Introduction
Reconstructing an argument gives the reader the ability to obtain a representation of an argument that is both comprehensive and succinct, intending to facilitate critical analysis of the written material. It entails concentrating solely on the components that make it possible for the reader to achieve both efficacy and efficiency. Hence enable validation of the materials’ authenticity and practicability. This paper aims to reconstruct an argument to enable critical evaluation of three articles written by Bruno Ambroise, Alex King, and Jesse Rappaport in collaboration with Quilty-Dunn Jake. In doing so, this paper will acknowledge that the message put forth by the three articles is relevant to society and the community as a whole.
Discussion
King writes an insightful article focusing on emoji’s conceptual and linguistic dimensions. Despite their widespread use to convey sarcasm and emotional punctuation, he insists that emojis have semantic significance (King par 2). He gives examples of how emojis serve as nouns and interjections in a conversation. There have been various responses to the widespread adoption of emojis as a replacement for natural language in ordinary communication. King argues that emojis can serve as words and bases his argument on research done by the Oxford English Dictionary (King par 4). The article achieves two important goals: it makes readers more aware of using emoticons in communication and enlightens them on emojis and their roles in digital culture.
Bruno Ambroise develops John Austin’s idea of a speech act by applying it to the context of online communication, such as email and social media. It is relevant because online communication is becoming increasingly common. Ambroise has concluded that Austin’s theory reduces to the realization that any speech can is an indicator of action (Ambroise 334). Ambroise refers to Austin’s notion that speech acts can occur anywhere, including online. People worldwide can now virtually communicate with one another thanks to the proliferation of the internet. As a result, it is possible to interpret it as a place where people can use language to carry on conversations and interactions that are part of their daily lives. Ambroise’s evaluation of Austin’s portrayal of utterances as statements that describe through saying is unequivocal, and the vast majority of utterances carry out activities (Ambroise 335). Ambroise objectively reviews Austin’s work and emphasizes the significance of language in interpersonal interactions as a result of his analysis.
Ambroise observes that a spoken act of communication requires an actual listener, in contrast to a written sentence. His analysis shows that a mutually literate interlocutor can only accept an illocutionary act (Ambroise 337). According to Austin, the act reminds readers that it was issued by a person or agent when the author writes it hence implying that written speech acts have their felicity requirements (Ambroise 339). In the case of a written speech act, the act fails if the felicity conditions are not met at the time of writing and for the duration of the speech act’s intended effect. Unsuccessful attempts to communicate in writing are not acts of writing. Consequently, Ambroise’s analysis helps develop the concept of speech act and gives the reader a better understanding of what it entails.
The article further highlights how comedians relay their message. According to Quilty-Dunn and Rappaport, comedians rely on wordplay, absurd scenarios, and things they do not believe in to make their audiences laugh (475). They assume that stand-up comedians want their audiences to infer that they, too, believe their jokes (Rappaport and Quilty-Dunn 475). They allude that several distinct types of speech acts are in stand-up comedy and that some are genuine while others are not. These hypotheses broaden the scope of conclusions drawn about the mental state of comedians based on their actions (Rappaport and Quilty-Dunn 481). As a result, the Universal Pretense and the Mixed View both permit additional inferences to be drawn about the comedian’s attitude based on the speech act. It is essential to determine which of these two perspectives is the most parsimonious. Stand-up comedy is distinct from other forms of comedy in that the audience can frequently figure out the comic’s true intentions.
Stand-up comedians, like actors, pass helpful messages to the audience. Quilty-Dunn and Rappaport argue that stand-up comedians, like actors on stage, merely give the audience the impression of oratory (Rappaport and Quilty-Dunn 483). However, unlike a performer, due to the obvious specific aesthetic norms of stand-up comedy, the audience frequently assumes the performer is presenting themselves honestly on stage and making statements. Seen as the actual creator of the content, therefore, stand-up comedy is more potent than ever. Due to comedians’ impact in conveying their message, they are credible sociological data sources. As a result, our analysis strikes a reasonable balance between these competing factors. The unspoken premise of stand-up comedy is that it is a form of entertainment distinct from social reality and is solely to tell jokes.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Bruno Ambroise, Alex King, and Jesse Rappaport’s articles with Quilty-Dunn Jake are critical to the community. While Alex King claims that emojis can replace words, Bruno Ambroise points out that conversing face-to-face requires an audience in contrast to writing. Quilty-Dunn and Rappaport claim that stand-up comedians are no different from actors in that they only give the impression of oratory to the audience. The investigation achieves a fair equilibrium between these conflicting considerations.
Works Cited
Ambroise, Bruno. “Speech Acts and the Internet: Austin to Bourdieu and Fraenkel.” Philosophy of Emerging Media, 2015, pp. 333–346.
King, Alex. “The Metaphysics and Linguistics of Emoji.” Aesthetics for Birds, Web.
Rappaport, Jesse, and Jake Quilty-Dunn. “Stand-up Comedy, Authenticity, and Assertion.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 78, no. 4, 2020, pp. 477–490.