After the September 11 attacks, the San Bernardino shootings in 2015 killed 14 innocent people and injured 24 more. It was also the bloodiest mass shooting in the US since 2012 (Tariq, 2020). The news shocked Americans, especially Californians. As the incident showed, terrorist attacks in the US are not uncommon. To fight domestic terrorism in San Bernardino and around the country are local law enforcement, medical, and fire services, not soldiers armed for war. They were among the bravest people I’ve ever met. From their actions, we can learn a lot about planning and reacting to future attacks effectively.
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Police Foundation evaluated local authorities’ training and response after the San Bernardino assault. Less than a minute after the initial gunfire, two police units arrived at the IRC. San Bernardino Police Lieutenant Mike Madden came first, followed by three other officers. No prior tactical experience was required, but all four cops had basic pistol training. The four officers entered with caution, unknowing that the shooters had escaped. Thirteen Santa Barbara SWAT police and another team aided Lieutenant Madden’s unit in evacuating the building in ten minutes.
Following the shooting, four distinct steps must be completed. These stages are emergency response, medical care and evacuation, shooter pursuit and elimination, and investigation. Each phase of the reaction provided a unique set of operational obstacles, the majority of which were successfully met by those on the ground. In contrast, others highlighted errors in protocol and coordination on the side of those in charge. While the victims were being treated and the IRC was being evacuated, detectives in San Bernardino could track down the assailants’ rental SUV in nearby Redlands at some point around 1500 hours when a police analyst linked the rented SUV to Farook and his apartment in Redlands. Following the SUV’s failure to yield, law enforcement authorities from numerous jurisdictions engaged the suspect in a high-speed chase with the suspect (Pepper et al.2019). The assailants opened fire on the officers during the pursuit, striking them many times. While driving through a junction near the IRC, the assailants pulled over their SUV. Farook exited the truck and began firing at the officers, while Malik remained inside the vehicle and continued to fire unrelentingly at the officers. Officers retaliated by firing at least 440 bullets at the terrorists, killing them all. The two suspects exchanged at least 81 rounds of ammunition with police personnel.
According to the incident report, the first cops on the scene of the attack, even though they specialized in quite different professions, exhibited exceptional cooperation. They adhered to the active shooter policy when clearing the building, concentrating entirely on detecting and neutralizing the threat before assisting the victims. Minor technical issues of rank and jurisdiction diverted their attention, and they could fall into the right building-clearing formation with no delay immediately. A short time after the attack, the principal agency chiefs began to work together to coordinate their responses. Upon the arrival of agency officials, tactical officers were relieved of command. A unifying command structure was immediately established in San Bernardino. All relevant groups were represented at the command center and thereafter settled on tactics, media management, and the probe itself. A major asset in San Bernardino was operational leaders’ capacity to collaborate.
Inter-agency coordination is essential for a successful response to an active shooter situation. These ties should be established before a crisis occurs to maximize agency collaboration and efficiency. The plan specifies a Public Information, Multiagency Coordination Systems, and Emergency Response Plans are all included in this category. As a result, they can save time using NIMS rather than manually creating a chain of command structures because all of the organizations involved already know to whom they are supposed to report. The reception to the event in San Bernardino was overwhelmingly favorable. Many police officers began to “self-deploy” to the IRC, generating a slew of concerns. As a result of the large number of cops who arrived in civilian clothes and drove their vehicles, self-deploying police can be quite beneficial to onsite commanders when protecting a large area.
Uncertainty among officers allocated to other duties and functions if they fail to report in a timely way. Self-reporting police are particularly helpful in a crisis because they offer crucial people. Although they had not been ordered to the scene, many of the first officers on the scene were from the San Bernardino County Probation Department. Since the SBPD’s main office is only 2.9 miles away from the IRC, probation is far more convenient. When probation officers learned of the event through the police scanner, they immediately went to the area to investigate. Because of their proximity to the scene, probation officials arrived on the scene before the majority of other law enforcement organizations. When the probation officers arrived at the IRC, they discovered many injured victims and were the first to begin the triage procedure by dispensing medical supplies to those in need. They were in charge of the transportation and triage of the victims. As part of their responsibilities, the big team of probation officers reported to the commanders and assisted in securing the perimeters around the IRC and triage facilities.
San Bernardino and Orlando officers confronted terrorists who had committed horrific acts of mass violence and who continued to threaten the community and first responders after being detained. Law enforcement agents created contact teams as soon as they arrived, entered the places, and immediately began an aggressive search to locate, contain, detain, or neutralize the terrorists, putting themselves in harm’s path to save the lives of those around them. When they did so, they followed the procedures they had been taught and followed best practices for responding to an active shooter situation, certainly avoiding further violence and preserving the lives of critically injured victims. In reality, law enforcement authorities in the San Bernardino area attributed their ability to respond to the attack to the active shooter training they had received previous to the attack.
Internal and interagency communications were difficult to maintain throughout the San Bernardino attack. The volume of police radio traffic restricts the amount of radio bandwidth that could be allocated. In addition, several cops reported having difficulties determining which radio channel to listen to and monitor. Some police noted radio communication problems inside the IRC, which they attributed to the architecture of the buildings and the lack of repeaters to improve signal strength. Others were uneasy with using unencrypted communications to tell co-responding officers of law enforcement sensitive information during the hunt for the suspects, and they avoided doing so. During a large-scale hostile incident, communications systems, including dispatch, should be load tested, and backup methods should be put in place in case the primary systems fail. Radio discipline should also be of the utmost importance during these circumstances. When responding to terrorist attacks, encrypted communications technologies could be immensely beneficial because they would allow for the secure exchange of vital information. The gunman and the victims’ families and friends bombarded the Orlando dispatch center with phone calls. The Orlando Police Communications Center staff were able to use their training to prioritize and delegate calls.
References
Tariq, H. (2020). The Racialization of Muslim-Americans Post 9/11: Causes, Themes, and Effects.
Pepper, M., Archer, F., & Moloney, J. (2019). Triage in complex, coordinated terrorist attacks. Prehospital and disaster medicine, 34(4), 442-448.