Jonathan Bennett, a well-known philosopher, was intrigued by the role of sympathy in moral life. His study explored how people approach their moral views and personal sympathies. Bennet (1974) selected stories from the lives of people like Huckleberry Finn, Heinrich Himmler, and Jonathan Edwards to illustrate and support his point. As a result, the author asserted that in most circumstances where such a conflict exists, one should obey one’s sympathies. Thus, the paper will claim that sympathy plays a vital role in moral life.
Readers might perceive the moral quandary in the circumstance in which Huck Finn found himself. Clarke (2020) states that in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (AHF), Huck, a 13 or 14-year-old white boy, is trying to escape from his violent, alcoholic father, while Jim, an enslaved Black adult, is running away from his owner, Miss Watson. Bennett presents Huck’s actions throughout this sequence of events as the consequence of a struggle between terrible morals, represented via his conscience and influenced by his upbringing in a racist, slave-owning culture and compassion for Jim (Clarke, 2020). Huck Finn was raised in a society that tolerated slavery and accepted it as usual, and he was taught that enslaved people are sold and purchased. Bennett deems sympathy the winner of the competition and uses the term extremely liberally to apply to any fellow feeling. Bennett portrays Huck as having “wide and deep” sympathies (1974, p. 131). Based on this portrayal, it is hardly surprising that Huck’s affections would triumph over his moral principles, and he would find himself unwilling to hand over Jim to the slavers.
The philosopher draws the overarching conclusion from AHF that sympathy may and should play a significant role in minimizing the effect of poor moral presuppositions on the action. While Bennett does not claim that one should always defer to compassion when it contradicts moral presuppositions, he does believe that one’s sympathies should be given substantial weight (Clarke, 2020). Bennet (1974) also contends that individuals have the potential to exercise ultimate control over the nature of their moral convictions. In his opinion, one method of exercising such control is to examine one’s values from the perspective of one’s sympathies.
Another analogous predicament between sympathy and morality occurs when the philosopher discusses Heinrich Himmler’s actions. In 1923, he became a Nazi; the man served drably and silently but successfully and was rewarded with more responsibility and influence (Bennet, 1974). Himmler oversaw the whole concentration-camp system and was in charge of conducting the so-called “final solution of the Jewish problem” (Bennet, 1974). Himmler appeared to be more concerned about his mental health if he continued to perform the tasks he was supposed to but did not wish to do. Tragically, poor morals triumphed over sympathy in this situation. Himmler, after all, bore his horrible load and paid the price for it. He had several psychological and physical problems, including nausea and stomach spasms (Bennet, 1974). Nonetheless, the author attempted to demonstrate that sympathy is the most powerful motivator for individuals to modify their minds.
To conclude, in the struggle between sympathy and poor morality, sympathy, as in Huck Finn, or morality, as in the instance of Himmler, may win. Another approach is that the conflict might be avoided by giving up or never having those sympathies that would interfere with one’s principle, as in the example of Jonathan Edwards. According to Bennet (1974), a disastrous aspect of Edwards was his morals, which were worse than Himmler’s. For instance, according to Edwards, God punishes some individuals to an eternity of unimaginably horrific torment while arbitrarily sparing others since none deserve to be saved. Bennet (1974) acknowledged that principles might sometimes prevail in a confrontation between principle and sympathy. Nonetheless, the philosopher states that one’s sympathies should be kept as keen, attentive, and conscious as possible, not just because they might occasionally alter one’s principles, behavior, or both. Consequently, people must strive to maintain their morality open to change, exposing it to legitimate demands from their sympathies.
References
Bennett, J. (1974). The conscience of Huckleberry Finn. Philosophy, 49(188), 123–134.
Clarke, S. (2020). Huckleberry Finn’s conscience: Reckoning with the evasion. The Journal of Ethics, 24(4), 485–508.