People are so accustomed to the complicated idea of trust that they fail to perceive its presence and variation. Trust, as an intentional mental phenomenon, does not have to be purposeful (Baier 235). Intentional trusting necessitates knowledge of assurance that the trusted will not harm one, even if they could (Baier 235). The critical question is whether people enter into contractual agreements because they trust or distrust. The paper will claim that contractual agreements negate the need for genuine trust but rather provide security.
For illustration, as the youngster approaches adulthood, and the parents face the likely reliance of old age, the trust may resemble reciprocal trust and mutual vulnerability between equals (Baier 243). Hence, they may create clear or legal agreements regarding what is to be done in exchange for what. Nonetheless, no contractual or quasi-contractual agreement can retroactively turn the young child’s trust and the parent’s reliability into a mutual contractual exchange (Baier 243). At worst, it can transform a continued relationship of mutual trust into a contractual responsibility to provide service to one’s parents.
Such an agreement may be a virtual consideration embodied by the parents’ official cancellation of any previous ‘debt’ of appreciation in exchange for the rights granted under the contract. Nonetheless, whatever appreciative repayment one offers to another is not usually given in exchange for a ‘receipt’ that serves as evidence against any outstanding ‘debt.’ The more generous and lofty intercourse of friendship and good services should not be replaced by contract (Hume 521). Looking into child trust helps one determine whether a contractual agreement is based on trust (Baier 244). For instance, not only does the kid have no concept of virtual agreement when they trust, but the parent’s obligation to the child appears to be unrelated to the anticipation that the child will return later.
Consequently, youngster believes as long as they are taught to believe and until their trust is betrayed. Baier emphasizes that it takes adolescents’ innocence to trust because they are encouraged to trust (244). Loyalty cannot be demanded of others; it can only be provided and accepted (Luhmann 43). It is impossible to expect it of oneself or others until some trust-building social artifice invents something akin to a promise that can be issued and accepted at will (Luhmann 43). Baier adds that promises are perplexing because they appear to have the ability, through word enchantment, to create a genuine voluntary short-term trust (245). Thus, they not only appear to generate duties at the will of the obliged, but they also appear to build trust at the will of the truster.
Agreement formation as a conventional method challenges a trustworthiness assumption. Among restricted circumstances are a unique voluntary act by the promisor, indicating that what they provide is a promise, and another voluntary act by the promise, accepting it (Baier 246). Contracts allow people to express what they want another person to do in exchange for what and what damages may be taken from them if they do not follow the rules (Baier 250). Another functional quality of contracts is closely related to the expressions that allow violations to be readily displayed (Baier 251). For instance, damages or penalties can be decided with a demonstration of reasonable fairness; they also refer to the security they provide the trusting party.
To conclude, contractual agreements eliminate the need for genuine trust. According to Baier’s argument, contractual agreements are a tool for trusting people sufficiently to engage in mutually advantageous future-involving exchanges without assuming the hazards that trusters may face. They are intended for collaboration between mutually suspicious, risk-averse strangers, and the insecurity they entail is the polar opposite of that a trusting infant encounters. From my perspective, I agree that contracts allow individuals to trust not only at will but with minimum exposure. As a result, they are fictitious representations of trust that create security between parties. Promises, on the other hand, imply some genuine faith in the other party’s good intent and wise use of discretionary authority.
Works Cited
Baier, Annette. “Trust and Antitrust.” Ethics, vol. 96, no. 2, 1986, pp. 231-260. Web.
Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1978.
Luhmann, Niklas. Trust and Power. Chichester, 1979.