Introduction
The philosophical principle of doxastic voluntarism holds that people exercise voluntary control over what they believe. This doctrine argues that people can choose to believe whatever they want. In the doxastic voluntarism debate, philosophers categorized voluntary control into two – direct and indirect voluntary control. A person has direct voluntary control over an act if when they decide to perform it, it happens instantly (Vitz, 2008). For instance, a person has direct voluntary control over his favorite soccer player at a particular moment. On the other hand, although a person may lack direct voluntary control over an act, they may exercise indirect voluntary control and cause it to happen by performing other intermediate actions, such as research and practice (Vitz, 2008). Nonetheless, this excerpt seeks to argue against doxastic voluntarism as it holds that belief is not a matter of choice.
The Classic Argument
Doxastic voluntarism argues that people can willingly believe propositions. However, if this were true, then people could judge propositions to be true despite their opinions about the credibility of the propositions (Vitz, 2008). Besides, they would realize they had the power to judge a proposition regardless of their opinion of whether it was true. Suppose Joseph – Antony’s friend – is murdered and the suspect is Ben, direct doxastic voluntarism implies that Antony could choose to believe that Ben killed Joseph despite his opinion of whether the proposition ‘Ben killed Joseph’ was true or false. However, this doctrine contradicts both the nature of belief and Pascal’s wager about God.
The nature of belief implies that a person who believes a proposition to be true would be disappointed to learn that the proposition is false. For instance, learning that a violent mob killed Joseph would surprise Antony, who originally believed that Ben was responsible for Joseph’s death. Therefore, people could not refer to the willfully acquired beliefs as representing reality. Moreover, people who acquire beliefs willingly must know they have the power to do this (Vitz, 2008). However, it is impossible to know whether you are capable of acquiring beliefs at will without believing that certain propositions are true or false. Similarly, Pascal’s wager about God aligns with the nature of belief.
Considering the proposition that God’s existence is unlikely, many people would choose not to believe in God. However, Pascal developed a matrix to illustrate the potential outcomes of choosing to believe or not to believe in God’s existence and argued that the potential rewards for believing in God outweigh those of not believing (Saka, n.d.). Therefore, believing in God’s existence is a more rational decision than not believing in God. We would rather be safe than sorry. If doxastic voluntarism were true, people would willingly choose not to believe in God’s existence despite knowing the potential consequences of their choice (Saka, n.d.). The empirical belief argument sheds more light on the flaws associated with the doxastic voluntarism doctrine.
The Empirical Belief Argument
The empirical belief argument borrows from the concept of empiricism. This argument holds that a person can acquire an empirical belief on a proposition only if it is true and the individual’s perceptive organs function properly to cause the belief (Vitz, 2008). For instance, a man can believe that the tie he is wearing is blue only if the tie is actually blue and his eyes function properly to cause the belief. If doxastic voluntarism were true, then believing empirical matters willingly would eliminate the relationship between environmental factors, perceptions, and beliefs, overruling the conditions necessary for acquiring an empirical belief (Vitz, 2008). Thus, it is conceptually impossible to believe empirical propositions at will. The intentional act argument also unveils the conceptual impossibility of doxastic voluntarism.
The Intentional Acts Argument
This argument employs an assessment of the characteristics of intentional acts to advocate against direct doxastic voluntarism. Direct doxastic voluntarism refers to believing as an act that a person can control directly and voluntarily. It further implies that a person’s intention would guide and monitor their direct voluntary control over any act (Vitz, 2008). For instance, a person has direct voluntary control over the act of washing dishes in their kitchen, and their intention to clean the dishes guides and monitors the action itself. However, the nature of acquiring a belief disqualifies it as an act that a person’s intention could guide and monitor (Vitz, 2008). Therefore, a person does not have direct voluntary control over the act of acquiring a belief, rendering doxastic voluntarism conceptually impossible.
Conclusion
Doxastic voluntarism presents an interesting and crucial debate. The fact that many philosophers over the years have raised arguments to support doxastic voluntarism despite the presence of numerous critics confirms that the matter is still inconclusive. This debate demands a broader insight into the essential features of human nature. For instance, there is an urgent need to further research the mind’s philosophy, moral psychology, and other relevant disciplines to improve our understanding of the inherent characteristics of belief and voluntary control. Additionally, the debate’s outcome presents significant implications for our knowledge about the boundaries of ethical and philosophical obligations and our appreciation of the connection between state responsibilities and individual rights.
References
Saka, P. (n.d.). Pascal’s Wager about God. Web.
Vitz, R. (2008). Doxastic Voluntarism. Web.