. Henry Arnold. Memoirs of General H. H. Arnold in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?, (1949), 3.
3. U.S. National Archives. Szilard Petition, First Version in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure? (1945), 5.
4. Dwight D. Eisenhower. “Recollections of a July l9th Meeting with President Harry S Truman” in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?, (1948), 3.
5. Winston Churchill. “British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s recollections of news received during the Potsdam Conference” in The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: A Military Measure?. (1953), 4.