The article was written by Edward Walker, Richard Holliday, and Graham Boaler from the MMI Engineering. The primary idea was in the fact that many organizations around the globe prefer a flawed method related to fire extension capability. The article’s authors provide a list of materials designed to be fireproof and approved by the American Petroleum Institute.
Within an onshore petrochemical facility, the design of the Lightweight Cementitious Fireproofing (LWC) should be safe, despite the fact that there is a number of instances in which the facility chooses to implement an inherently unsafe design. This occurs because of some stakeholders of the petrochemical facilities have little knowledge of the requirements of performance as well as how capable and reliable a chosen system is. Furthermore, the financial aspect can also drive the choice of a supplier to use obsolete or unsafe design (Boaler, Holliday & Walker, 2015, p. 27).
The safe design of the Lightweight Cementitious Fireproofing relates to satisfying the needs and requirements of the system. The primary requirement of such a system is the responsiveness to the real danger of fire, pre-fire durability, and the blast loading response that in itself includes drag forces, projectile impact, over-pressure, and substrate deflection.
In addition to listing the effective characteristics of an LWC design, the authors also describe the problematic causes. The primary disadvantage of the box LWC design is that it directly relates to the pre-fire durability, reliability, and the cost of ownership. The pre-fire durability of the design helps to shelter the oil and gas substances from the potential ignition. However, in the majority of cases, a box design of the LWC is incapable of managing the mechanical impact caused by the angle bead detail.
Furthermore, wetting the steel structure, moisture, or water permeate the LWV structure and fills the spaces that were created by the box design. The further ingress of moisture then contributes to the weight of the structure and cause damage such as corrosion. Suppose the material of the box construction is corroded, its ability to withstand potential fire declines. The way in which oil, gas, and other chemical process plants operate should be designed in such a manner that there is no risk of potential fire explosion, and employees are safe both inside and outside these facilities (Singapore Fire Safety Guidelines, 2011, p. 5).
The article is a useful source of information for the primary stakeholders in the oil and gas industry. Despite the fact that the modern petrochemical processing plants are trying to use the most effective and fireproof design of LWF, there is still a risk of corrosion and lack of fireproofing. Some stakeholders of such facilities may not be aware of these dangers, so the point of the article is to encourage the management of the petrochemical facility to assess the conditions in which the substances are stored and processed. Since the box designs of the LWF are inferior to other types of design like solid fill or profile designs (Boaler, Holliday & Walker, 2015, p. 28).
Their disadvantage is linked to the risk of corrosion, poor durability, and high maintenance requirements. Thus, the main advice targeted at the oil and gas processing plants’ management is to reassess the condition of their facilities and change the LWF design to fit the requirements for fire resistance and fire prevention.
References
Boaler, G., Holliday, R., & Walker, E. (2015). Are Unsafe “Fireproofing” Practices Still Being Used in Oil & Gas and Petrochemical Processing Plants? Loss Prevention Bulletin, 242, 24-28.
Singapore Fire Safety Guidelines. (2011). Fire Safety Guidelines for Open Plant Structures in Oil, Chemical, and Process Industries. Web.