Public budgeting is essential in supplying the population with the resources necessary for the completion of important social and economic projects. As the amount of resources the government can dedicate is limited, the structure of the budget becomes an extremely sensitive issue. The more money, investments, and capital that can be directed at a certain sphere, the more developed it will be. Subsequently, the more resources a political figure can amass, the higher their authority will be (Garofalo et al., 2020). Therefore, maintaining and strengthening power is a major political influence behind the confrontation regarding the structure and implementation of a public budget.
Whether it is a sudden emergency demanding an immediate influx of resources or a planned decision, a budget can be altered despite the initially approved plan. The method used to change the structure of the budget is a political mechanism known as a budget amendment. Although such a measure devalues the deliberation surrounding budget approval, it may be necessary to prevent a deficit. In order for a country to execute all social and economic functions properly, its expenditures should not be higher than its income (Asatryan et al., 2018). Otherwise, it will lead to a lack of resources, which will allow the government to maintain economic stability.
The solution to the dilemma of circumstantial decision-making, as opposed to the planned budget expenditures, lies in balancing incomes and expenditures. A common measure designed to alter the budget without straining the government’s finances is to use a balanced budget amendment. It is a rule which prohibits the government from spending more than it can amass (Asatryan et al., 2018). Subsequently, any politician who intends to alter the public budget has to find an alternative source of income in order to prevent the deficit.
References
Asatryan, Z., Castellon, C., & Stratmann, T. (2018). Balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes: Evidence from historical constitutions. Journal of Public Economics, 167, 105-119. Web.
Garofalo, P., Lema, D., & Streb, J. M. (2020). Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: The influence of political alignment. Economics & Politics, 32(2), 305-334. Web.