Introduction
Understanding Hitler’s rise to power during Germany’s interwar development is crucial for the future prevention of similar tendencies. As an outcome of World War I, Germany became a democratic state known as the Weimar Republic (Voth 9). It faced numerous postwar social, political, and economic problems, such as civil unrest, reparations, or hyperinflation. Without room to breathe, the Republic suffered greatly from the Great Depression in 1929 (Voth 9). From that moment, Hitler and his followers began to receive more votes during the elections. It may seem logical that the popularity of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) is bound to an economic decrease and a growth in unemployment (Galofré-Vilà et al. 81). However, there is also evidence of a relationship between radical voting and fiscal austerity, the German banking crisis of 1931, and the overall Nazi propagandistic success (Doerr et al. 7; Galofré-Vilà et al. 81; Voth 9). Consequently, this paper will study Hitler’s rise to power in the economic, financial, and propagandistic aspects to determine their roles in this matter.
Economic aspect
The Great Depression forced Germany’s government to apply austerity measures in 1930, with cuts in expenditures and tax raises. Regarding the spending, Germany’s major cities reduced it by roughly 8% (Galofré-Vilà et al. 91). The reductions were mainly focused on health, administrative, education, and housing expenditures, ranging from 14% to 38% accordingly (Voth, 10). As for the taxes, the state’s income increased by approximately 10% (Voth, 10). By the end of 1931, almost every tax in the country, such as income, wage, and profits, was raised by the government (Galofré-Vilà et al. 88). Weimar Republic’s structure was federative and worked on a principle that the revenue from the Federal government was first split and then sent to particular states. With the total expenditure reduction, the federal transfers were reduced too. It left the state governments with the option to either reduce their expenditures in turn or increase their tax rates. The first option primarily affected people from the lower classes, who relied on various welfare payments. The second option, in the meantime, harmed the middle-class people, which were more concerned with their regular payouts.
Both cases, however, led to the population’s dissatisfaction with the current government. In other words, the population’s dissatisfaction and desire for better life transformed into the consequent rise in the votes for NSDAP (Huijgen and Holthuis 31). The Nazi Party was not a single party in the opposition, though. The first shift in polls could be seen in the early elections that occurred in September 1930. The only parties that went openly against austerity were NSDAP and Communist Party (Galofré-Vilà et al. 88). Consequently, those were the only parties who registered the increased vote support – approximately 10-13% increase for Communist and an abrupt 3 – 18% for NSDAP (Galofré-Vilà et al. 87). The latter saw an advantage in the government’s emergency decrees, criticizing the austerity and spreading the promises of reversing it.
There was also evidence that Nazi support declined when the actual reversal policy was implemented. In November 1932, the government signalized the end of the austerity and provided various economic stimulus packages (Galofré-Vilà et al. 88). Additionally, the Lausanne conference allowed for postponing Germany’s war debts, which further eased the financial situation in the country (Galofré-Vilà et al. 88). These measures served as a mere respite in the light of the total negative austerity’s impact on Germany’s economy. Nevertheless, they resulted in an almost 5% decline in votes for NSDAP (Galofré-Vilà et al. 88). This tendency showcases the direct ratio between the severity of austerity and the Nazi’s vote pool. It also proves that German’s economic policy was responsible for the initial growth of NSDAP support.
Financial aspect
During the austerity policy of 1930, the number of Hitler’s voters registered its first leap. After the bank crisis of 1931, his support increased even more. From the end of 1930 to 1932, the Nazi Party received another enormous boost in votes – from roughly 18% to almost 38% (Voth 13). The crisis in Germany followed the European one, triggering the mass withdrawal and causing the failure of Danatbank. It resulted in three-week bank inactivity, Germany’s exit from a gold standard, and an overall decrease (approximately 7%) of the population’s income (Voth 14). At the same time, the negative impact of the crisis on the national industry was much higher than in other countries.
Overall, Germany’s industry preceded the crisis by a significant margin. The German industrial output began to contract already in 1927, primarily because of the investment fall compared to 1929 in the U.S (Doerr et al. 7). By 1929, the national industrial output in Germany registered a 40% decline (Doerr et al. 7). Unemployment rose exponentially when the expenditure cuts from austerity were applied – not only were people left without jobs, but they could not rely on benefits anymore as well. Since German capital consisted primarily of loans from abroad, the international debt market’s freeze caused additional tax raises and expenses cuts across the country (Doerr et al. 8). The firms that heavily relied on borrowing soon found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy.
Such was the case with the textile firm Nordwolle which worked under the Danatbank. Its management’s poor decisions led to severe losses on Danat’s loans, equal to 80% of the bank’s equity (Doerr et al. 8). A German central bank attempted to save Danatbank, which might have worked with the support of France and Great Britain. Nevertheless, the political situation was not in its favor – Danatbank collapsed, and the country’s currency lost its bond to gold. German banks provided financial support country-wide, not limiting themselves to the states where they were represented. In addition, German firms tended to choose one particular bank and stick to it afterward (Voth 13). Consequently, when one out of four major German banks collapsed, numerous firms suffered significant losses in productivity and ability to provide workplaces. Shortly after, the population’s financial shock and economic consequences contributed to the election results in the Nazi’s favor.
A seemingly similar event did not produce the same result later, though. When another German bank, Dresdner, collapsed too, the negative impact on the economy was relatively equal. However, it was not the case with the votes’ preferences, which showed only a slight change (Voth 14). The main difference between the two banks was that the Danatbank had a Jewish banker as its leader. With its collapse, Nazis finally received a solid, country-wide validation for their anti-Semitic propaganda. The effect in the regions with historical anti-Semitic tendencies was the strongest, especially where Danatbank was originally well-represented (Voth 15). Strengthened by the banking crisis, anti-Semitism immensely grew on a country scale with the NSDAP effort. Hitler and his followers successfully exploited Germany’s dire state and blamed it on the under-represented Jews.
Propagandistic aspect
There were multiple obstacles in the way of Nazi propaganda. The actual government strictly controlled the information issued by NSDAP – banning newspapers, confiscating leaflets and brochures, and disallowing radio broadcasting (Selb and Munzert 2). Thus, the Nazis and Hitler himself had to be significantly involved in the elections campaigns across the country, forming their program wisely and with care. According to Selb and Munzert, Hitler’s earlier participation in NSDAP performances was not as effective in terms of acquired votes as in the last years of Germany’s democracy (14). Despite the modest effects on the votes pool, those performances achieved various other goals. Every person who changed the voting preference could be counted as two since by strengthening the NSDAP, he weakened their opponents simultaneously. Nazis also had to care about funds and image as a political party. They deliberately targeted the regions where the Nazis’ influence was weak or on a decline (Selb and Munzert 11). The eventual success of Nazi propaganda significantly contributed to the party’s popularity.
Before the austerity, NSDAP did not pose any real threat to other parties in the parliament. In 1928, it had to change its focus from the aggressive Anti-Semitism and violent overthrow of the current government. The decision that began to bring members to the party was to act against the Young Plan in 1929 (Doerr et al. 9). The plan allowed Germany to change the schedule for the reparations payouts, also lowering the short-term payments at the cost of the debt maturity increase. In this context, Hitler tried to point out the Young Plan’s basis on an outstanding loan from the U.S., which increased Germany’s overall debts in the face of the crisis (Doerr et al. 9). Later in 1930, NSDAP actively opposed the fiscal austerity policy and found great support in the middle-class Germans and elites who suffered greatly from the rising taxes (Doerr et al. 9). However, the most significant leap in the votes’ number happened after the fall of Danatbank, which allowed Nazis to remind people of Germany about the “Jew problem.”
Hence, the significance of Hitler’s performances to the party’s success began to grow dramatically. In the Spring of 1932, Hitler was among the candidates for the president post after securing 30% of the votes in the first round (Selb and Munzert 11). Before the second round of presidential elections in April 1932, Hindenburg – the actual president – issued a decree limiting the campaigning time to six days before the runoff (Selb and Munzert 11). In such a short period, Hitler managed to perform 21 speeches in different parts of Germany with a first documented usage of an airplane for campaign purposes in history (Selb and Munzert 4). He then continued chartering planes for his needs, trying to appear in as many places as possible in his “Hitler over Germany” campaign (Selb and Munzert 4). Hitler’s unprecedented performance allowed NSDAP to secure a significant amount of seats in the parliament.
The year 1933 became decisive for Nazis in their rise to power. They managed to earn people’s support through previous successful decisions, and a decline in votes due to the end of the austerity did not produce enough impact. In January of 1933, Hitler was appointed chancellor, right ahead of the elections in March, where NSDAP acquired approximately 44% of voices (Galofré-Vilà et al. 89). It allowed Nazis to form a coalition and secure the absolute majority in the parliament. Such was the last election in the Weimar Republic, which is also thought to be connected with violence and intimidation (Galofré-Vilà et al. 89). The prevalence allowed NSDAP to monopolize power soon and put Hitler in charge of all of Germany.
Conclusion
While it is hardly debatable that the Great Depression and a poor Weimar Republic’s economic state are responsible for the swift rise of NSDAP, it resembles only the tip of the iceberg. Along with the other opposition, Nazis stood against the tax increases and expenditure cuts. Financial shock after the banking crisis in 1931 deepened the population’s disbelief in the current government, making the opposing parties even more attractive. However, in contrast to other parties in the parliament, NSDAP’s active propaganda was much more agile and managed to make the right decisions amidst the uncertainty of the Great Depression. Agitation against the Young Plan and fiscal austerity allowed Nazis to gain ground in the parliament. Danatbank’s collapse provided Nazis with the needed validation of their social policy. With enough support gathered, NSDAP used more force-oriented strategies. In 1933, Hitler was appointed a chancellor, and soon after, Nazis monopolized their reign over Germany. To conclude, Hitler’s rise to power showcases that there is always a need for thorough research, even if the reasons already seem apparent. It also pictures how vulnerable a population can be to propaganda during harsh times.
Works Cited
Doerr, Sebastian, et al. From finance to extremism: the real effects of germany’s 1931 banking crisis. (2018). University of Zurich, CEPR Discussion paper. Web.
Galofré-Vilà, Gregori, et al. “Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party.” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 81, no. 1, 2021, pp. 81-113, Web.
Huijgen, Tim, and Paul Holthuis. “’Man, people in the past were indeed stupid.’ Using a three-stage framework to promote historical contextualisation”, Teaching History, no. 172, 2018, pp. 30-38.
Selb, Peter, and Simon Munzert. “Examining a most likely case for strong campaign effects: Hitler’s speeches and the rise of the nazi party, 1927–1933.” American Political Science Review, vol. 112, no. 4, 2018, pp. 1050-1066, Web.
Voth, Hans-Joachim. “Roots of war: Hitler’s Rise to Power.” The Economics of the Second World War: Seventy-Five Years On, edited by. S. Broadberry and M. Harrison, 2020, pp. 9-17. Web.