‘The Nature of the Virtues’ by Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) discusses the concept of virtue as it appears in Western philosophical thought throughout millennia. Analyzing the similarities and differences between the ideas of virtue entertained by different philosophers, the author eventually arrives at the definition of virtues as qualities crucial for pursuing ‘internal’ goods inherent in certain practices. While, at first sight, this definition seems to have little to do with business, which explicitly pursues ‘external’ goods, the emphasis it puts on maintaining standards of impartiality and fairness makes it perfectly applicable in this sphere.
MacIntyre’s main research question is whether there is the shared core element to varying definitions of virtue as used by different Western philosophers, and, if there is, what is it. As the author rightfully points out, the specific ideas of virtue vary wildly – qualities that Homer and Aristotle considered laudable, such as magnanimousness, would seem irrelevant or outright harmful to Thomas Aquinas or Benjamin Franklin (MacIntyre, 1981). However, the common factor uniting these concepts is that virtue is not a goal in itself but, rather, a means to pursue a good by excelling at a certain practice. MacIntyre (1981) notes that these goods can be either external – that is, only connected to a given practice contingently and readily available through other means – or internal, meaning one can only achieve them by exercising a specific virtue. For instance, one can acquire money, which is an external good, through any number of ways part from being an honest, upstanding judge, but one cannot achieve the internal good of justice except that by being just.
With this in mind, MacIntyre’s concept of virtue may seem to have little immediate value for business matters at first sight. Notably, the author’s definition of virtue is “acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 32). As a result, the core of virtue – at least as defined by MacIntyre – seems to be at odds with the core of business as a human activity. After all, the primary goal of any business is to turn a profit, meaning it exists for the pursuit of external rather than internal goods.
However, a closer examination of MacIntyre’s account of virtue reveals that it is actually perfectly applicable to business insofar as it relates to organizing business processes and promoting good practices. As mentioned above, virtue is ultimately about excelling in practices, which one cannot master without the relevant quality. One example given by MacIntyre (1981) is that a person cannot reach the internal good of justice except by treating people “in respect of merit or desert according to uniform and impersonal standards” (p. 32). This example is just as applicable to treating employees fairly as it is to many other areas, meaning there are no unmanageable obstacles to using it in a business setting.
In short, MacIntyre’s (1981) concept of virtue may not relate to the primary goal of business but is still perfectly applicable to many of its aspects. Admittedly, the defining feature of virtue is that it enables the pursuit of internal goods, while business is largely focused on obtaining the external ones. Still, there are plentiful opportunities to fit the exercise of virtues, as defined and understood by MacIntyre (1981), into all sorts of business practices.
Reference
MacIntyre, A. (1981). The nature of the virtues. The Hastings Center Report 11(2), 27-34.