Introduction
The foundational elements of natural theology have been the cosmological arguments for God’s existence. These arguments have been most influentially formulated by Thomas Aquinas in his classic book Summa Theologica and, more recently, by Gale and Pruss in A New Cosmological Argument. This paper attempts to clarify Aquinas’s Five Ways, emphasizing the Third Way—the argument from contingency—while incorporating ideas from Aquinas, Gale, and Pruss to discuss the Problem of the Gap.
Summary of Thomas Aquinas’s Five Ways
Since everything in motion is caused by something else, Thomas Aquinas’ First Way, also known as the argument from motion, maintains that there must be a first mover—God, in this case—unmoved by anything. A similar framework underpins the Second Way, or the argument from causation, which argues that the universe’s chain of causes must have an uncaused first cause (Aquinas, 1911). The argument from degrees of perfection, or the Fourth Way, postulates the presence of a creature with the highest degree of attributes, which acts as the gold standard for all other qualities. The Fifth Way, the governing argument, notes that inanimate objects strive toward a goal, implying the direction of an intelligent being—referred to as God.
Description of the Third Way
More consideration should be given to the Third Way—the argument based on contingency. According to Aquinas (1911), contingent objects observable in the world possess the potential for existence. Since an infinite regression of contingent creatures is impossible, a necessary being, God, whose existence is independent of all other factors, must exist. This argument is closely related to contingent facts in the cosmos, as discussed by Gale and Pruss (1999). It implies that the contingent entities’ existence inevitably indicates the existence of a necessary entity that underpins them.
The Problem of the Gap addresses the difficulty of moving from the abstract notion of a first cause or necessary being in the cosmological argument. The theistic notion of a personal, benevolent, omniscient God follows from this shift. By thoroughly examining God’s essence in later sections of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas tacitly closes this gap by arguing that the necessary being must have the characteristics commonly identified with God (Aquinas, 1911). Nevertheless, detractors contend that the cosmological argument is limited in proving the existence of a necessary being or first cause and that it sometimes attributes only some of the qualities of a divine entity to it.
This creative argument revives the age-old search to comprehend the origins of the universe. Gale and Pruss (1999) recognize this difficulty in their articulation of a novel cosmological argument. They acknowledge that their reasoning does not establish the existence of an entirely flawless God but rather of a robust and sentient being capable of creating the universe. This method shows that the creator is aware of the gap; rather than attempting to bridge it entirely, it suggests a being that could conceivably play the creator’s function while staying within the bounds of the argument’s logical framework.
Conclusion
In summary, Aquinas’s Five Ways—especially the Third Way—presents a strong case for a necessary being based on observing contingency in the universe. The modern reinterpretation offered by Gale and Pruss fits the framework of cosmological reasoning. Nevertheless, both strategies run into the Problem of the Gap, a major philosophical conundrum. The distance that separates establishing a necessary being or first cause from associating this being with the God of classical theism demonstrates the breadth and depth of cosmological arguments in natural theology.
References
Aquinas, T. (1911). Summa Theologica. O. P. Benziger Brothers.
Gale, R. M., & Pruss, A. R. (1999). A new cosmological argument. Cambridge University Press, 35, 461–476.