The defendant’s neighbor’s dog was about to die in a canal in July 2017, and plaintiff Ann Samolyk hurt herself when she dove in to save it. She said that while doing this, she suffered cognitive and neurological damage that led to her having to rescue the dog. The parties’ residences were close to a canal along the seaside neighborhood’s perimeter. Ann claimed to have overheard a request for assistance to rescue a dog that had fallen into a canal the evening the accident occurred (Scatchard). Ann was discovered unconscious when the defendant’s son eventually rescued the dog from the canal.
However, the court did not agree to provide the spouses with compensation. In light of this theoretical framework, they denied extending the rescue concept to include injuries received while defending property, except in situations where the plaintiff has taken action to safeguard human life. The jury was confident that any effort to change how the rescue concept is applied so that it also protects property, whether alive or inanimate, real estate or chattel, must stem from our compulsion to save human life (Samolyk v. Berthe). Even though some people may have solid emotional attachments to domesticated animals, public policy cannot support expanding the rescue doctrine to accord property the same status and dignity accorded to human life.
Moreover, they were also cognizant that certain preemptive actions that seem to be motivated by the defense of property are, in reality, only adjuncts to the defense of human life and may give rise to a claim under the rescue theory (Kurki and Pietrzykowski 74). However, I disagree with their reasoning because animals are alive beings. If the woman did not intervene, it would lead to the death of an animal and emotional trauma to the owner. The intricacy of interactions between humans and dogs, dogs’ emotional range, and the significance of coevolution in the development of humans and dogs are all discussed in several popular science works (Meiches 5). Dogs had gotten unheard-of attention and care when large numbers of non-human living forms were being wiped off (Meiches 5). These days, dog literature advises using them for emotional support, managing chronic pain, and providing aesthetic enjoyment in addition to their labor-related skills. Critical and materialist studies of war and security have also started to take an interest in dogs.
Additionally, if instead of the dog, there was a person, the jury would more likely come to a different verdict. Even within the general concept of law, there are simply too many phenomena categorized or understood as law over time and across cultures for any attempt at generalization to be either fruitful or instructive (Schauer 1136). That being the case, the plaintiff’s cause of action might have survived a motion for summary judgment if she had dove into the canal after the defendant’s dog in response to observing a little kid chasing the animal and running toward the pier. In that hypothetical case, Ann’s decision to save the dog from an impending threat to protect the kid may have been reasonable. As a result, it may have provided the foundation for a claim that might be recognized under the rescue concept.
However, in this case, the jury decided that Ann’s actions were completely motivated by her assessment of the dog’s safety. These subtle distinctions are meant to reflect and underline the underlying public policy of the state’s rescue philosophy, namely preserving human life. Since Ann’s choice to leap into the canal to save the dog’s life did not give rise to a claim that may be recognized under the rescue concept, the plaintiffs’ complaint was appropriately rejected.
Overall, the jury rejected expanding the rescue concept to cover harms sustained while protecting property, except in cases where the plaintiff has acted to protect human life. The jury, in this instance, found that Ann’s judgment of the dog’s safety was the only driving force behind her conduct. Ann’s decision to jump into the canal did not result in a claim that could be accepted under the rescue concept, and the plaintiffs’ case was eventually dismissed.
Works Cited
Kurki, Visa AJ, and Tomasz Pietrzykowski. Legal personhood: animals, artificial intelligence and the unborn. Springer, 2017.
Meiches, Benjamin. “Non-human humanitarians.” Review of International Studies vol. 45, no.1, 2019, pp. 1-19.
Samolyk v. Berthe. 251 N.J. 73, 27, 2022.
Scatchard, Capehart. “New Jersey Supreme Court Refuses to Extend the Rescue Doctrine to Include Rescue of Animal”. Lexology, 2022, Web.
Schauer, Frederick. “Lawness.” Washington University Law Review, vol. 95, no. 5, 2018, pp. 1135-1148.