China’s Strategic Approaches During the Korean War

Introduction

North Korean soldiers launched an attack against South Korea on the 25th of June 1950. The information available indicates that China was initially reluctant to assist or support North Korea in any way ¹. Chinese domestic situation was weak economically when compared to pre-civil war years; their agricultural production and manufacturing products dropped by 40% and 50% respectively ². CCP had already made a resolution to demobilize its troops, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from border regions, and even cut the military budget ³. China was initially against intervening in the war between North Korea and South Korea, and it adopted a very passive perspective to the conflict for some time despite pressure from Soviet allies.

However, immediately after the war began, the Security Council (UNSC) of the United Nations called for a cessation of antagonism and called for immediate removal of North Korean military forces from the 38th parallel. This was followed two days later by another UNSC decision calling on member states to second forces to help repel forces from the 38th parallel and to bring back peace in the region ⁴. These two resolutions created the room by which the United States of America forces entered into the war and started their operation in the war in a very intensive manner. It is also important to understand that, the United States perceived the North Korean attacks in the Korean peninsula as the beginning of major aggression by the communist blocs. Hence, when America dispatched her 7th fleet troops to offer protection to Taiwan from attacks by the People’s Republic of China; the Chinese communist government was convinced that a war with America was inevitable ⁵. America instead decided to increase its support to Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam.

China responded to this by reinforcing the support of its armed forces to North Korea. Thereafter, a prolonged conflict between America and China ensued in the horn of the Korean region and the other Southeast Asian countries. The circumstances forced China to boldly announce its position in the war; CCP declared that if America crosses the 38th parallel, Chinese soldiers impersonating North Korean troops would act decisively in the war ⁶. China strongly considered that America’s entering into the 38th parallel and protection of Taiwan constituted an imminent threat to China’s territory, which then pushed China to meddle in the Korean conflict. Considering that Beijing did not see intervening in the Korean tussle as the best decision, can only mean that other considerations aside from security its territory from possible aggression by the adversary might have played.

China’s Physical Security concerns

China’s decision to assist the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had its historical connections. China regarded America and its allies in the west and imperialists who wanted to control and dominate other independent counties. This created suspicion among the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders about U.S. activities in East Asia. Hence, when America dispatched her 7th fleet troops to protect Taiwan, the Chinese communist government was convinced that a war with America was inevitable ⁷. CCP leadership was very vulnerable and scared that America’s forces’ involvement in the Korean War, would make them move towards the Chinese border and it might constrain its development agenda ⁸. There was fear among top Chinese leadership that having America’s troops close to its border, PLA forces would be stretched. This concern was because of the fact that the border is one thousand kilometers ⁹. However, the Chinese ruling party did not have enough soldiers to guard it because it will shift the spotlight of Beijing on the North-eastern region. Fiscally it would be expensive and at the same time dangerous politically.

Chinese Economic Resources Concerns

The North-Eastern region where the war was concentrated had the main raw materials like coal, steel, and hydropower that China relied on its economic rebuilding. The worry was that if America’s troops moved near river Yalu, the countries manufacturing plants would be within the range of their enemy. Thus, it was not going to business as usual working in those industries as long as the U.S. was present around that region ¹⁰. Threats that U.S. soldiers were going to cause while around would limit the reconstruction. More, CCP feared that there would be many anti-Communists programs in the region, which would make it difficult for them to consolidate their regime and authority, so they had to intervene.

Chinese domestic politics

The presence of the United States military near river Yale curtailed CCP’s ability to deal with the anti-Communist activists in China. Having been formed just one year before the War, CCP was still in the process of consolidating its regime. There was a strong resistance from within against CCP formation and establishment, it faced difficulty in gaining support from the many citizens. Following the Chinese tactical culture about the crisis as accounted for by both danger and opportunity, CCP leadership saw the War in Korea as one which presents a challenge and opportunity altogether. These domestic issues were not necessarily linked to PRC’S foreign policy ¹¹. China was still divided after many years of war, but according to the Chinese government, successful intervention in Korean War would increase the zeal of the people and strengthen CCP’s position as the dominant party ¹². The top leadership led by Mao believed that their intervention would also serve as a base for their socio-economic re-engineering and development.

On the other hand, Mao saw an opportunity to exploit. He believes that external threats posed by the United States could be used by CCP to help them consolidate domestic control. Taking the war to the Americans would assist in strengthening CCP’S position among its loyal support base internally ¹³. Mao was ready and willing to heighten the tension within the country and use it as an excuse to crack down on those opposed to communism. This tactic really worked well because the number of executions and assassinations of Chinese citizens by the Communists intensified immediately after the intervention in the Korean War.

The Ideologies of individual Chinese leaders

CCP’s leaders led by Mao considered the United States as the leader of the imperialist countries. Their communists’ ideals made them hate and consider imperialism bad and any country CCP saw as leaning towards imperialism was China’s enemy. This made the U.S. rank as the number enemy in the minds of CCP leaders ¹⁴. Mao regarded the United States as an aggressive and dominant Imperial country that emerged stronger after the end of the Second World War. In their minds, America was slowly making advancements towards dominating every other country in the world. They believed The United States’ motive was to be the leader on the international stage and suppress the communist ideals and eventually destroy all the countries leaning towards communism ¹⁵. The feeling that imperialists led by the U.S. were staging massive international aggression next to China that was still trying to deal with anti-communist movements internally, did not resonate with CCP leaders. It pushed them to step into the Korean conflict to try and repel U.N. forces led by America’s troops.

It seems that CCP leaders were also largely influenced by old Chinese philosophy called Confucian. Confucianism put more emphasis on morality, the correctness of social relationships, justice, kindness, and sincerity ¹⁶. This philosophy was part of the Chinese community structure and course of action; to Confucians, daily life was the platform of divinity. This ideology placed a strong emphasis on togetherness amongst the people. Further, Confucianism stresses that ‘brothers’ should follow defined roles based on their standing in society and that brothers should help one another. Betraying a brother is seen as a serious crime according to this ideology ¹⁷. Seemingly Confucianism influenced the attitude of CCP leaders led by Mao towards countries that also practiced communist ideals like North Korea. It pushed China under CCP to stand in solidarity with North Korea whom they had close ties and considered as strong allies among the communist blocs.

Chinese commitments to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The relationship between PRC and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was also a key factor that swayed China’s resolution to intercede in the Korean conflict of 1950. China was deeply committed to its association with DPRK and CCP leaders regarded North Korea as a special comrade ¹⁸. Historically, these close ties existed because the two counties shared the same communist ideals. At the time of this War, North Korea was led by President Kim II – Sung who was a one-time member of CCP. In addition, many North Korean forces assisted their Chinese counterparts in the war against Japan between the 1930s and 1940s. It is also important to note that North Korea allowed the Chinese People’s liberation army (PLA) to use their country as a strategic base during the Chinese civil war ¹⁹. Many political, economic, and cultural interactions also happened along the Sino – Korean border at the time of the civil conflict, which further solidified the relationship between CCP and DPRK. This long-standing relationship played a key role in China deciding to involve itself in the Korean War.

The necessity by PRC leaders to preserve a North Korean socialist State also convinced China to participate in the war. Chinese were not interested in dominating North Korea, but instead, they wanted them to serve as a buffer between China and the United States dominated South Korea ²⁰. The eyes of PRC these reasons made sense because the U.S had broken its promise and crossed the 38th parallel. There was no further guarantee to the Chinese would not try to cross the Yalu river into China’s territory ²¹. China was left with no option but to stand with North Korea in this War. Mao decided to release his troops on an offensive mission against the United States troops; they resolved that their initial attacks must be very efficient if they were to defeat the United States forces. For these reasons, they planned and executed a surprise attack by secretly moving troops across the river Yalu.

Political Miscalculation

A political miscalculation on the side of both Mao and Stalin played an incredibly large part in why China entered the Korean War. Stalin misinterpreted the level of the United States involvement in this War to support its key ally South Korea immediately after the U.S. released a statement that excluded Korea from America’s western Pacific military activities. This led Stalin into giving green light to North Korea to use forceful means including war to achieve the unification of Korea ²². Mao also misjudged misreading the level of assistance the Soviet Union would give China in the event it decided to enter into the War in support of North Korea. The net effect of these miscalculations led Mao and his team to sanction military action against the United States thinking that America would not go into full-blown war.

Chinese Relationship with USSR

China keens on maintaining strong ties with its close allies and the Soviet Union was one of them. When the war broke out, President Joseph Stalin of the USSR was also firmly involved. From 1945, the Soviet Union was scared that new American and Japanese military ties could use the Korean Peninsula to attack Asian allies ²³. It was a considered view in USSR under Stalin that the United States must only be allowed anywhere near the Korean Peninsula. However, Soviet Union leadership feared getting into direct conflict with America over the matter ^24. The events that followed before the war, made Stalin consult North Korean President Kim II-Sung, where Stalin advised Korean leaders to seek support from China for military boost.

China though reluctant at first eventually agreed to support North Korea; signaling another green light for Korea to invade South Korea. When North Korea was overwhelmed in the War, Stalin placed another plea to the Chinese government for military reinforcement ²⁵. The Soviet leader specifically asked Mao to send PLA forces into Korea disguised as volunteers to save North Korea without the direct involvement of the USSR.

Ultimately due to the respect China had for the Soviet Union who was its stronger allies in the Communist ideal, it signed a Sino – Soviet alliance with USSR and agreed to participate in the War. Chinese intervention was, however, based on the assumption that Stalin would provide air force assistance during the war ²⁶. USSR eventually owned up to its side of the agreement and provided limited military support in the form of planes, tanks, advisors for PLA, supply and service units, and weapons ²⁷. The Soviet Union also gave the Chinse air cover across key points around river Yalu.

History’s later developments have shown that Mao made a correct choice based upon accurate evaluation ²⁸. China’s resolution to intervene proved to USSR President that Mao and his colleagues were “genuine internationalist Communists.” Shortly after Chinese forces entered the Yalu, Stalin directed the USSR air force to safeguard the Chinese reserve lines ²⁹. Thereafter, Soviet troops and economic assistance were made available to China.

China’s political position East Asia

Chinese CCP had its objectives with regard to the politics of East Asia. Mao and other leaders were positioning China to be the ultimate political power in greater eastern Asia. This acted as another impetus and motivation for China’s intervention in the Korean War ³⁰. According to Mao, the War was an important undertaking because of the Chinese political position in East Asia. Earlier before the War began, between 1949 and 1950, Mao did pay a visit to Stain and the two leaders agreed to share responsibilities of expanding their communist insurgency. The agreement left China with the responsibility of covering entire East Asia. China, therefore, had the role of ensuring the whole Korean region is communized.

The war gave Chinese leadership a real test of their desires to instill their own remarkable revolution and to impose their communist chauvinism. It was a test of a new political structure in East Asia against the western dominated international system in the Asian – Pacific region ³¹. The CCP wanted to stamp its authority as a force among the Asian countries, to preserve the communist ideology, and to stretch its influence across Korean Peninsula. This war presented them with the best opportunity to take the U.S. head-on and try to win by driving the Americans off the Korean peninsula ³². PRC was strategic and convinced that a triumph in the Korean War against the United States and other U.N-led forces, would boost China’s influence on the world stage. Additionally, it would elevate PRC’s position as a political powerhouse in Asia, and assist in their quest to communize the region.

China’s interest in the Korean Peninsula could be viewed geopolitics and history. In geopolitical considerations, Beijing has always viewed the Peninsula region as an area of competition between the Chinese and the United States through its military forces situated in South Korea ³³. CCP leaders’ cooperation with North Korea in terms of security and economic matters, means they could use their close ties to expand their influence in the Korean Peninsula. There was no way China was going to sit back and watch America take over this key strategic region, so it decided to sanction military intervention.

Once Mao and his team had created the Chinese People’s Republic in October 1949. The Soviet and Chinese communists were both prepared to invest huge amounts of resources in maintaining a friendly buffer state on the Korean peninsula ³⁴. This meant to create a security wall between the communists and the expanding influence of US imperialism in East Asia. In pursuit of that plan, they were willing to support North Korea’s plan to reunify the country by force.

Conclusions

The main strategic reasons why China joined in the Korean War are physical security and economic security concerns, ideologies of CCP leaders led by Mao, Chinese domestic politics, and the close relationship with North Korea. Further, Chinese political miscalculations, its strong ties with the USSR government, and the Chinese political position in East Asia were also key strategic factors in its decision to get into the war. China feared the possible invasion of its territory by the United States troops, and with its material power destroyed during the civil conflict; the presence of America’s forces around its borders made CCP’s leaders unsettled. It was a popular belief among the PRC government that would limit the counties economic reconstruction.

There was also fear that America’s presence would strengthen anti-communist movements who were still posing a challenge to CCP. Beijing’s calculation was that the intervention would increase the morale in the country and help contain the growing ant-Communist movements within the country. Thereby assisting CCP to strengthen its authority and internal rule having been established just less than one year when the Korean War began. Ideologically, there was the belief among CCP leaders that a communist–capitalist conflict was inevitable. Mao and his team believed that China was automatically enemy number one of the United States.

China viewed itself as an emerging political power in East Asia and by extension internationally as far as Communist ideology was concerned. The War was an important undertaking because of the Chinese political position in East Asia because China had the role of ensuring the whole Korean region is communized. To CCP leaders, the Korean War was a test of a new order in East Asia against the western dominated international structure in the Asian – Pacific region. It was an opportunity to show the world that communism was an alternative to the imperial capitalist of the West led by America. Victory against America would signal Chinese power in the Asian region and beyond. Lastly, China wanted to cement a strong relationship with the USSR socialist leadership, so it did not hesitate to intervene in the conflict on the advice of the Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin. Ultimately that decision strengthened the ties between Beijing and Moscow, with the two countries still enjoying close ties militarily, economically, and politically, while supporting each other on various global issues.

Notes

1. Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean,” 457.
2. Zhou, “Explaining China’s Intervention,” 2014.
3. Zhai, “China’s Decision to enter,” 94 – 115.
4. Dudziak, “The toxic legacy of War” 2021.
5. Yufan and Zhihai, “China’s Decision,” 2009.
6. Zhou, “Explaining China’s Intervention,” 2014.
7. Yufan and Zhihai, “China’s Decision,” 2009.
8. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances,” 35.
9. Zhai, “China’s Decision to enter,” 104.
10. Zhou, “Explaining China’s Intervention,” 2014.
11. Kovach, “What Were Mao’s Motivations,” 1.
12. Jian, “In the Name of Revolution,” 101 – 106.
13. Carlson, “This week in history.
14. Kovach, “What Were Mao’s Motivations,” 1.
15. Kovach, “What Were Mao’s Motivations,” 1.
16. Shin, “The spirit of Chinese,” 39 – 41.
17. Shin, “The spirit of Chinese,” 44.
18. Jian, “Chinese and America Misjudgement,” 101 – 102.
19. Cathcart and Kraus, “The Bonds of Brotherhood.”
20. Spark Notes, “The Korean War,” 1 – 2.
21. Spark Notes, “The Korean War,” 1 – 2.
22. Jian, “Chinese and America Misjudgement,” 2020.
23. Kovach, “What Were Mao’s Motivations,” 1.
24. Jian, “Chinese and America Misjudgement,” 101.
25. Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?” 17.
26. Jian, “Chinese and America Misjudgement,” 108.
27. Jian, “Chinese and America Misjudgement,” 107.
28. Zhihua, “Revisiting Stalin’s and Mao’s,” 2020.
29. Zhihua, “Revisiting Stalin’s and Mao’s,” 2020.
30. Korea Institute of Military History, “The Korean War,” 9.
31. Korea Institute of Military History, “The Korean War,” 14.
32. Jian, “Chinese and American Misjudgement,” 2020.
33. Kim, “China and Regional Security,” 2020.
34. Miller, “Uncovering the Hidden History,” 2020.

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