Introduction
Religion is an integral part of the life of society, performing a number of important functions, one of which is cultural. Despite the fact that this area is ancient, there are still disputes among researchers about the significance of this institution for the individual and the state. Clifford Geertz analyzed religion as a complex cultural system, exploring its meaning and meaning. However, the anthropologist and critic Talal Asad disagreed with the author and argued with his concept. It is necessary to analyze what weaknesses are present in Asad’s theoretical model and what is lost when following his reasoning.
Talal Asad’s Theoretical Model of Relgion
First of all, the authors have serious disagreements on the definition of religion as a sphere. Talal Asad argued that defining religion in globalized, universal terms masks the fact that religion is a historical concept, a product of Western secular modernity (Asad, 2003). Asad’s texts have made a significant contribution to the expansion of the cultural and historical framework of the anthropological study of faith and the very problems that the anthropology of religion deals with (Asad, 2003). Asad is convinced that religion must be viewed in conjunction with its twin, secularization, which, in turn, is inextricably linked to the internal transformation of European Christianity (Asad, 2003). He sees no signs of either a dialectical shift from religion to secularization or the infiltration of secular beliefs into religion (James, 2018). On the contrary, in his opinion, religion and secularity mutually constitute each other, as it always has, and this means that anthropologists of religion must be extremely sensitive to context (Lane, 2021). Asad’s ideas are particularly relevant to the study of Orthodox societies, but they have drawbacks.
It is worth emphasizing that Asad does not take into account the context in which Geertz analyzes the public institution. In this case, religion is rather a complex cultural phenomenon formed as a result of the evolution of the worldview and people’s own feelings (Moberg & Piedmont, 2021). The heyday of belief is approximately the same time evenly in all civilizations (James, 2018). This allows asserting that for the full formation of religious movements, society had to reach a certain stage of development (Triandafyllidou & Magazzini, 2020). However, Asad preferred analysis in terms of human rather than cultural evolution (Asad, 2003). The critic explains religion as a related process that goes along with the intellectual and anthropological development of man. In other words, the author misses the key idea of Geertz respectively incorrectly interprets some of the theses of the researcher (Catto et al., 2019). The most striking example of such a delusion is Asad’s appeal to secularization as a form of struggle against the church and the human institution of religion (Asad, 2003). At the same time, for Geertz, the church as an organization does not make sense in the context of the method of cognition since the researcher refers specifically to the cultural or worldview function but not to the regulative one (Lane, 2021). This does not mean that Asad’s position is wrong, but he is studying a different subject of research, therefore, his conclusions in this part are not refuting Geertz’s theses.
The next serious disagreement in the studies of Asad and Geertz is the definition of the source of the constitution of religions. From Asad’s point of view, the road to new theories of confessions runs towards modern times from the era of pre-modernity and goes through religions (Asad, 1993). In addition, the author separately notes their ontologies and anthropology, ideas and practices as criteria for the development of religions (Triandafyllidou & Magazzini, 2020). Localizing his criticism of Clifford Geertz, who equates liberal Protestantism with religion, Asad turns to medieval Catholicism and Islam (Asad, 2003). In Catholic monasticism, he finds an illustration for his conviction that religion is constituted not so much by meanings or ideas but by certain configurations of social and religious power (Asad, 1993). At the same time, Asad misses that modernity does not have a single source of origin or trajectory of movement (Asad, 1993). Islam and Judaism had their roles in shaping modernity and “modern religion,” but neither was as fundamental as Catholicism. Christianity was the axis around which the normative ideas of modern religion were originally twisted (Asad, 1993). This is so deeply rooted in the histories of modernity in general and modern religion in particular that it is habitually overlooked (Lane, 2021). At the same time, when analyzing a full-fledged social institution that originated in the ancient world and successfully evolved, one cannot appeal to only one of its types.
In other words, when analyzing, for example, Catholicism or Islam, the researcher takes analogy as the main source of evidence. The fact is that such an approach does not guarantee the reliability of the study and can lead to confusion. This is explained by the fact that despite the influence of one culture on another, and even on the time frame of different faiths, the general approach to the knowledge of religion is the same (Hood & Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2019). This can be seen both in the formula of each denomination and in its evolutionary path. However, church authority or other configurations of suppression or subjugation are not observed as an absolute rule for each type of religion, therefore, such a thesis can hardly be called true.
In his turn, Talal Asad, criticizing Geertz, takes a relativistic position. From his point of view, the existence of a definition of religion as such is impossible, researchers can only define religion based on a specific historical and cultural context (Asad, 1993). Religion, in this case, is seen more as an emic term (Asad, 1993). Today, most anthropologists of religion take a similar position and, therefore, often ignore attempts to define religion in any comprehensive way (Manchini, 2020). The constructivist approach calls for more monitoring of what is happening in the field of social practices, grasping the processes of defining and redefining the boundaries of the religious and non-religious and describing them (Manchini, 2020). Such a perspective eliminates the need to give universal definitions to what is, in fact, constantly changing and does not represent something unified and indivisible. However, this contradicts the very idea of religion and denies numerous ancient and modern sources and teachings (Hood & Cheruvallil-Contractor, 2019). In virtually any established and functioning denomination, the unity, indivisibility, and omnipresence of God and religious principles are the basic principle of truth. The constructivist approach tries to rationalize the idea by applying the scientific method to the spiritual realm, which is an object error.
It is worth noting that when referring to the model built by Asad, a researcher can lose much more understanding than gain. Talal Asad noted that, despite the harmony of Geertz’s scheme, it leaves open the question of where this system of symbols comes from, who creates it. New age is rich in various symbols, which contain images of ethnic traditions, esoteric ideas and elements of scientific discourse (Asad, 2003). How exactly are they involved in the construction of religiosity, and why in this way and not otherwise? Why, for example, do some New Age followers have ethnic nationalism while others do not (James, 2018)? Why do New Agers avoid institutionalization, and do they create any alternative forms of organization? Are all New Age practices individualistic? How is communication arranged in the New Age environment, which produces symbols and meanings, how is expert knowledge structured (Bråkenhielm, 2018)? Asad’s reflections do not answer these questions of knowledge and even mislead. For example, his attempts to introduce the notion of expertise are speculation that aims at additional criticism of Geertz. In addition, by introducing such categories, the author himself does not disclose them to the extent necessary, equating religion with a full-fledged science (Bråkenhielm, 2018). Accordingly, when studying confessions and faith according to the Asad model, an individual runs the risk of compiling a worldview in the wrong plane, interpreting religion as an expert area, where accurate knowledge is initially present and specific formula.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be noted that Assad’s research and model are not wrong. However, his criticism of Geertz is irrelevant in the aspects discussed above. The fact is that the anthropologist applies the methods of scientific knowledge and expert interpretation, ignoring the context and the idea of Geertz. This leads to the fact that there are several significant gaps in Assad’s work, which have been analyzed and criticized in this text. When comparing the two final theoretical models, Assad’s product turns out to be less effective and efficient due to the fact that a number of concepts and categories turn out to be delusions. However, the anthropologist’s study serves as a prime example of alternative opinion and the application of scientific theory and method to the religious field and the evolution of denominations.
References
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Bråkenhielm, C. R. (2018). The study of science and religion. Sociological, theological, and philosophical perspectives. Pickwick Publications.
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