Introduction
The Boeing B737-8 (MAX) operated by Ethiopian airlines that crashed was considered one of the fatal aircraft accidents. It was also the second and the last to involve the B737-8 (MAX) planes, which have since been grounded by several airline companies globally and are non-operational. The events of that fateful day will forever be remembered by the victims’ families and the world as they left a scar in their hearts. Blame games then took part as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Boeing wanted an explanation of the cause of the events. The crash of Boeing’s most treasured generational plane is attributed to regulatory failures by the FAA, technological failure of the plane’s Minimum Controllable Airspeed gadget (MCA), and dishonesty by Boeing and its group of pilots who prepared a manual for the operation of the aircraft.
Account of Events
The Boeing B737-8, operated by the Ethiopian airlines group, left Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. Onboard were 157 people, 149 passengers and eight crew members. The plane took off the runway at 05:38:44 ATC; two minutes later, the plane’s nose-dived into a crash, according to official communication between the air traffic control center and the pilot [1]. The plane’s Angle of Attack (AOA) from the left and right values had started deviating shortly after takeoff. A few seconds later, the pilot was shown an autopilot warning where he voiced his concerns to the radar. The autopilot then again engaged and disengaged simultaneously, thereby prompting radar to advise them to change to climb to a flight level of 340 [1]. The captain then started having flight control problems with the autopilot. The last record of the communication found was that of the two pilots calling out ‘left alpha vane.’
Causes and Factors of the Accident
According to a journalistic report from one of the aviation journalists at the Verge, the plane had issues with its MCA gadget. Five months before the crash of the Ethiopian Airlines plane, another B737-8 had crashed in Indonesia, killing all the crew and passengers [2]. One common factor that investigators have singled out is the tech feature Boeing fitted their jets with. The B737-8 aircraft are developed with their engines heavier and placed near the wings to increase fuel efficiency; this makes the plane’s nose point upwards.
On the B-737 MAX, there are two AOA sensors, but only one feeds data into the MCAS. In both accidents, this sensor seemed to have malfunctioned, driving the software to command the nose-down maneuver that the pilots could not override [4].
MCA gadgets are therefore placed in planes to determine how far upwards the nose is pointing, thereby determining danger and then automatically pushing the nose down to evade the danger [3]. It is, therefore, possible that in both accidents, the MCAs had faulty readings from the position of the plane’s nose and then sent them into a nosedive.
Ethical Issues Arising from the Factors
A further dive into the investigation reveals chilling revelations about the FAA and Boeing, which raises questions about the ethicality of the accident’s causation factors. When a plane is developed, the FAA is mandated to regulate airplane production to ensure that aircraft are safe for use. However, reports indicate that the FAA rushed the launch of the planes without proper air safety checks of the manuals, and Boeing included safety features to their aircraft on an add-on basis [2]. Ethically, the aircraft inspection process has to be carried out diligently to avoid overlooking several items such as the MCA. FAA also certified the planes without extensive pilot training on how to use the aircraft. This strategy helped Boeing save millions of dollars on simulator training which came at a great expense.
Boeing was also not honest with the pilots tasked with flying the B737-8 as there was no mention of MCA in the 13-page training manual that pilots were given. They never did their due diligence in the experiment with their risky product [5]. This might have made the pilots inadequately trained to handle situations that involved MCA malfunctions. Not much is known as to why the FAA also flagged the training manuals without checking if every plane component is mentioned. Boeing was also discriminatory in putting safety features in their planes. They adopted the trend of car manufacturers where customers pay extra for advanced safety features such as communication modules. The two Boeing planes that crashed lacked several features which would have helped the pilots to crash land safely. Planes are delicate, hence, they require all the safety features available, and no plane manufacturer should use safety features for monetary gain.
Personal opinion
In my opinion, the ethical factors, which are dishonesty by Boeing and the hasty inspection process by the FAA, led to the technical failure of the MCAs. The FAA was supposed to inspect the new Boeing planes before certifying them thoroughly. They should have checked all the underlying factors, including the aircraft training manual and the fact that there is no regulation on safety features as an add-on. Boeing was also supposed to be honest with the pilots and not omit that the planes had MCAs. The company was also expected to experiment extensively with their aircraft and allocate several hours of simulator training required to certify pilots for new aircraft. However, the accident resulted from the MCA malfunction, which forced the planes to nosedive, causing a fatality.
References
Ethiopian Airlines Group, Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau Preliminary Report. Addis Ababa: Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, 2019, pp. 9-14.
A. Hawkins, “Everything you need to know about the Boeing 737 Max airplane crashes”, The Verge, 2019. Web.
C. Brady, “The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS System”, The Boeing 737 Technical Site, 2021. Web.
T. Sgobba, B-737 MAX AND THE CRASH OF THE REGULATORY SYSTEM. International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, 2021, p. 1.
S. Boyarchenko, Competing For Success? On Dangers of Product Competition. Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, 2021.