Introduction
Soul, mind, and body are three important and basic subjects studied in the discussion of human philosophy. Understanding the interconnection between the soul and the body has always been of concern to scholars. The essence of the soul and the substantiation of the mind as a different entity from the brain have never been completely clear. Various philosophers have put forward conceptions of the existence of body and mind, and the purpose of this essay is to explain the solution to the mind-body problem and to justify the best one. Thus, the mind-body problem concerns the connection between the physical body and the mind, and the best way to explain it is property dualism.
Main Problems
The mind-body problem is the most basic of the problems that exist in philosophical science. The concept of the mind-body is needed to explain how mental states and physical states interact together. Hence, the central questions are the origin of the very nature of consciousness and whether it can be understood in terms of physical phenomena (Chambliss, 2018).
Accordingly, philosophers debate whether the body and mind are distinct entities or whether they are part of the same entity or interconnected. Moreover, the mind-body problem leads philosophers to discuss dualism, the concept of the need to separate the body from the mind (Chambliss, 2018). Another group of philosophers argues about monism, the idea of the inseparability of the body from the mind. As a result, the scientific community debates how the body and mind affect each other and whether they should be considered as a whole.
Four Philosophical Solutions
However, the mind-body problem is constantly being discussed, and there are four philosophical solutions to the problem, including type identity theory, functionalist physicalism, property dualism, and substance dualism. Type identity theory answers the main question and states that the mind and body have the same properties (Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, n.d.). This is because any processes in people’s brains and mental states are based on the physical characteristics of people. Therefore, type identity theory states that the mind and body are part of the same entity.
Moreover, functionalist physicalism also indicates that brain activity does not occur independently but has a connection with other organs. Hence, any mental states arise through cause-and-effect relationships, which is why the concept does not associate them with a specific physical state or body but with the functions that the brain performs in the body (Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, n.d.). This means that changes in people’s minds depend on their functional state, which may require several physical realizations. According to the theory, the mind can exist in different physical forms, but this concept is not limited to the body.
The next concept is property dualism, which states that body and mind exist in the same person but are two different phenomena. The philosophers point out that the brain can impact the human body, but the mind and body cannot be equated (Chambliss, 2018). Furthermore, substance dualism determines that the mind and body are different substances and function separately. Substance dualism philosophers argue that the mind can exist as a separate substance and is not restricted to regulating physical processes (Chambliss, 2018). Therefore, substance dualism explains that the body and mind have different natures, but the concept is criticized for it.
My Choice
Dualism produces problems in the relationship between the material and the spiritual, the physical and the mental. One such problem is the question of the causality of these entities. It is necessary to note that dualism is opposed to monism, the theory according to which there is only one fundamental kind, one category of things, or one principle. The primary position of property dualism is based on the fact that physical processes in the brain affect mental phenomena and vice versa; mental events cause physical processes. As a result, it is possible to explain the existence of the body and mind and to provide grounded answers to contradictory questions.
I consider property dualism the best endpoint for explaining the problem of the body and mind. Property dualism, rather than distinguishing between two different substances, as in material dualism, differs between two different properties: the mental and the physical. All mental properties are related causally to some physical features (Ravenscroft, 2018). Thus, physical states cause all psychic states through a causal connection. However, this causal relationship between the mind and its physical agent, in this case, the individual brain, does not constitute an ontological association (Ravenscroft, 2018). While possessing a causal relationship, the mind is not amenable intrinsically to any physical or neurobiological status or property.
In other words, while the neurobiological organization of the brain is the cause of the mind’s existence, it can exist in some extra-brain-based physical precondition. This allows for the multiple implementations of mental qualities in various physical substances that promote them (Ravenscroft, 2018). Thus, property dualism does not allow for the existence of a non-mind but requires that the mind be based on some kind of physical predicate for some kind of physical predicate to arise.
Descartes often used the phenomenon of phantom limbs as part of an argument for substance dualism. The philosopher reasoned that if pain could be felt in a limb after that limb had ceased to exist, then the human soul must be able to continue to exist after the body has died (Ravenscroft, 2018). Although modern neuroscience has not yet answered the question of the cause of phantom limbs and related pain, Descartes ignored the physical causes of mental pain. Thus, phantom pain is better evidence of property dualism than substance dualism (Ravenscroft, 2018). Almost all amputees experience some kind of phantom limb and its associated pain.
Therefore, I maintain the dualism of properties in that the dualism itself does not address the essence of entities but their characteristics. Two different types of properties, mental and physical, can be assigned to the same object, human being, or object. However, at the same time, these characteristic properties are fundamentally different and cannot be analyzed in terms of each other (Ravenscroft, 2018). It means that distinct properties describe different aspects of a single whole. The advantage of this theory is that it explains how the body-consciousness interaction occurs since the causes of people’s actions have a physical and mental nature.
Conclusion
In summary, the debate between philosophers about the problem of body and mind has long been based on the question of the relationship between these conjunctions and their influence on each other. However, four main theories have been introduced to answer these questions: functionalist physicalism, type identity theory, property and substance dualism. They distinguish themselves by their point of view on the relationship between body and mind and offer different approaches to it. Type identity theory identifies these concepts, while functionalist physicalism does not look for the causes of the relationship but instead points to physical processes. At the same time, substance dualism separates the mind from the body and endows the mind with its nature. I support the explanation provided by property dualism. These phenomena exist in the same person, but they are not identical.
References
Chambliss, B. (2018). The mind–body problem. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 9(4), 1450-1463. Web.
Ravenscroft, I. (2018). Why reject substance dualism?. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, 1, 267-282. Web.
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers. (n.d.). Faith and philosophy. Web.