In the philosophical tradition, few topics come up as frequently as does the subject of meaning. Humans have a history of seeking significance in things surrounding them and experiencing frustration if this goal cannot be achieved. But should meaning be found in every aspect of everyday human experience, or are there cases where other lenses rightfully dominate the structural analysis? Over the last few years, philosophers have engaged with the modern social and economic perspectives on work and what motivates people in their labor outside of apparent financial need. This essay aims to examine some of their conclusions and elaborate on what meaningful work is and why humanity has no right to it, at least in absolute terms.
The concept of meaningful work in philosophy is heavily contested despite, or perhaps due to, the rising interest in this topic. Common attributes include the work in question being valuable and worth doing in worker’s eyes, often connected to other areas of their life (Veltman, 117). Meaningful work serves a broader purpose for society at large and provides a worker with self-realization and self-actualization in the workplace. Some scholars go so far as to equip the concept with the idea of self-transcendence, an almost religious and profoundly spiritual state of maximum possible closeness to perfection (Yeoman et al.,148-149). Overall, meaningful work conveys the sense of gratification and personal pride in one’s occupation and can help maintain professional engagement. Despite being linked to higher performance, meaningful work can frequently contradict material gratification, as self-realization needs are very individual and do not necessarily coincide with adequate financial compensation.
Despite the ideological attractiveness of the concept, humans generally do not have a right to meaningful work as social creatures. In her book, Andrea Veltman argues that the idea of meaningful work is not feasible for society et large (189-190). She highlights the state’s inability to ensure the sufficient availability of meaningful work and provide adequate matches between occupations and individuals. Furthermore, it is essential to consider that society needs a certain amount of dangerous, dirty, repetitive, and otherwise disheartening work to function correctly. If the concept of meaningful work were to be implemented on the societal level, how would the community decide whom to relegate to worse occupations? It is not possible to do without perpetuating injustice and pre-existing discriminatory bias against the marginalized groups. Today’s global infrastructures are built on the foundation of mass production, and replacing it with the abundance of meaningful work does not seem realistic (Veltman, 144). Within the existing social structures, significant work is linked to egalitarianism, and the real-life manifestations of the concept demonstrate that only the privileged groups get to experience it in practice.
It is important to consider that humans do not have a right to meaningful work within the existing social order. To say otherwise would mean to ignore or excuse, under some pretense, the ungratifying and sometimes degrading forms of work some groups of the population have to take on. As society demands the existence of these occupations to function, they will inevitably be given to workers. Considering the widespread problem of social inequality, it is highly unlikely that such distribution of undesirable work occurs with any level of fairness. Therefore, from an ethical point of view, until significant changes are applied to social and economic structures, nobody has a right to meaningful work.
Works Cited
Vertman, Andrea. Meaningful Work. Oxford University Press, 2016.
Yeoman et al., The Oxford Handbook of Meaningful Work. Oxford University Press, 2019.