Operation Jawbreaker: Term`s Description

The investigation of the success of intelligence and military operations is required to ensure their future improvement. For this project, it is proposed to research, describe, and evaluate the success of the counterterrorist operation JAWBREAKER. This codename is applied to an operation that was launched after the 9/11 terror act by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This operation targeted the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and had the ultimate aim of killing Osama bin Laden.¹

The methods consisted of forging partnerships with the local resistance (the Northern Alliance) and assisting it with the common goal of destroying the Taliban and Al-Qaeda by mutually exchanging intelligence and providing funding and supplies.² As a result, the operation has been classified as covert.³ The outcomes consisted of the Northern Alliance successfully working against Al-Qaeda with the help of the US,⁴ although the ultimate aim was not achieved within the project.⁵ In general, it has been described as an extremely successful operation that was also carried out very quickly, which may be partially attributable to the cultural intelligence of the officers involved in it.⁶

In order to repeat its success, the investigation of all the possible causes of its effectiveness is required. This topic is researchable, even though there are few sources, especially recent ones, that directly consider it. Still, there are published⁷ articles, accounts,⁸ and reports,⁹ as well as some publicly available CIA data.¹⁰

Also, the event is mentioned in sources that are not necessarily focused on it but still consider¹¹ the¹² US¹³ and other countries’¹⁴ activities in Afghanistan. In addition, the research will employ a form of success criteria, which may consist of Meharg’s suggestions¹⁵ and include Nuechterlein’s analytical framework.¹⁶ The preliminary research question inquires about the effectiveness of the operation and the causes of its success, and the proposed list of literature is presented in the references of this document.

Bibliography

Berntsen, Gary, and Ralph Pezzullo. Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander. New York: Crown/Archetype, 2005.

Buckley, Chip Michael. “Overt Acceptance: Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives.” Master’s thesis, Mercyhurst University, 2015.

Central Intelligence Agency. “Experience the Collection.” CIA Museum. 2018. Web.

Hilpert, Carolin. Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy: Germany and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Kerry, John F. Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today. A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009.

Meharg, Sarah Jane. “Measuring Effectiveness in Complex Operations: What is Good Enough?” Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute. 2009.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001.

Peake, Hayden. “88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary.” Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 2 (2015): 1-2.

Schroen, Gary. First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan. New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2005.

Strandquist, Jon. “US Paramilitary Programs in Comparative Perspective: CIA, the US Army Special Forces, and the Question of Organizational Form.” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 (2017): 79-93.

Footnotes

1. Jon Strandquist, “US Paramilitary Programs in Comparative Perspective: CIA, the US Army Special Forces, and the Question of Organizational Form,” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 (2017): 85-6. Web.
2. Strandquist, “US Paramilitary Programs,” 85.
3. Chip Michael Buckley, “Overt Acceptance: Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives” (master’s thesis, Mercyhurst University, 2015), 1-2.
4. Buckley, “Overt Acceptance,” 1-2.
5. Strandquist, “US Paramilitary Programs,” 86.
6. Buckley, “Overt Acceptance,” 1-2.
7. Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander. (New York: Crown/Archetype, 2005), 1-10.
8. Gary Schroen, First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan. (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2005), 15-7.
9. Peake, Hayden, “88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary,” Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 2 (2015): 1-2.
10. Central Intelligence Agency, “Experience the Collection,” CIA Museum, 2018. Web.
11. John F. Kerry, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today. A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 7-8.
12. Buckley, “Overt Acceptance,” 1-2.
13. Strandquist, “US Paramilitary Programs,” 85-6.
14. Carolin Hilpert, Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy: Germany and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 26-40.
15. Sarah Jane Meharg, “Measuring Effectiveness in Complex Operations: What is Good Enough?” Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2009. Web.
16. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 12-31.