Although wars are rare occurrences even under the best conditions, they are triggered by the various factors which prevent competing states from negotiating successfully and settling the outstanding issues. International politics is a considerably small and anarchical environment where bargaining, compromises, and arrangements are the primary mode of political interaction. This implies that states are analogous to multiple sovereign units, each with definite functions and concerns, such as advancing their security and wealth (Levy and Thompson 2010). The resulting uncertainty and competing interests render international systems inherently conflictual. In this regard, self-interests primarily drive countries’ interaction, and violent confrontation ranks among the possible bargaining tools to advance their affairs, particularly when compromise is unfeasible. Although the egoistic, competitive, and conflictual nature of states precipitates confrontations, it is the breakdown and failure of bargaining, which triggers wars.
War entails an armed conflict in which different countries engage in violent aggression, destruction, and active hostility to fulfill a particular objective. Throughout history, armed confrontations are mainly the result of various factors, including the warring parties’ geographical proximity, power parity, and alliances (Bremer 1992). For instance, states with radically different power balances are unlikely to wage war due to the weaker side’s disadvantage (Bremer 1992). However, the costs and risks associated with wars deter nations from hostilities, with parties opting to reach negotiated settlements instead of escalating the conflict to a violent encounter (Fearon 1995). This implies that despite the presence of all elements which could trigger hostilities, nations are naturally inclined to bargain for mutually acceptable resolutions due to the detrimental ramifications brought about by wars. Consequently, the realist’s assertion that the struggle for scarce resources and the desire for domination are the causes of war is flawed. Therefore, states exclusively opt for violent aggressions when bargaining becomes unfeasible or impractical.
Additionally, international politics are anarchical and characterized by the absence of common rule-making and enforcing authority. Waltz (1988) argues that, in the absence of a legitimate global force, countries utilize all skills to compete with and adjust to the pressures of their interactions to flourish and thrive. Consequently, the dynamics of their engagement determine their behavior and predict the outcome of their conduct. According to Waltz (1988), the global political arena is essentially a self–help platform where each state is responsible for its survival, reflecting the unavoidability of war under the uncontrolled system. The resultant obsession with identifying and counteracting threats generates a conflict of interests, resulting in tension and uneasiness. However, Levy and Thompson (2010) posit that an armed hostility will only erupt when deterrence measures fail and where one state believes that it can only achieve its objectives through military action. Subsequently, countries are inclined to exhaust the available peaceful avenues before spiraling the conflict against each other, despite the desire to accomplish self-interests.
Moreover, countries will only trigger such violent confrontations when the results are explicit, and there exist no other reliable means of achieving their interests. Lopez and Johnson (2017) assert that states initially prefer achieving the maximum possible benefits without paying a cost. This implies that where a state initiates a war to pursue a given objective and succeeds, the gained benefit equals the value of the acquired target minus the associated expenditures. Conversely, realists argue that countries often engage in war when competing against a rival over a scarce resource of pursuing some other egotistical interests. Where negotiations would allow states to obtain an equivalent value of the interests or targeted proceeds, they would exploit that avenue due to the minimum financial and other associated repercussions. In this regard, rational leaders utilize diplomacy and other communication forms as the initial dispute resolution option instead of armed conflicts.
When encountered with conflicting interests, countries evaluate various mechanisms to reach a negotiated settlement with preferable outcomes for both parties. Fearon (1995) argues that there always exists a combination of negotiated settlements, which conflicting parties prefer instead of fighting. This implies that bargaining is the initial recourse as it provides multiple positive options, which leave both sides in a better position without risking the uncertainties and inefficiencies of war. In contrast, realists argue that countries are primarily driven by their interests and benefits accruing to their opponents, jeopardizing their concerns such as security or dominance. Subsequently, countries will always enter into aggression instead of opting to peacefully split the object of their disagreement since such negotiations will spread the benefits to the hostile partners (Fearon 1995). Moreover, striking bargained agreements may be impeded by multiple factors, including the indivisibility of the dispute’s object. From this perspective, a conflict can be deemed as the farthest option in the bargaining process and often follow the inability to reach a mutually respectable position by the two parties.
Further, uncertainties and the resultant incentive to misrepresent privately held information cumulatively contribute to the escalation of disagreements into wars. This implies that informational disparities regarding the various aspects of the negotiation process significantly influence the bargaining process and the war behaviors of the parties. More specifically, countries embroiled in a conflict may be unable to identify mutually acceptable settlement terms due to the existence of confidential information and the possible benefits incentivizing nondisclosure. Additionally, the reluctance to disseminate such details to the other party impedes the conclusion of a peaceful agreement, leading to the escalation of the conflict into a violent encounter. According to Lopez–Fresno, Palmira, and Miranda (2018), bargaining is a communication process between parties, which fosters mutual interests, minimizes disparities, and allows countries to accommodate each other’s demands. As a result, the building of integrative bargaining depends significantly on the created environment of trust, the absence of which generates a climate of distrust and the eventual spiraling into armed aggression.
In international relationships, credible commitment issues hamper negotiating parties’ ability to trust one another regarding the rival’s undertaking to uphold the mutually beneficial peace bargain. Where one party enjoys an incentive to renege on an agreement, the other member in the negotiation may be discouraged from engaging in such arrangements and opt for war instead. From a realist’s perspective, states as rational actors, are considerably inclined towards choosing a present-day exorbitantly priced lottery, despite the uncertainty of the outcome over a bargained future occurrence due to the declining negotiating leverage. This perspective depicts the realist’s claim that dissenting parties cannot resist exploiting the advantages of changes in the bargaining leverage due to their egoism. For instance, where combatants resolve to disarm, one side may initiate an armed fight once the other party disarms since the latter is now at a disadvantageous position. This indicates that commitment challenges encountered in the bargaining process may lead to aggressive confrontations since the shifting power points may adversely impact the negotiated outcomes.
Conclusively, the bargaining and realist theories provide the most valid explanations of why armed struggle occurs between countries. While the former argues that conflicts escalate between parties due to factors that inhibit the competitors from negotiating effectively, the latter posits that competing interests between states are the major cause of war. Although humans rank among the most cooperative animal species, they are characterized by the distinctive degeneration into violent confrontations. However, wars are rare occurrences and states exhaustively evaluate the pursuit of peace instead of intentionally opting for armed antagonism. As a socially inferior outcome, battles are generated by uncertainties and incentives to misrepresent, indivisibility, and credible commitment challenges, which cumulatively impede successful bargaining. As a result, active hostility is precipitated by the failures which impede the successful negotiation of a mutually acceptable settlement between parties.
References
Bremer, Stuart. A. 1992. “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816−1965.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (2): 309−41.
Fearon, James. D. 1995. “Rationalists Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 379−414.
Levy, Jack. S, and William R. Thompson. 2010. Causes of War. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
Lopez, Anthony C., and Dominic D.P. Johnson. 2020. “The Determinants of War in International Relations.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 178: 983-997. Web.
Lopez–Fresno, Palmira, Taina Savolainen, and Miranda Silvia. 2018. “Role of Trust in Integrative Negotiations.” The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, 16 (1), 13-22.
Waltz, Kenneth. J. 1988. “Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (4): 615−628.