Introduction
The strategic role of nuclear weapons in national security is crucial. The main goal of any national security policy is to ensure stability, defined as the absence of war. The core principle underlying the United States nuclear policy is deterrence. The presence of a nuclear arsenal provides the potential danger of such retaliation, thus preventing a possible attack. In this article, the role of nuclear weapons in the national security of the United States will be analyzed. First, the structure and logic of the nuclear arsenal will be described. Second, its role in national defense will be investigated. Third, the evaluation of the current nuclear policy will be provided.
The Structure and Logic of Nuclear Arsenal
The nuclear power of the United States is represented by a triad that includes land-launched nuclear missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, and aircraft with nuclear bombs and missiles. At present, the United States possesses:
- 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), each with the capacity to carry up to three warheads;
- 18 Ohio-class submarine, each armed with 24 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), carrying eight warheads each;
- about 100 nuclear bombers B-2 and B-52 (Forsyth et al., 2016, p. 98).
Thus, it represents the interagency coordination of the US military, in accordance with the joint doctrine, a fundamental principle of coordinated action aiming at a mutual target.
The Role in National Defense
The role of military power for national defense was realized at the time of the Cold War. The policy of minimizing armed forces and enhancing it only in case of emergency was maintained since the aftermath of the Revolutionary War (1775-1783). However, the rivalry with the Soviet Union demonstrated the necessity of a permanent military. The reason for it was not only providing national security but the international responsibilities in maintaining global security, set by NATO in 1949.
After the possession of nuclear weaponry by the Soviet Union, the US was compelled to enhance its nuclear arsenal for maintaining global peace. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), developed during the Cold War, was based on a strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons of the adversaries would destroy all of them. The awareness of it was the cause of developing deterrence policy. As Forsyth et al. (2016) state, deterrence offers the adversary a “choice of complying with what has been demanded of it—inaction—or defying those demands and risking implementation of the deterrent’s threatened to sanction” (94). Thus, the power of nuclear arsenal is evident without using the weaponry itself, preventing the attack by the threat of the counterattack.
The Evaluation of the Current Nuclear Policy of the US
At present, the efficiency of a nuclear arsenal in providing national security is evident. As it has been observed, “nuclear weapons are better than conventional forces in terms of enhancing general deterrence,” much due to its lower cost of maintenance (Forsyth et al., 2016, p. 96). However, there is no single opinion about the amount of nuclear weaponry optimal for ensuring such security. Currently, there is a tendency to reduce the size of nuclear weaponry, driven by the argument that even “small numbers of nuclear weapons produce dramatic effects” (Forsyth et al., 2016, p. 100). On the other hand, the defender would need to possess, “at a minimum, enough survivable nuclear forces to inflict damage on the aggressor roughly equivalent to the gains—in the territory, industrial capacity, et cetera” (Forsyth et al., 2016, p. 98). The majority of the analysts hold the opinion about slightly decreasing the amount of weaponry that exists at present.
I agree that the presence of a nuclear arsenal is a necessary factor in national security matters. In my opinion, both extremes, including minimum and maximum amounts of nuclear weapons, would be ineffective. The minimum would not be appropriate in ensuring a stable balance and deterrence. On the other hand, increasing the amount of weaponry would be a challenge for the national budget. Therefore, adjusting the amount requires a detailed analysis of the counter-power and possible threats to national security.
Reference
Forsyth, J. W., Jr., Saltzman, B. C., & Schaub, G., Jr. (2016). Remembrance of things past: The enduring value of nuclear weapons. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 10(5), 93-109.