The concept of morality has always been considered subjective, as there are no specific rules regarding truth or falsehood in ethical considerations. Graham (2004) argues that people perceive it as a personal opinion, although it is only a kind of relativism since ancient times. Thus, morality is the personification of human vices and advantages, as well as the hardness or softness of physical objects, and it corresponds to the concept of ethical objectivism.
Good and evil, ethics and violation, order and chaos are either subjective opinions or controversial facts. The author of the chapter confirms that morality is not the opposite of the exact sciences, but rather alternative teaching about how different people and their mental barriers are (Graham, 2004). The apparent correlation between psychology and ethics is undeniable since any point of view is based on experience, behavioral patterns, and personal preferences. Moreover, even distinct markers of happiness, such as goodness, can be challenged in their real attributes. The author claims that if any concept, regardless of the rational belonging to good or evil, can be tested by questions, it can be on both sides of ethics. Moral realism, in turn, is an analogy to understanding psychological distinctions between people. These are natural differences that exist in the surrounding world and, accordingly, define ethics as being independent of the environment. All this leads to the final judgment that morality is rational, namely, objective, since the absence of clear answers about the norms of ethics is part of society’s life.
Morality is assessed as a subjective concept since each person perceives it differently. Graham (2004) argues that ethics is a rational science that has a clear correlation with psychology. All people are different, and their opinions about good and evil are directly proportional. Thus, moral objectivism explains mental diversity and unique positions in society, although it is often perceived as subjectivism.
Reference
Graham, G. (2004). Ethics, truth, and reason. In Eight theories of ethics (1st ed., pp. 1-17). Routledge.