The standard way of thinking about skepticism has it that the choice between our ordinary beliefs and skeptical hypotheses cannot be justified. Jonathan Vogel states that it makes sense to prefer a theory that offers a better of some data rather than one that offers a worse explanation. He proves this point with several criteria, such as the necessity of the presence of only the essential information in theory and, at the same time, its explanation of many factors1. I argue that Vogel’s claim about the ‘real world hypothesis’ prevalence over the skeptical ones is somewhat questionable.
The notable flow of the ‘real world hypothesis,’ is that it assumes that we have specific knowledge about the external world. The most widespread argument for the skeptics is the comparison of two different situations: in one, a person can ‘really’ see the bridge, in other they think they see the bridge due to their brain being in the lab under the experiment. The result is the same, but it is even impossible to understand which situation a person is in right now. Or if there is a natural bridge before them.
Vogel can argue that his response provides a better explanation for a person’s experience and a deeper understanding of the processes. The ‘real world hypothesis’ assumes that our experience is caused by the real objects themselves. For instance, if a person observes a tree with leaves swaying in the wind, it is because there is a tree, which denotes a visual sense, and there is a wind that causes the movements of the leaves. Yet, the problem with this statement is the lack of any justifiable evidence that our experience at least exists.
The isomorphic skeptical hypothesis states the absence of any real actions happening but connects it with the pseudo-shapes and pseudo-locations. It seems true as one cannot understand for sure if their experience and feelings are caused by an actual wind or rather by a stimulated one. This being said, the question arises, why should one prefer the skeptical hypothesis over Vogel’s one? As this paper argues, Vogel’s response does not provide any sufficient explanation.
References
Vogel, J. (1990). Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(11), 658-666.
Footnotes
- Vogel, J. (1990). Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(11), 658-666.