It is important to note that the impact of science was immensely useful for bringing more knowledge, wisdom, understanding, and life improvement to humanity. However, it is not clear whether or not scientific frameworks lead to absolute reality or only interpretive ones. The former forms a basis for scientific realism, where the universe discovered and described with the use of the scientific method is real despite various interpretations. Antirealism follows a different path towards such a notion by pinpointing the fact that science is highly subject to change, and it can only describe the reality or truth within a specific paradigm, which can shift.
On the one hand, Thomas Kuhn was a proponent of antirealism of science, where his arguments were used to reveal the paradigmatic nature of the scientific framework. He stated that there are five major features of a scientific theory, which include accuracy, consistency, broadness, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Cover et al., 2012). However, he argued that these core characteristics could be in conflict with each other when selecting a superior theory, where one might be more accurate, but the other could have a wider scope (Cover et al., 2012). In other words, the selected criteria are mainly shared ones, which are not necessarily objective since they can also be influenced by idiosyncratic factors. Therefore, the process of selection and decision-making in a scientific process is largely determined by reliance on flawed elements of human nature. There is a barrier to communication between differential theories as well, which further hinders this process of achieving objective truth devoid of human misjudgments. Kuhn’s central claim is that truth is not properly compared or conversed when two parties bring their own paradigms, which include their own evaluative methods, and thus proper assessment is not achieved, but rather one paradigm is overthrown by another.
On the other hand, Ernan McMullin has realism-related points of disagreement with Kuhn in regards to his assessment, where antirealism plays a key part. McMullin points out that Kuhn’s notion of paradigm changes and revolution is highly divergent in their depth and impact. For example, the discovery made by Copernicus is not the same as the discovery of X-rays made by Roentgen because the latter did not lead to major changes in the current paradigm but rather extended it (Cover et al., 2012). In other words, the electromagnetic theory was not eliminated or fully reconstructed since X-rays were merely added to it. More significant revolutions exemplified by Kuhn include the oxygen theory of combustion. However, McMullin once again argues that the epistemic principles of science were still left untouched by this discovery because both paradigms would agree on the importance of evidence and the scientific method (Cover et al., 2012). In other words, paradigms do not overthrow one another but rather become implemented or incorporated into each other in varying degrees.
Moreover, McMullin addresses the biggest paradigm shift provided by Kuhn in regards to Copernicus. The former states that even the deepest of revolutions were only revisions of methodologies of paradigms. Both Copernicus and Einstein brought major framework changes, but these were related to the methods and perspectives used (Cover et al., 2012). Therefore, the epistemic values of science are not affected by even the most profound discoveries because the latter only affects perspectives and methodological processes. In addition, McMullin points out that Kuhn’s perception of values being tied to experience and not philosophical justification among scientists is incoherent since the only experience itself is needed to justify these values (Cover et al., 2012). In other words, it is possible for values to persevere and continue to serve in the search for truth, but their justification is linked to the experience of scientists. The epistemic values are used to define and observe science itself, and each such value is compared or critiqued on its own when it comes to paradigm comparisons. As a result, a more coherent theory is selected over a less coherent one, but there is no diminishment of values over another.
McMullin further disagrees with Kuhn when it comes to the rationality and realism of science. The famous example of Kuhn about Copernicus and Ptolemy attempts to reveal that both provide explanatory functions, which means that scientific realism is impossible because one seemingly sound paradigm was replaced by another. However, McMullin states that both Copernicus and Ptolemy might have had similar or neutral predictive power, but one was clearly superior in its explanatory capabilities (Cover et al., 2012). In other words, both had utility in providing the predictions of the movement of celestial bodies, but the explanation from Copernicus was clearly more accurate and required fewer inventions for predictions.
In conclusion, the view of the reality provided by science is truthful and factual despite the changes in the paradigm of human understanding because they are still deeply rooted in epistemic values. The latter elements lead to a strong belief in scientific realism since methodologies, predictive powers, or measurement principles might change both drastically or mildly. However, the values of the scientific process remain intact and always serve to define science by adjusting its assumptions around them.
Reference
Cover, J. A., Curd, M., & Pincock, C. (2012). Philosophy of science: The central issues (2nd ed.). W. W. Norton & Company.