Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a heuristic model of moral intuitions as described in the book, The Moral Psychology Handbook, by John M. Doris. To present the model, it is first necessary to identify it and explain its working principles. Models of heuristics can improve on one another. It is also important to illustrate the relation of the model to moral judgment. Finally, it is necessary to explain the implications of the heuristic model for philosophical theories of moral intuitions.
Main body
Moral intuitions are very important because people live and make decisions according to them. Doris claims that moral intuitions are “strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs” (246). These intuitions are permanent and need strong counter-argumentation to be revised. They exist for long periods without change and work without further reasoning at the very instance of decision making. People refer to them every time they need to justify their actions in terms of morality. Therefore, moral intuitions work in every kind of situation concerning promises or obligations.
According to Doris, “All heuristics work using unconscious attribute substitution” (248). When people do not have enough information about an object or a situation, they intuitively choose the facts that suit the case and form their deductions upon them. Such heuristic models of decision-making include availability, representativeness, and recognition. Sometimes people even limit the available information themselves for fast and simple decision-making. They will look only for one heuristic attribute in an object or situation. The same occurs in the case of moral intuitions. People often tend to evaluate their choices only by their morality, omitting all other details.
Models of heuristics can affect one another. When different attributes are available, a person can intuitively choose between different models. People can control their unconscious processes to a certain extent, and that ability allows them to decide what heuristic model will suit their case best. Nevertheless, a person chooses a model unconsciously and cannot fully describe the process of decision-making. Moral intuitions often improve on non-moral heuristics. In many cases, people choose a moral attribute instead of a practical one and successfully use it in non-moral situations.
Moral intuitions are closely connected to moral judgments. The heuristics people choose only partially represent their morality. Society often imposes certain attitudes that receive support from the majority. Even unconsciously, people tend to make decisions according to public opinion. In comparison to ordinary heuristics, personal morality often opposes society and authorities. Moral judgments are more complex than simple moral intuitions. Heuristics include common moral rules and principles (Doris 258). People can categorize their actions as universally approved or disapproved deeds and judge them accordingly.
The heuristic model of moral intuitions provides certain philosophical implications. In the process of decision-making, people substitute attributes with heuristics. Therefore, moral intuitions cannot provide direct insight into the nature of a situation or an object since heuristics lack reliability in certain circumstances. Moral intuitions are highly effective in simple situations. When the matter under question is complex, however, fast decision-making with the use of heuristics may return wrong results. The heuristic model of moral intuitions supports consequentialism. According to Doris, “The target attribute is having the best consequences” (267). Therefore, moral intuitions defend the accurateness of consequentialism.
Conclusion
The heuristic model of moral intuitions is very important in the context of moral psychology and philosophy. It helps to develop an understanding of the underlying processes of decision-making and to trace the connections between moral and non-moral attributes. Furthermore, the heuristic model provides new ground for studying moral judgments. Finally, moral intuitions have prominent philosophical implications that support consequentialism.
Work Cited
Doris, John M. The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press, 2010.