Introduction
The organization initially tasked with providing emergency response to the 1992 riots in Los Angeles was the California National Guard. Previously, the service has received consistent training and used up to 13,000 troops to target specific riots. Nevertheless, over the decades, there has been a reduction in the need for law enforcement agencies to get military support. In the OES Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan from October 1991, it is mentioned that the support of agencies such as the National Guard is only needed “after the disturbance has been determined to be, or to likely become, beyond the capabilities of local new enforcement forces” (Falkenrath & Rosengrant, 2000, p. 1). Thus, the mutual aid plan suggested that police departments, such as LAPD, should be the first on call. However, after the trial of police officers accused of beating Rodney King in 1991, the California National Guard had got a signal that serious trouble could ensue in LA. Thus, this case study is dedicated to the analysis of the inadequate emergency response to the 1992 LA riots, emphasizing such issues as leadership and ethics to provide recommendations that could have improved the situation.
Considering the fact that the investment into the training of the California National Guard declined between the 1960s and the 1990s, budgetary constraints are a problem. The government implemented a change in funding priorities, focusing on military preparedness to address natural disasters, overseas operations, and the war on drugs (Falkenrath & Rosengrant, 2000). Thus, there was not enough budgetary support to ensure the effectiveness of the Guard to support the LAPD and other agencies in establishing peace in the city and preventing violence on riots.
Current research in the area of responding to and managing riots has focused chiefly on the adverse consequences of poor handling as well as long-term effects for society. Scholars have been positioning riots as components of continuous political expression and not as a temporary rupture from ‘real’ politics (Ince et al., 2021). Such an approach allows studying the importance of building ethical responder forces, the purpose of which is to establish peace and opportunities for an open dialogue. Besides, the 1992 LA riots have caused a transformation in the city’s police force, with the current LAPD having just over 30% of white police offers as opposed to 60% in 1992 (Wells, 2017). There is an increase in accountability by means of the department publishing data on the use of force and officer-involved shootings online and enforcing the wearing of body cameras all the time.
Analysis of Leadership
In the effort to manage the events occurring during the LA riots, the leadership showed a lack of preparedness and oversight. From the very beginning, the mobilization of the Guard, the administration did not implement adequate efforts to motivate their subordinates. Specifically, it was unclear which agency would coordinate the Guard’s involvement, determine what the mission would be, or estimate the number of personnel needed to administer the plan. Initially, the LAPD was sure that it could manage the riot by themselves, as there were around 20,000 officers available, but their improper management by the leadership resulted in the department needing the Guard’s assistance (Falkenrath & Rosengrant, 2000). As mentioned by Sheriff Lieutenant Dennis Beene, “had we managed those resources properly, we would not have needed anybody from the outside to deal with what we had” (as cited in Delk, 1995, p. 40). This shows that the leadership was ill-prepared to manage a large-scale riot in the city and could not offer firm guidance and motivation to officers.
When it comes to the Guard’s mobilization, it began well with the troops chosen to be deployed responding quickly. However, there was a lack of communication on the part of leadership. Even though the soldiers responded quickly, it was not because they were informed prior and given some time to get prepared. Instead, soldiers were following the news and understood that they were likely to be deployed. Nevertheless, once the troops reported to the expected location, the leadership showed a lack of focus and preparedness to follow procedures aimed at addressing the situation. Specifically, it quickly became apparent that the majority of the troops had not received adequate training to respond to the riot (Falkenrath & Rosengrant, 2000). Because of this, the commanders of troops quickly began conducting basic riot training, hastily preparing them for the riot response and making them read and sign a copy of the Rules of Engagement.
Besides summoning Guard troops that were ill-prepared to deal with the riots, the leadership also did not adequately estimate the number of ammunition and equipment needed. There had been a recent update in the protocol of storing ammunition, and the leaders had to order helicopters to fly to different locations to supply the troops. Both poor communication and lousy judgment delayed the delivery of ammunition as there were unclear commands made regarding the most effective logistical procedures. The process was so poorly organized that crew members had to ultimately load pallets with ammunition by hand instead of using the helicopter winch system, which was faulty. To add to issues with ammunition management, the helicopter arrived six hours later than originally expected, and those responsible for communicating about the logistics informed no one about the delay.
The insufficient and ineffective efforts of the leadership continued to be evident during the Guard’s deployment into the city. Close to the time of the deployment, many parties involved were confused about the specific role that the National Guard would play, hence, the expectations varied. Confusion continued for some time, leading to misinformation and causing the frustrated personnel of the Guard to call to find out themselves who was in charge – LAPD of Sheriff’s Department. As mentioned by Richard Andrews of OES, “everything that could go wrong did go wrong with the National Guard deployment. […] There was not accurate, consistent information being provided up the chain of command […]; There were a lot of people […] who were blindsided at almost every turn” (as cited in Howitt et al., 2009, p. 178). Overall, in the absence of firm leadership, communication was inadequate, while the commanders involved did not function as adequate leaders.
There should have been regular correspondence between the major players, specifically, LA’s Mayor, the LAPD, the Sheriff’s Department, and the National Guard. At the time of crisis, decisions had to be made quickly and with the participation of everyone involved. Instead, bits of information were transferred between departments without leaders having a complete picture of how they would manage their subordinates and which protocols would be followed. The lack of coordination made it harder to understand which problem areas had to be addressed first to ensure smooth implementation. Even though everyone was sending their resources for assistance, the inadequate leadership made it so that the agencies involved could not even manage their own resources, let alone collaborate with others.
Analysis of Ethics
From the beginning of violence that ensued during the 1992 LA riots, the law enforcement forces were inadequately prepared, which led to the protest being inappropriately labeled as riots. Because of this, the leaders’ decision-making was flawed from the start. The African American community had been suffering from institutional racism in US society and injustice and there must have been more dialogue between the community and law enforcement. The inappropriate institutional responses escalated the violence, resulting in fifty-one fatalities in six days and a total of $1 billion of property damages (Song, 2020). The higher-standing officials should have listened to protestors who came to express their outrage with the unfair verdicts of the trial and call for justice for African Americans.
As to the transparency of the parties involved in the public communications, there is little evidence showing that the communication was clear and concise. From the very start of the process aimed at addressing the public unrest, there had been an unclear exchange of information between entities. Moreover, there was no dialogue taking place between protesters and the agencies involved in managing the public unrest. For example, the riots were greatly supported by the inflow of jobless and uneducated groups; instead of engaging in a dialogue to find solutions and meet their needs, the governmental agencies used force and force only.
The leadership of the entities responsible for addressing the uprisings in Los Angeles showed little concern for ethics when addressing the problem. When there are race-associated tensions occurring in the community, violent behaviors can occur, which is what the riots represented – the act of opposition against the attitudes of the government toward African American community. Besides, the concerns of internal stakeholders were not addressed, especially because of the great exposure of the protests in the media. It was impossible for law enforcement to develop any plan because it was immediately leaked to the news.
Therefore, the ethical decisions of leadership adversely influenced the performance of agencies in managing the crisis of public unrest. There should have been more concerns given to the needs of the public exhibiting their dissatisfaction with the government; namely, their demands should have been considered while the force used against them should have been more selective. Even though the dialogue is a lengthier process that entails considerations for the physical and emotional well-being of the public, it would have resulted in fewer casualties and high costs.
When leaders follow the principles of ethics and disseminate them against their subordinates, an organization tends to be more effective at addressing the arising challenges. As mentioned by Metwally et al. (2019), while ethical leadership can shape the culture of effectiveness and readiness to change, ethical leaders, who serve as guides and offer support, can also make a difference by reducing uncertainty. It was severe uncertainty and the lack of communication between the agencies involved that limited the effectiveness of the management plan. Besides, if a leadership culture within the governmental agencies adhered to the principles of ethics, both the public and the troops involved in unrest management would exhibit more patience and understanding in conflict resolution.
Recommendations
Transformational leadership would have worked in the case of managing the public unrest in LA in 1992 because this leadership style is flexible and forward-thinking. A transformational leader that oversees an emergency management plan is a person that knows the community, including its vulnerabilities and needs (Caro, 2016). They must be a forward thinker that can anticipate what events could take place and develop plans that prepare their agency for any possible consequences. Instead, the leadership style applied to the public unrest in LA was authoritarian, with the majority of respondents being unable to provide recommendations or express concerns.
To resolve the situation through balancing the needs of communities, addressing the issue, and doing ethically appropriate, an open and honest dialogue is needed. The leadership of the parties that are opposed to one another must engage in a conversation about their needs and demands and negotiate to find solutions. In practice, the dialogue-based approach has shown to be effective for dynamic risk assessment and improved command-based decision-making for enhancing proportionality of the law enforcement’s response (Gorringe et al., 2012). It has also been shown to improve public order management, encourage crowds’ self-regulation, and prevent the use of unnecessary police use of force (Gorringe et al., 2012). Thus, the dialogue-based approach must be considered by leaders because it helps address public unrest from the perspective of ethics and not the mere use of power.
To account for the obstacles preventing agencies from addressing the issue of public unrest, it is imperative that leaders account for the diverse perspectives and ideas of problem resolution. It is imperative to be aware that many opinions exist in society, both among the public and law enforcement or the military, assuming that no one group could dominate and silence others. Instead, through critical thinking, forecasting, and open communication, it is possible to facilitate a framework of immediate and ethical response to instances of public unrest, including its violent types. It is necessary to note that there may be some violent protestors showing excessive use of force and breaking the law just for the sake of it. It is imperative to separate these individuals from the rest of the public that can engage in peaceful discussion and problem resolution.
While enacting completely new policies is not needed, the upholding of recommendations entails the continuous revision and updating of existing policies. Specifically, it is imperative to establish a better formulation of leaders’ roles and responsibilities, include considerations of ethical problem-solving, as well as include research of public unrest and its roots and implications. It is imperative that agencies involved in the mitigation of violence on the streets do not oppose themselves to protestors but rather follow ethical guidelines to facilitate problem resolution.
Having a dedicated budget allocated for emergencies such as public unrest is the recommended solution to the issue. Using data on previous cases of riot management and the expenses that agencies had, it is possible to forecast a budget that must always be available for emergencies. The budget must include considerations of the number of personnel involved, the necessary equipment, as well as any additional resources necessary for the smooth implementation of unrest management.
References
Caro, D. (2016). The nexus of transformational leadership of emergency services systems: Beyond the Wu-Shi-Ren (WSR)-Li paradigm. International Journal of Emergency Services, 5(1), 18-33.
Falkenrath, R., & Rosengrant, S. (2000). The flawed emergency response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots (C). President and Fellows of Harvard College.
Gorringe, H., Stott, C., & Rosie, M. (2012). Dialogue police, decision making, and the management of public order during protest crowd events. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 9(2), 111-125.
Howitt, A., Leonard, H., & Giles, D. (2009). Managing crises. CQ Press.
Ince, A., Borén, T., & Lindell, I. (2021). After riots: Toward a research agenda on the long-term effects of urban unrest. Journal of Urban Affairs.
James D. Delk. (1995). Fires & furies: The Los Angeles riots of 1992. ETC Publications.
Metwally, D., Ruiz-Palomino, P., Metwally, M., & Gartzia, L. (2019). How ethical leadership shapes employees’ readiness to change: The mediating role of an organizational culture of effectiveness. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 2493.
Song, Y. S. (2020). Christian ethical analysis of the L.A. riots in 1992: The media and institutional racism. Religions, 11(7), 344.
Wells, R. (2017). Lessons from the LA riots: How a consent decree helped a troubled police department change. CNN.