Introduction
Terrorism remains a massive issue in many countries, resulting in deaths and high costs. For example, according to recent studies, in 2016, terrorist actions cost African regions $15.5 billion in economic damages1. This number is ten times bigger than that from 2007 when the cost to the economy was estimated at US$1.54 billion (United Nations Development Programme 2019). Africa’s part of the global financial impact of terrorism rose from 4.2% in 2007 to 20.3% in 2016 (United Nations Development Programme 2019). Consequently, extremism and terrorism in Africa have a negative impact on the countries of this region, which prompts the states to implement multiple counterterrorism measures. Nevertheless, such a country as Nigeria proves to have a controversial system of counterterrorism due to underdeveloped military and non-military approaches.
Aim
Considering Nigeria’s high rates of terrorism and extremism, it is vital to illuminate the government’s strategies to eliminate the terrorist cells and extremist groups and mitigate the consequences of such occurrences. The given work aims to analyze Nigeria’s tactics and their efficiency in terrorist and extremist acts. Additionally, it is necessary to explore possible strategic solutions to the identified gaps in counterterrorism measures of the state.
Conceptual Clarification
Terrorism includes domestic terrorism that is usually carried out to overturn the state or gain local political benefit. Meanwhile, international terrorism denotes violent acts committed with the goal of causing national or global security damage (Eji 2016). In Nigeria, the acts of ethnic and religious groups and the state that can be defined as terrorism have been documented throughout national history (Eji 2016). Terrorism in Nigeria has shown itself in numerous forms, notably as part of larger conflict contexts.
Because of the massive economic cost of terrorism, the four nations are regarded as epicenters of violent extremism. These countries include Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and Libya (United Nations Development Programme 2019). One country that has experienced the most economic consequences of terrorism is Nigeria. Nigeria reached 89% of the overall US$109 billion damage during the ten-year timeframe (United Nations Development Programme 2019). Meanwhile, the counterterrorism measures of the government are believed to be questionable.
Conceptual Framework
In order to gain an insight into the terrorism situation in Nigeria and the counterterrorism measures of the state’s authorities, several factors must be examined. Among the factors that will be further discussed are military and non-military interventions. With the help of a literature review, it will be possible to understand to what extent each measure tends to be helpful and whether there are gaps in the government’s initiatives toward extremism and terrorism.
Discussion
When it comes to Nigeria’s counterterrorism national policy, it is mainly ingrained in the government’s National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). It was approved for execution by the leader Goodluck Jonathan in 20142. The revised version was issued in 2016 under President Buhari’s presidency (Eji 2016). It covers topics such as the essence of Nigeria’s terrorist threat, action rules and mechanisms, and the responsibilities of stakeholders and organizations involved in counter-terrorism (Eji 2016). The strategy is divided into five processes, each with its own set of goals.
For more than a decade, this government’s pursuit of a helpful strategy to genuinely eliminate terrorism has resulted in the oscillation of many techniques that have failed to generate the desired result. For example, the Nigerian military’s professional competence in counterterrorism has been doubted (Eji 2016). This is particularly the case in civil-military interactions, human rights enforcement, and military participation norms in particular. Furthermore, the terrorists have changed tactics in counterinsurgency, putting the Nigerian army to the test in terms of capabilities (Eji 2016). While the Nigerian military was able to reclaim territory controlled by terrorists using conventional technologies, it could not deal with the militants’ unorthodox strategies of suicide bombers, kidnappings, and guerilla warfare.
The diplomatic method entails international collaboration through alliances and collective measures by governments against terrorism. The realization that no nation can combat terrorism alone has increased the importance of foreign policy (Eji 2016). Nigeria has sought to surround itself with allies and neighboring countries to fight against Boko Haram (Eji 2016). This has taken the shape of regional and international operations against the organization and offers for cooperative development of the Lake Chad Basin region, where Boko Haram has sought refuge (Eji, 2016). President Buhari visited all of the country’s neighboring nations and the U.K, the U.S., and France, in 2015, in an attempt to obtain both diplomatic and military support in combating terrorism in Nigeria (Eji 2016). However, it is noteworthy that such attempts are futile without additional efforts.
On the other hand, diplomatic initiatives are potentially complementary to other attempts, which means that these attempts can only be effective if the government involved has set other policies at the regional level. In another respect, international collaboration can only be beneficial if local counterterrorism actions are suitable and durable (Eji 2016). The implication is that Nigeria should organize the policies and other areas to develop a long-term and efficient nationwide counterterrorism tactic that will guide its initiatives and the initiatives of state and international associates who will support or take an interest in assisting it.
Recognizing that the warfare paradigm has failed to decrease the terrorism rates but has significantly increased the death toll in warzones, along with rising criticism, may have prompted the government to evaluate the use of non-military measures. The new effort involved a deradicalization campaign called “Operation Safe Corridor”3. The campaign has been created under Nigeria’s overall approach to counterterrorism, with the primary goal being the deradicalization, restoration, and reconciliation of Boko Haram opposition groups. The background of non-military Boko Haram approaches traces back to 2013. That year the northern elite pushed growing demands on the Jonathan-led administration for a political strategy to solve the crisis, emphasizing the issue’s links to socioeconomic disparity and marginalization (Onapajo & Ozden 2020). In 2017, the authorities restarted a deradicalization campaign, Operation Safe Corridor, to pursue the earlier effort (Onapajo & Ozden 2020). This ia a comprehensive program aimed to eliminate relapses of extremists.
The initiative primarily targets remorseful insurgents rather than the general public for a 52-week intense exercise. It is centered on deradicalization therapy, vocational education, and primary and religious education in preparation for social reintegration (Onapajo & Ozden 2020). The reintroduced people are anticipated to be watched after the government has gathered their DNA and biometrics to avoid relapse and confirm that they no longer pose a serious risk.
Analysis / Strategic Solutions
At this time, the Nigerian deradicalization measure is beset by a slew of issues that threaten to undermine the project’s fundamental goals. Regrettably, a poor deradicalization effort increases the public’s risk (Onapajo & Ozden 2020). This is because those who are poorly deradicalized have a high inclination to rejoin the organization and become more toughened since they need to overcommit themselves to demonstrate their contribution to the team.
In addition to the mentioned projects and strategies, there are programs and efforts to improve international collaboration. This is due to the need for improved border security and relations with neighboring nations and to also develop the trust of foreign partners, both state and non-state entities. Lastly, there is the requirement of public and private sector engagement or an all-stakeholders model in which the whole state and community commitment are channeled in combatting terrorism. It is critical to consider means and methods of improving the performance of counter-terrorist organizations to fulfill the goals of terrorism containment. A greater focus would be placed on strengthening the capability of security services. Considering that are the federal programs that will encourage and sustain the counterterrorism policy.
Conclusion
Hence, during the ten-year timeframe, Nigeria faced US$109 billion in damage from terrorist and extremist acts. The authorities of Nigeria implemented both military and non-military programs as counterterrorism measures. Nevertheless, both initiatives prove to have minimal effect on the contemporary situation. While military initiatives cannot tackle the issues of suicide bombers, kidnappings, and guerilla warfare, a deradicalization campaign is vulnerable to relapses of the former terrorists. Therefore, many other strategies must be implemented, such as border security and reinforced international relations.
Recommendations
Consequently, more research needs to be done regarding the complex topic of terrorism and extremism in Nigeria. In order to cause changes in the country, various new policies must be introduced that could build community resilience and reinforce national security. Among the objectives is to enhance better governance and democratization for economic and social progress, the lack of which is said to have had a role in the rise of terrorism in Nigeria.
References
- United Nations Development Programme. 2019. Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism in Africa. UNDP.
- Eji, Eugene. 2016. Rethinking Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18(3), 198-220.
- Onapajo, Hakeem, & Ozden, Kemal. 2020. Non-Military Approach Against Terrorism in Nigeria: Deradicalization Strategies and Challenges in Countering Boko Haram. Security Journal, 33(3), 476-492.