Introduction
The European Union has immense potential to transform the lives of its members; however, lack of single decision making processes and transparent legislative systems could be coming in the way of achieving this. Many critics argue that decisions at the EU take too long, are too complicated and lack aggression. The latter mostly occurs due to amalgamation of competing interests, so the Union fails to make choices that would bring the greatest good to member states and instead settles for those types of decisions that cause the least opposition. Members also complain of isolation in these policy making procedures especially those who come from seemingly disadvantaged countries.
Policy making institutions and processes; overview of EU institutions and role played in promoting closer integration
One of the most prominent EU institutions its Parliamentary body; these members enjoy a five year tenure and are actually six hundred and twenty six in number. Parliamentarians are supposed to work hand in hand with Ministers within the body who represent their respective nations. Furthermore, Parliament is endowed with the task of ensuring that other institutions within the European Union actually comply with democratic policies. One particular case is the total recall of the entire Commission if Parliament feels that they have not been engaging in democratic mannerisms (Sapir, 2006). Lastly, the latter body makes decisions on financial expenditures within the EU through collaborations with the Council. Parliament often passes many types of law that are designed to make members states more effective. Nonetheless, there are several challenges that frequently come up during such situations (Michaski, 2002). For instance, a directive can be passed and specifications may not be made on their implementation. This frequently complicates the process of implementation. Some nations may be very keen on implementation while others may not and this may dramatically alter the success of an EU law (Piper, 2005).
The other prominent EU institution is the European Commission (EC). This entity possesses a president, a vice and a number of departments under its wing. The EC has been given the task of proposing laws that can then be worked on by the Council and the Parliament which eventually decides on whether to discard, modify or pass these proposals. Additionally, policies and expenditure are normally supervised by this Commission (EU, 2009). It is also supposed to foresee negotiations on behalf of the Union. The biggest obstacle confronted by the Commission is working under the watchful eye of Parliament which can always decide to dismiss it at any time. Its actions are also highly governed by other values such as subsidiarity. In other words, actions by the latter body are only permissible if it has been ascertained that no other approaches can be effected domestically (McCormick, 2008). Normally the Commission contributes towards greater integration by passing regulations that it feels are needed by the EU without going through Parliamentary channels. All technical types of law fall within this parameter (Egenhofer, 2006).
The Councils is the other EU institution that plays a crucial role in integration. The entity has a presidency who only serves for half a year. He presides over ministers representing member states. Its role is to legislate in collaboration with the Parliament. It is also supposed to look at international agreements and make any conclusion on it. Furthermore, budget approval is often done by the latter group in conjunction with Parliament. They are also expected to perform a coordinating role of all policies by the European Union at any one time (EU Commission, 2006).
How enlargement of the European Union will affect the major institutions as time goes on
There are certain key issues that need to be looked at with regard of greater enlargement. First of all, the EU must re-examine some of its internal assumptions. It may no longer be possible for the Commission to place a lot of precedence on local interests given widening membership; however, it may have to seek consensus in order to make far reaching actions (Torbiorn, 2004). The Union will have to re examine its decision making mandates and centres of power too. Most of the complexities arising in decision making have been brought on by certain factors that are likely to plummet in the wake of enlargement. For instance, some countries appear to have a greater influence on decisions owing to the level of contributions they make to the EU. Additionally, not all member countries will be granted equal voting rights and this may spark off a lot of disagreement between the groups (Rosamond, 2000). There may also be divergent interests in international interests and these could increase with an expanded membership. There are likely to be greater struggles between various nation states in the Union and this may make decision making quite difficult (Verdun, 2007).
Many citizens from member states often have tremendous influence on how their leaders represent them in the EU Parliament (Tsoukalis, 2003). In the past, a lot of interference from nationalistic tendencies has ruined policy making process. Unless enlargement is handled positively, it is likely that it may lead to a renationalisation. This is because most ordinary EU citizens still do not take pride in the EU and instead draw their identities from the nation states. Such occurrences are likely to get worse with time unless something is done to alter them as early as possible (Palmowski & Meyer, 2004).
The EU has been going through a series of challenges and enlargement would have been the opportunity to change all these. However, current patterns point towards more challenges arising out of this process especially with regard to the EU institutions. First, governments are still focusing on nationalistic tendencies which tend to undermine some of the powers that EU institutions have been granted (Wallace, 2007). Additionally, a declining European will may also result in an undermined institutional framework (Settembri, 2007). Enlargement has caused a situation in which more competing interests are being brought on the table. Values will no longer take as much precedence as they should and this is likely to cause a lot of controversy between the concerned groups. Greater balancing of interests will mean less room to manoeuvre for the institutions because they must consider maintenance of harmony and this effectively reduces their powers.
The effectiveness of the institutions especially the Council will be put into serious question in the wake of greater enlargement. This is because of the tendency to involve the public in decisions. For instance, when Turkey made a bid to enter the European Union, some of the traditional member states such as Britain decided to take the matter back to their electorate in order to get approval for disapproval from them. Other nations followed suit and consulted with their general public such as Netherlands and France which actually held a referendum on the matter. It is likely that greater reform anticipated by the Council can be tremendously impeded once member states keep going back to their citizens to seek for approval (Kurpas & Gron, 2008).
Enlargement will also cause major strains on the Council and Parliament in terms of budgetary spending. This is because rich nations may have some inhibitions on redistribution of their resources and this may not necessarily be accepted by all these members. There will be a struggle to receive funding and a focus on income generating ideas. This implies that the Council and Parliament as institutions will need to overcome these obstacles as they try to pass reforms (Spencer, 2003).
Generally speaking, greater enlargement is therefore likely to lead to problems amongst EU institutions because of several reasons. First of all, it is likely to challenge assumptions on competition and hence decisions revolving around the concept. It is likely that this may be an obstacle for the Council and Parliament which have to be reform oriented (Cameron, 2004). It is also likely to create scenarios in which concerns over wealth distribution will have to be handled with a large share of concerns coming from member states perceived to be big contributors to the budget. They may feel as though their resources are being stretched too thin (Smith & Jenkins, 2003). The need for crisis management will therefore be top on the agenda for most institutions in the European Union later on especially with rising nationalistic sentiments. This means that coherence will be a problem and it must be sought in whichever way possible. One way in which this can be achieved is through the process of forging an EU identity in which nation states can sometimes overlook their divergent interests and work towards a common agenda (Scharpf, 2006). The EU institutions are a reflection of popular sentiments and some of the reasons in the past that have caused complications are likely to crop up in the future if nothing is done currently.
The Council as one institution that has generated controversy surrounding its role in building a supranational entity and its importance in the European integration process
A number of analysts have asserted that one of the biggest problems currently impeding the integration of the European Union is the negotiation process within the Council. The Council has actually undergone a dramatic change especially because its members must represent all new and old member states. To this end, it has been found that Legislations seem to be longer by the latter group because unanimity has sometimes proved to be illusive. The latter normally arise when discussions on seemingly sensitive issues like Justice are being done (Quaisser & Wood, 2008). In other words, there appears to be a lack of structure during negotiation processes because the Council may no be doing a very good job of outlining what the main issues are. Furthermore, there seems to be a need for order in terms of tracking what has been achieved during a negotiation (Skach, 2005). This kind of disorder may be brought on by the fact that Council has not delegated these tasks to a smaller group. Part of the reason behind this could be that member states do not trust one another and they do not feel that they can leave everything in the hands of an intermediary group. Some semblance of order will definitely be needed in this regard and something must be done as soon as possible to ensure that it occurs (Wood, 2004).
The council has also been criticized for extensive consultations between members even when this does not directly relate to some official legislative reasons. In this respect, other executive bodies around the world, consultations are often held when there is a serious need for one. Members therefore spend time and resources consulting rather than handling other pressing matters (Renda, 2009). One possible reason for these excessive consultations is the fact that the Council’s presidency is valid only for six months. This implies that the consultations may be done for political reasons or so that the concerned individuals can gather some clout for their efforts (Tsakatika, 2005).
As stated earlier, the council is endowed with the responsibility of making conclusions on international agreements. In order to do this effectively, it must be bold enough to state things in a succinct manner (Hagemann & Sachse, 2009). Usually, the President is endowed with their responsibility. However, many observers have noted that most conclusions are often amorphous and lengthy. The President of the Council rarely makes out what should be given greater precedence and this often confuses stakeholders who must then weed out the irrelevant material and decide which ones really count. It could bring on several challenges to integration in the future because parties may not be in a position to effectively curve out what really matters to them (Nugent, 2006).
Poor coordination in the Council is also another important factor that needs to be re-examined so as to hasten the integration process. For instance, the Council may be looking at a particular issue and may decide to make about eight different formations. This implies that the chance of speaking with one voice in such groups is quite unlikely. Furthermore, a member may be tempted to take on a different stance in these different councils. One of the reasons why coordination is a very serious problem for the Council is the six month Presidency. Since the President must have his own staff, then an expiry of the six month membership is likely to lead to an abandonment of key agenda issues which may conflict with the next level of leadership. It may also cause situations in which perceptions of the EU to the world are actually quite negative because this may bring about scenarios where a decision that had been reached earlier by a certain president is then pushed to the sidelines by another. Furthermore, one formation may lead to resolutions between a certain nation state and this may be in contravention with the agreements between EU and a rival nation state (Steuneberg, 2002). In deed, if the EU is to move forward, then there should be no room for such confusion. In the past, the Council has attempted to deal with this problem by selecting all the formations that are relevant to a particular legislation and getting them to meet. The problem with such an approach is that it is no guarantee against further confusion since some of the councils formed may be quite large and this makes it quite difficult to synchronize them (Renda, 2009).
Critics have also reported that the European Council is having problems with analyzing the impact of their initiatives. In this regard, it becomes difficult to ascertain whether particular decisions were actually worthwhile for the Union. This problem has been brought on by the requirement to carry out assessments on the all initiatives even if some of them were brought by the Legislative programmes. This lack of prioritising strategies has been a problem now and in the future (Passas, 2004).
Lastly, the problem of transparency within the Council has related to assessments of initiatives. No watchdog or body that has been designed to analyse detailed aspects of these processes yet these have proven to be major sources of contention from participating member states (Keeler, 2005).
Conclusion
The problems with decision making within the EU are quite off-putting because they impede the ability of the various EU institutions to facilitate integration. Lack of identification with the EU is one of these areas. Enlargement has its unique challenges as well; they are mostly amplified in the Commission. This is because lack of coordination, mistrust and self interest have been felt and manifested mostly within this institution. Some of the ways of dealing with these challenges include forging regional identities and curbing the inherent mistrust.
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