Introduction
China bids on foreign infrastructure development due to its potential to advance Chinese diplomacy and economy and enhance security. The Belt and Road (BR) project was announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 (Ye, 2020). The first reason, foreign “infrastructure diplomacy,” was to enhance “mutual connectivity” throughout the Asian continent (Ye, 2020, p. 117). BR aimed to enhance the ASEAN-China cooperation by liberalizing trade and increasing inter-regional financial collaboration (Ye, 2020). The second reason was economical, arguably inspired by the Chinese Marshall Plan (CMP). Both intended to fund infrastructure development in impoverished nations through China’s industrial surplus, promote cooperation, and establish China as a leader in the international economy (Ye, 2020). Lastly, China was guided by security concerns regarding American geostrategic advancements in maritime Asia (Ye, 2020). Thus, Ye’s (2020) first argument (A1) is that the initiative formed in a climate of fragmentation and politico-economic tension, hinting at the lack of reliability and planning. Ye’s (2020) central thesis is that its ambiguity provided a broader appeal yet created a disconnect between the political rhetoric and on-the-ground manifestation, only furthering the fragmentation and creating a global backlash potential.
Mobilization Messaging
The government instilled top-down pressure to report on the project solely according to the internal political agenda. The presidential office’s “cohesive” mobilization messaging stressed the importance of nationalist aspirations – the rise and modernization of China (Ye, 2020, p. 124). Ye (2020) lists two rhetorical mechanisms: ambitious language and intentional ambiguity, which allow for flexible interpretation and broader appeal. Ye (2020) argues that despite the ubiquitous dispersal of messages, substantive policy guidelines were seldom present, which caused further state fragmentation. Although the political leadership instilled ‘consensus’ on the core nationalist messaging regarding the BR project, local branches, and corporations inserted their policy proposals and preferences.
Leadership
The leadership and the governance of the BR initiative were complicated. Ye (2020) maintains the BR initiative was not meant as “a new global vision” since agencies involved in diplomacy (MFA) and international negotiation (MOFCOM) were not given specific and influential roles (Ye, 2020, p. 129). The NDRC, however, was in the lead, likely because it had the power to approve significant financial investments (Ye, 2020). Moreover, prominent corporate actors in energy, transportation, and finance operated without NDRC oversight. Lower-level agencies participated depending on the regional priorities since no uniform, and obligatory directives were issued (Ye, 2020). Overall, the effects of fragmentation re-emerged during the execution stage: regional economic priorities motivated the local actors to pursue their agenda. Thus, the third argument is that instigating foreign and economic policy change requires directive political leadership and agencies with finances and authority to oversee large projects.
Implementation
In an external implementation, most of the reported BR projects were done by the central state. Most were industry-related, such as “small-scale infrastructure and power sectors,” indicating that the BR was primarily motivated to overcome industrial overcapacity (Ye, 2020, p. 138). Further, Ye (2020) states that the initially proposed banks, like AIIB and SRF, were not sufficient for supporting the BR. Fourth, Ye (2020) argues that the present global advancements of the BR do not seem like an “ambitious projection of power abroad” (p. 137). In terms of internal implementation, the new BR funding revitalized many regional infrastructure projects that were commenced and stalled previously due to the crisis (Ye, 2020).
Dangers
Ye (2020) warns of the dangers of the BR’s ambitious rhetoric and localized implementation: first, many nations may begin to rely unconditionally on China’s lending and investment. Second, infrastructure and regional industry development are deft-financed; the BR funding allowed many projects to stay afloat, which may only postpone the impending crisis (Ye, 2020). The last argument is that due to ambiguous communication of critical ideas, the BR project causes “confusion, suspicion, and opposition” when presented to leaders outside China (Ye, 2020, p. 132).
Capitalism
Unlike Ye’s analysis, Xing’s outlook for the future of the BR initiative is more optimistic. Xing’s (2019) central thesis is that the BR project positions Eurasia as one of the center points of China’s foreign diplomacy, which undoubtedly makes BR a political ambition that will overturn the global dynamics. Xing (2019) places the discussion in the context of capitalism. First, Xing (2019) argues that maintaining structural power endows the nation with the ability to govern global (capitalist) relationship patterns, which is why the US is wary of the potential global emergence of China. Furthermore, Xing (2019) contends that China’s emergence “disturbed” the ‘conventional’ global power and market dynamic, which fits in with the history of capitalist expansion (p. 4). The present economic system is capitalist: it is regulated by the desire for capital accumulation and characterized by production segmentation, capital mobility, and investment-capital union (Xing, 2019). The goals of capital accumulation and territorial expansion thus become the significant characteristics of the BR initiative.
Global Economy
The BR initiative is hugely influential through the IPE framework. It covers approximately 65% of the global population and 33% of the global GDP (Xing, 2019). BR aims to create two economic ‘belts’: the first belt connecting China’s neighboring countries and the second maritime belt connecting African and Chinese ports through the Suez Canal (Xing, 2019, p. 6). The project covers a variety of infrastructures and would serve to connect and foster development across Eurasia, East Africa, and over 60 partner nations (Xing, 2019). Xing (2019) stresses that most academia is likewise optimistic regarding the benefits of the program for China and the neighboring regions. Xing (2019) further suggests that China might bring back the free trade and globalization initiatives. Second, Xing (2019) argues that China’s change, coupled with other economic and international labor division alterations, could redefine global relations and the IPE in terms of upward or downward mobility among all nations.
Concerns
The reactions of the Western nation to this process vary. Third, Xing (2019) argues that the expansion will entail the growth of military power, which, coupled with the dependency of foreign states on Chinese trade agreements and infrastructure financing mechanisms, may drastically increase China’s regional power. Xing (2019) touches on the “China syndrome” in Western policy discussions, characterized by the perception extremes – from excessive appraisal as a ‘superpower’ nation to demonization (p. 10). Tracing the history of the BR initiative allows us to see new patterns of international political economy (IPE), patterns that are no longer exclusively set by the “US-led postwar treaties” (Xing, 2019, p. 4).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the BR project was, undoubted, a child of its autocratic regime. The nationalist initiative arose out of state fragmentation and economic crisis. The major criticism is the lack of clear expansion policies, which may create an international conflict. While the leading players agreed on the need for foreign diplomacy development and domestic progress, they had their ideas regarding the implementation. In terms of IPE, China strives to reach and deeply integrate with new markets and foster international trade. The BR initiative’s principal aim is to support the Chinese industry and support GDP growth and employment by redistributing domestic overcapacity and developing foreign infrastructure. The example of China’s success is used to prove that there are multiple mechanisms whereby nations may prosper and collaborate in the global economy.
References
Wong, E., Chi, L. K., & Tsui, S. (2017). One belt, one road. Monthly Review.
Xing, L. (2019). China’s pursuit of the “one belt one road” initiative: A new world order with Chinese characteristics? In L. Xing (Ed.), Mapping China’s ‘one belt one road’ initiative (pp. 1–27). Springer International Publishing.
Ye, M. (2020). The belt road and beyond: State-mobilized globalization in China: 1998–2018 (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.