Introduction
The concept of war is not new to humanity; on the contrary, humanity has known war since its inception. As time passed, various thinkers, philosophers, soldiers, and generals elaborated on the intricacies of strategy, tactics, and other vital implications of warfare to achieve their military goals. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz are prominent examples of men who devoted their time to preserving their military knowledge for future generations in the form of written works.
While both thinkers base their theories on the intricate dynamics of war and strategy, Sun Tzu emphasizes the value of deception, adaptability, and indirect methods, viewing war as an art. On the other hand, Von Clausewitz leans towards understanding the chaotic and political nature of war, asserting it as an extension of politics, focusing on its unpredictability and friction.
The Art of War, a seminal ancient Chinese work on war strategy, is generally attributed to Sun Tzu, a renowned ancient Chinese military officer, strategist, and scholar. Around 500 B.C., Sun Tzu served as a well-known military counselor to Chinese royalty (Odoh and Blessing, 2023). Establishing sufficient defenses to fend off any assault and looking for ways to destroy the opponent were two fundamental principles of his literature (Tzu, 2000).
In turn, German military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the political and moral dimensions of warfare in his work On War. He was a person who had a direct impact on the Prussian army in the early 19th century, introducing reforms that helped the country wage war against Napoleon (Joshi, 2019). It is challenging to choose between these works because each has its advantages and disadvantages. Von Clausewitz’s vision tends to be more practical, whereas Sun Tzu’s work provides sophisticated general guidance. This essay will compare the two theorists and demonstrate that they held contrasting opinions in most regards.
Nature of War
Over pure military power, Sun Tzu favors fluidity, adaptability, surprise, deceit, and intelligence. He asserted that a prudent commander will prevail if these concepts are applied effectively. The path to success is evident for intelligent commanders who want to keep their adversaries perplexed and unbalanced, rather than reacting and acting. According to Sun Tzu’s teachings, using force in battle is a last resort (Tzu, 2000).
Sun Tzu’s ideas are attractive, emphasizing the winning of battles with the least time and sacrifice. When used correctly, this strategy protects people’s lives, their property, and the support of the general populace. Overall, Sun Tzu favors a strategy of winning by every means possible. His main goal is to persuade the opponent to comply with his demands without eliminating the enemy’s forces.
Sun Tzu’s main aim is victory, yet he does not suggest making sacrifices to achieve it. His primary objective is to devise a means to defeat the adversary without resorting to physical combat. This, according to Sun Tzu, ought to be the initial objective of every commander. In a conflict, a commander’s ability to compel his adversary to submit without both sides paying a bloody price increases the likelihood that the ensuing peace will be reached more quickly and be simpler to administer (Tzu, 2000). Long-term hostility and bitterness cause lasting wounds and fuel resentment among adversaries, which a shorter and bloodless battle can alleviate.
The way von Clausewitz approached military doctrine differed significantly from that of the former. The overwhelming deployment of force and efforts to reduce friction in warfare drew much of von Clausewitz’s attention. His way of thinking has shortcomings because he allowed himself to overfocus on the idea of a single, determinable center of gravity. In other words, according to von Clausewitz, finding the center of gravity or the key point at the critical moment on which the fate of the war rested was crucial (Clausewitz, 2014).
In this regard, von Clausewitz fails to acknowledge that conflict frequently presents numerous smaller centers of gravity (Hageback and Hedblom, 2021). In the quest for a general advantage, each of these numerous smaller centers of gravity can be located and used for one’s own advantage. The adversary can be swiftly knocked off balance by simultaneously pressuring these centers.
The smaller objectives during the fight against the opposing army are another point of disagreement between the philosophers. It can be seen that Sun Tzu refers to winning without using force as “the acme of excellence” (Tzu, 2000). Therefore, it is only logical that he would support defeating an opposing army without causing any damage. In this context, the best approach is to avoid engaging in combat altogether.
Sun Tzu asserts that by doing this, troops will not be worn out, and an army’s gains will be complete (Tzu, 2000). Conversely, to annihilate the enemy’s army, in von Clausewitz’s opinion, is the primary purpose of battle. As is mentioned in his work, the only way to achieve comprehensive victory is “by daring all to win all” (Clausewitz, 2007). Again, the intelligence and cunning of Sun Tzu are compared with the head-on, brutal approach of von Clausewitz.
The severe attrition of World War I serves as an illustration of how cruel von Clausewitz’s strategy can be. Human wave attacks were repeatedly launched in an effort to overwhelm the opposition by focusing on their strongest areas of defense (Samuels, 2023). This kind of thinking only led to alarmingly high mortality rates on both sides. Human wave assaults were essentially mass suicides due to the new automatic weaponry of the time. Moreover, at that time, neither the tanks nor the planes were swift or decisive enough to play a significant role in outmaneuvering.
Moral Factors
While their philosophies differ in some respects, Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz converge on several key ideas. A primary similarity is their focus on concentrated strength, specifically the importance of applying superior force at the critical moment of decision. Sun Tzu illustrates this principle by comparing a winning army to a massive weight easily overwhelming a single grain on a scale (Tzu, 2000).
Von Clausewitz reaffirms this when he states, “The best strategy is always to be very strong” (Clausewitz, 2007). In this context, both philosophers emphasize the value of morale, including in the rearward and frontline armies. They realized the importance of giving people a purpose to fight and achieve victory. Furthermore, they concur that the best-case scenario for conflicts is for them to be brief. “There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare,” according to Sun Tzu (Tzu, 2000).
The concept of morale is intimately tied to this topic. As more recruits would be required and more taxes would have to be collected to cover their pay, the longer the battle lasted, the greater the burden would be on both the front and the rear. This significance was acknowledged by von Clausewitz, who stated that a good general can give orders, but the soldier must have the means to follow them (Clausewitz, 2007). Therefore, morale and motivation can be considered key factors in warfare.
Friction in War
The concept of predictability in conflict is an area where these two war theorists diverge again. One can infer from Sun Tzu’s writings that he thought war was a reasonably foreseeable occurrence. He even goes as far as to claim that, under a few circumstances, he will likely predict which side will win and which one will lose. Specifically, he warned generals against recklessness, cowardice, and a hasty temper that might lead to defeat in an open battle. During non-combat army management, Sun Tzu reminds generals of the sensitivity of honor to shame and advises against excessive solitude toward the army (Tzu, 2000). The latter two factors can lead to undesired outcomes during the march and war in general, serving as distractions and reducing predictability.
Von Clausewitz had a totally different perspective. He had been in the military since he was young, so he undoubtedly had experience with the chaos of combat. Despite the best preparations, a commander may encounter difficulties due to the “fog” of the battlefield, which “prevents the enemy from being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, and a report from reaching the commanding officer” (Clausewitz, 2007). Thus, plans can prove ineffective due to such unpredictable events.
Nevertheless, von Clausewitz failed to recognize the significance of unconventional tactics or how they might reduce the effectiveness of sizable enemy forces without necessitating a conclusive showdown with overwhelming force. Although he warns readers about friction as suffering, bafflement, weariness, and anxiety, he also neglects how friction may be exploited to the enemy’s disadvantage (Hageback and Hedblom, 2021). He instead concentrated on reducing the effect of friction on allied forces.
Sun Tzu’s idea of challenging the adversary’s plan is at odds with von Clausewitz’s emphasis on the necessity of eliminating the enemy head-on in battle. Additionally, he claimed that the army’s primary goal must be to decisively attack and defeat the enemy’s force (Clausewitz, 2007). It implies that the elimination of adversary forces should be the main objective of the overall strategy.
There is a need to comprehend both Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz to properly understand contemporary war strategies. Both provide intriguing and distinctive perspectives on combat that can aid in understanding conflicts from the 20th and 21st centuries. Given the vastly varied traditions and views of war among non-Western generals, Sun Tzu may have much to say on asymmetrical wars involving them (Ploumis, 2021).
It is also relevant to study Sun Tzu during this period, given the development of China, which its ancient thinkers have significantly influenced. In turn, some of von Clausewitz’s ideas, such as friction, are crucial in today’s conflicts, which are frequently fought under constantly changing circumstances. Consequently, von Clausewitz should not be considered completely irrelevant, despite his overreliance on brute force.
Conclusion
In summary, Sun Tzu’s and von Clausewitz’s visions and opinions on war differ substantially, leading to the conclusion that they held contrasting views on the subject of war. The most apparent inconsistencies can be attributed to military philosophy, war predictability, and particular tactics.
If Sun Tzu favored an indirect approach to war and argued that wars are predictable, von Clausewitz preferred decisive actions and acknowledged the capriciousness of military conflicts. Regardless of their differences, both Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz have merit, and their ideas can be incorporated into modern warfare. The insights of these thinkers on war from different times can inform contemporary military strategy and enhance it by recognizing their applicability in different contexts.
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