Many situations present an opportunity to identify whether an individual has or has not caused damage, while other cases, less unambiguous, also exist. A considerable body of philosophical literature is dedicated to the notion of harm and its examination. In some cases, individuals actively participate in damaging actions. In other instances, they become passive observers or intermediaries, facilitating them. There seems to be no agreement about the moral status of harm enabling. Nevertheless, the first case, in which one actively causes damage, appears to attract the most attention – those who commit morally corrupt acts directly are more likely to be publicly condemned. In general, philosophers and ethicists distinguish allowing harm from the act of harming, assigning them different degrees of immorality, but not all human behaviors can be easily categorized. Thus, the need to consider other categories arises – enabling damage presupposes specific conduct that differentiates it from the other two notions.
In some situations, there is nothing to be done to prevent harm. Yet, individuals who find themselves in such a situation do not necessarily authorize it. Enabling harm can be defined as removing an obstacle that hinders harm from happening or facilitating it. The moral status of this human conduct became a subject of multiple ethical debates. Hanna (2015) exemplifies the concept by describing a situation in which a vehicle rolls down a hill and its trajectory crosses a walking girl. Still, there is a rock in the car’s path that can stop the tragedy from happening. When someone removes the stone from the vehicle’s way, as a result of which the girl is killed or injured, the person, according to Hanna (2015), enables harm. In this case, helping the accident occur could be indistinguishable from directly harming. Thus, the notion requires a person to become an agent and withdraw a barrier that otherwise would prevent avoidable damage from happening.
Furthermore, the act of enabling harm should be distinguished from allowing it. Gregory Mellema’s citation seemingly does not allow the differentiation between harm-allowing and harm-enabling since it does not specify how an individual makes it possible for others to act. To accomplish this, the doctrine of doing and allowing was established and based on which there is a crucial moral discrepancy between the two (Hanna, 2015). The difference between the notions seemingly lies in the degree to which an agent participates in a harmful act. While enabling harm implies that a person helps damage happen, allowing harm presupposes that an individual has resources or a chance to stop it from occurring but remains inactive. Some scholars see enabling as a form of allowing and equalizing their moral status. For example, “some deontologists claim that harm-enabling is a species of harm-allowing. Others claim that while harm-enabling is properly classified as a species of harm-doing, it is nonetheless morally equivalent, all else equal, to harm-allowing” (Hanna, 2015, p. 69). Still, both harm-doing and harm-allowing signify that an individual is in control and can change the course of action.
It is not uncommon to be faced with a problematic situation in which a decision is required, and the result will be unfavorable, no matter what decision is made. If all presented options are harmful, it is often suggested to choose the lesser evil. According to the lesser of two evils principle, when a person’s choices are unsatisfactory, they should find the one that would cause the least possible harm. The idea relies on the difference between the damage that one will inflict and the damage that will be prevented. The recommendation appears to be standard in ethical decision-making and became a basis for many mundane and essential decisions. For instance, its application in voting constitutes a subject for vigorous discussions. The principle of lesser of two evils or the least evil (if the choice should occur between multiple harmful alternatives) can be applied to a range of other conflicting circumstances.
When faced with a situation in which there is nothing to be done, an individual does not enable or allow harm. To do so, one needs to help damage occur or not effectuate actions that should have been effectuated. On the other hand, voluntarily withholding one’s aid could be classified as harm-enabling or harm-allowing, depending on what deontological point of view is considered (Hanna, 2015). Moreover, some instances of enabling harm can be equated to doing it – the situation with a moving car and a rock can serve as an example.
It can be concluded that situations in which there is no action a person can do to prevent harm cannot be classified as such in which one enables the damage. The conclusion is based on definitions and approaches to harm-enabling and related notions. Additionally, if all options are unfavorable, the lesser of two evils principle can be applied under ethical decision-making. Despite being controversial, the concept aims to minimize the extent of damage caused and is used on numerous occasions, varying in their importance.
Reference
Hanna, J. (2015). Enabling harm, doing harm, and undoing one’s own behavior. Ethics, 126(1), 68–90.