Introduction
The People’s Republic of China has significantly improved its economic capabilities over the past 40 years, reflected in the Chinese army and the global balance of power shift. The international system is under strain, and the United States is confronted with conflict and competition with two major nuclear powers simultaneously for the first time in its history. The US must ensure that its military and capabilities are far superior to all potential enemies and that the focus is on deterrence rather than active conflict.
China’s Military Rise: History and Threats
China started massively modernizing its armed forces in 2015 to create a manageable and compact army while removing excessive bureaucratic burdens and transmission chains. China is threatened by the region, as shown by its active military buildup. They are being tested at Chinese training facilities with new tanks and weapons. Due to China’s new rules enabling the use of force in disputed areas, tension has only risen.
Beijing’s official doctrine of the “Three Wars” directs its global hybrid war, which employs political, psychological, and media tools to sway public opinion (Simón, 2020). The interpretation of disputed sea waters as Chinese violating the current UN Convention on the Law of the Sea threatens a potential armed conflict with Japan or the United States (Chase et al., 2017). Similarly, China’s “On Land Borders” law, which denotes the PRC’s intention to define its borders, raises the possibility of conflict with India and other neighbors, notably the Russian Federation.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) developed a new military doctrine that prioritizes overthrowing the enemy’s information systems, and this was one of the critical development vectors. The doctrine gives cyber troops a significant role and forces the enemy into a different type of confrontation where any military advantage can be neutralized by interfering with control systems. In 2015, the Strategic Support Forces—space troops responsible for cyber warfare—were established as part of the reform (Houlden et al., 2021). There is also the PLA’s Department of Network Systems, which is responsible for managing cyberwarfare.
China intends to increase its nuclear arsenal, which has 200 warheads as of now, by at least twofold over the next ten years. China is also advancing encryption and data protection technologies, mainly by applying quantum cryptography. The strategy’s success in eliminating Hong Kong’s autonomy suggests that China may do the same for Taiwan under the current Anti-Separatism Law, which underlines Beijing’s determination to take control of the island (Houlden et al., 2021). Moreover, as part of the military’s modernization push, AI is used in logistics, warfare, training, command and control, and automatic target recognition.
Constructing foreign military bases is another justification for China’s increasing danger. The first base in Djibouti, which became operational on August 1, 2017, is close to the Dorale port (Kania & Costello, 2020). China is constructing a second overseas naval base in Pakistan, on the Jiwani Peninsula, close to the deep-water port of Gwadar. China’s naval bases may eventually be in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Additionally, Beijing’s maritime expansion may reach the Atlantic Ocean thanks to plans to build a naval base close to the Bata port in Equatorial Guinea, which the Chinese built.
The establishment should respond to China’s rising power since the US claims to be the main power and the global guarantor of peace and stability. The USA should implement a defense strategy as its first step, focusing in particular on boosting the military power of its nation and the democratic states of the eastern region. The current practice of giving Taiwan defensive weapons in case of a Chinese attack illustrates this. It is worth noting that the USA should refrain from actively promoting the militarization of Taiwan because this can only lead to increased tension between the states. In the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the US should take all necessary measures to prevent the attack but refrain from directly engaging in combat.
In addition to military measures, the US should also resort to diplomacy and economic levers of influence. In the case of relations between the US and China, these two aspects are interconnected since the states profess different values – the US is a democratic state, while in China, authoritarianism; accordingly, the primary method of influence is the economy. Such measures may include sanctions, tariffs, and trade restrictions. Concerning diplomacy, the USA’s primary strategy should be to negotiate with the democratic countries of the Eastern region, such as Japan, South Korea, and others.
Conclusion
In conclusion, China’s expanding military might poses a significant threat not only to the nations in the East but also to the United States and the rest of the world. The development trends of both China and the United States indicate that the world is returning to a bipolar system. Therefore, America must be at least on par with the PRC in terms of deterrence and balance. In order to do this, the US must continuously implement all-encompassing policies that involve militarization, diplomacy, and economic power. The authoritarian regime makes it simpler for China to increase its military might, so the US must act now to secure its interests in the future.
References
Chase, M. S., Garafola, C. L., & Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N. (2017). Chinese perceptions of and responses to US Conventional Military Power. Asian Security, 14(2), 136–154. Web.
Houlden, G., Romaniuk, S. N., & Hong, N. (2021). Security, strategy, and military dynamics in the South China Sea: Cross-national Perspectives. Bristol University Press.
Kania, E. B., & Costello, J. (2020). Seizing the commanding heights: The PLA strategic support force in chinese military power. Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(2), 218–264. Web.
Simón, L. (2020). Between punishment and denial: Uncertainty, flexibility, and U.S. military strategy toward China. Contemporary Security Policy, 41(3), 361–384. Web.