It is challenging to overestimate Kant’s role in developing moral philosophy, which explains the fact that many other experts rely on his works. In her article “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Foot (1972) attempts to deny a commonly held belief that moral judgments cannot be hypothetical imperatives. In doing so, the author demonstrates why moral judgments cannot be categorical imperatives and focuses on shared features that moral judgments and hypothetical imperatives have.
To begin with, one should present the relative comparison of moral judgments and categorical imperatives. The latter represents an action that is objectively necessary by itself (Foot, 1972). Thus, Kant mentioned that moral judgments were used categorically, but one should state that this fact does not allow to claim that they are categorical. One should explain that etiquette rules are moral judgments, but it is impossible to state that they are categorical imperatives because these rules do not represent the actions that are necessary by themselves.
In turn, some arguments allow for concluding that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives. As mentioned in Foot’s (1972) article, hypothetical imperatives represent statements about what ought or should be done to achieve a good outcome. Since the word “should” is present in these imperatives, it denotes that a person does not have an automatic reason-giving force that is a characteristic feature of categorical imperatives. The focus on the same example with etiquette rules reveals that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives because these are actions that should be implemented, and it would be good to make them (Foot, 1972). According to the presented evidence, a few arguments demonstrate that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives, even though a commonly held opinion was that they were categorical ones.
Reference
Foot, P. (1972). Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. Philosophical Review, 81(3), 305-316.