Introduction
On April 29, 2011, President Obama, the then-United States of America commander in chief, ordered an operation that resulted in the death of the most wanted man on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) watch list, Osama bin Laden. According to Cox (2020), the president had consulted with the CIA for months about the potential of Osama bin Laden being within the purported hideaway and the likelihood of ordering his capture or assassination operation. Finally, President Obama gave the order, and Osama bin Laden was assassinated in a military drill known as Operation Geronimo, ending a decade-long search for the Al Qaeda leader. The death of Osama bin Laden brought relief to millions of American citizens and the entire population, particularly after September 11, 2001, when hundreds died in the notorious Twin Towers bombing by Al Qaeda. However, there are many uncertainties about the constitutionality of President Obama’s approval of Operation Geronimo. This essay argues that Operation Geronimo was legally authorized and that President Obama had the power to order and carry out the Operation.
Operation Geronimo
To comprehend President Obama’s constitutionality in ordering Operation Geronimo, one must examine the decision with reference to domestic and international laws. The legality of allowing Operation Geronimo is based on President Reagan’s Executive Order 12333, which stipulates that “no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination” (Trenta, 2021, p. 10). However, because this directive does not characterize assassination thematically, the Operation cannot be considered unlawful under this interpretation (Senn & Troy, 2017). Furthermore, following the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force resolution. The resolution authorizes the president of the United States to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons” (Schultz, 2017, p. 10). As a result, President Obama was within the bounds of United States domestic law when he authorized the mission that executed Osama bin Laden, who was directly involved in the planning and implementing of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, under this resolution.
However, even if such authority is legitimate, issues remain about how the Operation was carried out following the rules of armed conflict, namely military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. In this case, military necessity was qualified since Bin Laden had assaulted the United States and constituted a menace to international peace by spreading terrorism. Similarly, the force employed after breaking into Bin Laden’s residence was proportional to the threat he posed to the special team since he allegedly lunged for his handgun in retaliation. Finally, the need for discrimination was met since the victims who perished in the subsequent fight were collateral damage rather than the objectives of the assault.
As previously stated, the authorization has to be in accordance with international law. “State can justify an international use of force if the force was either used in self-defense following an armed attack or expressly permitted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council,” according to international law standards of jus ad bellum (Cox, 2020, p. 250). In this situation, the United States was a victim of Bin Laden’s violent attack on September 11, 2001, and arresting him constituted to a form of self-defense. On the other hand, the laws of jus in bello provide “the parameters on the allowable scope and nature of that force” (Cox, 2020, p. 251). As a result, the US had a legal foundation to enter Pakistan and carry out its mission within the bounds of international law.
There have been charges that the US violated Pakistani sovereignty by invading Bin Laden’s lair without consulting local officials. The UN Charter stresses territorial sovereignty, which all states should uphold (Cox, 2020). However, Article 51 of the same UN Charter allows the US to pursue its aggressors in self-defense, even if it means infringing on the territorial sovereignty of other countries (Cox, 2020). Thus, by ordering Operation Geronimo, President Obama acted in accordance with international law.
Notably, if the two nations are not at war, international law prohibits a government from deploying force on another’s territory without its agreement. It is worth mentioning, however, that President Obama had sufficient rationale for his choice. According to Tankel (2018), the Obama administration had cause to think that the Pakistani intelligence service sanctioned bin Laden’s stay in Pakistan. If these suspicions were valid, requesting Pakistan’s assistance would have allowed bin Laden to go. Therefore, the unilateral military intervention utilized in Operation Geronimo was legal since there is an exception to sovereignty, mainly when a government is reluctant to conceal a threat to another country originating on its land. Although Pakistan did not explicitly indicate that it was hesitant to assist in the Operation, the fear of a “tip-off” sufficed as an unwillingness to help (Cox, 2020). Osama bin Laden, a well-known terrorist, represented a massive global threat. Hence, by not asking permission to use force in Pakistan, President Obama acted within his power, given evidence that the Pakistani government was reluctant to bring bin Laden to justice.
Another issue with the assassination of Osama as the default choice stems from the law of war mandates recognizing the enemy’s surrender, which is consistent with international human rights legislation respecting unalienable rights. Bin Laden was unarmed when he was murdered, yet he refused to submit. The United States Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) crew stated that even though Bin Laden was not armed, he was surrendering, according to Tankel, (2018). Even though he was unarmed, other extremists in the complex opened fire on the SEAL team. The SEAL team’s conduct is justified under military rules of engagement that specify when, when, how, and against whom a soldier may use force. According to Tankel (2018), soldiers are entitled to use military force when the opponent is armed or demonstrating resistance. Even though bin Laden was not resisting Operation Geronimo, his militants were fighting, and hence, the SEAL team could not risk taking him alive since it would put them in danger. According to Senn and Troy (2017), the choice was made after analyzing all feasible alternatives. The best option was to remove the threat. Consequently, having to assassinate Osama as the default choice was justified.
Conclusion
Overall, the legitimacy of the instructions to launch, and subsequent execution of, Operation Geronimo is clear. Obama was instructed on the legal implications of his actions, including domestic policy inside the United States, international sovereignty rules and exceptions, and international human rights, as well as other relevant factors. His decision to authorize and carry out a raid in Pakistan was within his legal power as commander in chief, was carried out in accordance with applicable principles of international law on sovereignty, and was aware of civilian issues and human rights regulations.
References
Cox, K. E. (2020). Beyond self-defense: United Nations peacekeeping operations & (and) the use of force. Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, 27(2), 3.
Senn, M., & Troy, J. (2017). The transformation of targeted killing and international order. Contemporary Security Policy, 38(2), 175-211.
Schultz, K. A. (2017). Perils of polarization for US foreign policy. The Washington Quarterly, 40(4), 7-28.
Trenta, L. (2021). Death by reinterpretation: Dynamics of norm contestation and the US ban on assassination in the Reagan years. Journal of Global Security Studies, 6(4), ogab012.
Tankel, S. (2018). Pakistan: The Paradox. In with Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror (1st ed., pp. 100-350). Columbia University Press.