A Japanese naval vessel attacked the USS Indianapolis in 1945 in the Pacific Ocean. Almost 1,000 sailors were tossed into the ocean, wherein they remained undiscovered from the Navy for approximately four days, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of men when they entered the water (Stanton 3). The sailors tried to survive as they were battered by seawater, facing sharks, dehydration, starvation, and disorientation. All except 317 of the men had passed away by the time help came (Stanton 3). While many people strive to find the answers to the questions regarding the true reasons behind the lack of immediate help, the main controversy revolves around Charles B. McVay, the captain of the USS Indianapolis, who was argued to be responsible for the sinking of the ship. Nevertheless, Charles B. McVay cannot be considered guilty due to the lack of immediate help and withholding information from the Navy.
The rejection of the escort provision is among the many arguments for captain Charles B. McVay’s innocence. The Indianapolis departed Guam alone in order to deliver its classified cargo, which was the uranium for the atomic weapon and was never declared missing. (Zapletal 16). Quite often, the debris obscured critical information, such as the location of a ship (Stanton 55). This could cause issues for the Indianapolis, which occasionally needed the assistance of well-timed escorts to keep her safe from hostile submarines and save it from peril.
The situation with the rejection was discussed in detail in Stanton’s book, indicating the wrongful decision-making of the officer in charge of the escort. As McVay asked for an escort during the discussion to cross to Leyte, Lieutenant Waldron, the top escort arranging commander, answered the phone (Stanton 55). By this time, everyone at the conference had arrived. He dialed the upper operational commander, Captain Oliver Naquin’s office (Stanton 55). Waldron asked the on-duty commander if the Indianapolis could have an escort. Waldron was informed that none were required and that all combat-ready destroyers had already been sent to support the ongoing B-29 raids on Japan in order to recover lost airmen (Stanton 55). They were also required to accompany ships carrying new troops to Okinawa’s advanced region. McVay was calm when Waldron hung up and told him there was no need for an escort.
Indeed, even with the decision to proceed without the escort, the seamen felt safe. The servicemen and other troops had been given permission to rest on deck to avoid the scorching temperatures when the Indianapolis was believed to be in safety at the moment of its destruction and was running “wide-open” (Zapletal 18). 300 of the 1,000 men aboard the Indianapolis at the time of the collision were either killed immediately or perished along with the vessel (Zapletal 18). What is more, the Navy has even tried to deny obtaining any distress signals, though several servicemembers asserted to have obtained them and failed to acknowledge or inform that the Indianapolis had hit a mine (Austin). As per the account of one of the survivors, Harrel, they “assumed a rescue ship was on its way and would be there in the morning, but it wasn’t” (Zapletal 19). He further stated that “the distress signal didn’t get out, or if it did, it wasn’t received” (Zapletal 19). As a result, the Navy refused to provide McVay with the escort he had demanded safeguard while passing through hostile waterways and ignored all of the distress signals the vessel sent in the final hours before it sank.
Nevertheless, the Navy had made more wrong decisions concerning Indianapolis, and they were aware of them. For example, they withheld critical data obtained through a top-secret software program that proved hostile submarine operations along the course the Indianapolis would be traveling to Leyte, giving McVay an inadequate intelligence assessment in this situation (Austin). McVay inquired about information from the intelligence community about hostile activity on Peddie road (Stanton 55). He was informed that a record of this kind would be created (Stanton 55). When his routing directions were written down, they would be included. After deciding that his navigation would pick them both up later that evening, McVay departed the office feeling assured that the next voyage of the Indianapolis would go without a mishap.
Consequently, Captain McVay was accused by Navy officials of two negligence-related offenses. These offenses included “failure to abandon ship in a timely manner” and “hazarding his ship” by neglecting to direct it in diagonal positions, a now-obsolete defense tactic known as “zigzagging” (Austin para. 17). However, since the vessel sank so swiftly, the investigators soon concluded they would be unable to establish the first accusation. They concentrated all of their efforts on ensuring that the second charge was successful, “culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty” (Newcomb 4). McVay had previously acknowledged that the Indianapolis had not been zigzagging when the attack occurred, noting weather circumstances (Austin). The Navy concentrated on demonstrating the significance of his failure to do so.
Later, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps removed the accusation from the investigation that McVay neglected to raise the alarm after discussing with Forrestal. Instead, they accused him of “failure to abandon ship in a timely manner” (Stanton 183). This was designated Charge II, and yet it was challenging to make this accusation hold (Stanton 183). It might be difficult to distinguish between a timely and untimely evacuation, given how swiftly the ship had sunk.
As demanded later by Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Navy had started preparations in Washington for a judicial examination. After the station at Leyte neglected to register the vessel as missing, Nimitz’s inquiry demanded an examination into the reason for the crash, the guilt of any soldiers involved, and how the crew had been found totally by coincidence (Austin). Several service members received warnings in the end for their individual failures to notice the Indianapolis’ disappearance, but only McVay would be tried and convicted of sinking the vessel once he returned to the U.S. In a statement, its judge advocate general (JAG) addressed authorities at the time, the Navy almost explicitly stated their justifications for doing so and it “springs from the fact that this case is of vital interest not only to the families of those who lost their lives but also to the public at large” (Austin). In other words, the Navy needed an individual to blame for such an egregious mistake.
Mochitsura Hashimoto, the submarine commander who had originally destroyed the Indianapolis, was among the eyewitnesses the government summoned to speak against McVay. Authorities and the news media both expressed outrage over the choice. According to Lynn Vincent, American military investigators urging Hashimoto to give testimony against McVay concerning the loss of his cargo vessel “would have been as outrageous” (Austin). However, Hashimoto did comply with the court martial’s request that he speak, but not in the manner the prosecution had planned.
Lastly, McVay was unaware that the only piece of proof lacking from his legal team may have resulted in his acquittal. The ULTRA intelligence that was hidden from McVay during his conversation with Captain Oliver Naquin was unknown to both McVay and his attorney. In reality, the naval auditor general had criticized the Navy for failing to fully utilize this data in a document marked “secret” and forwarded to Admiral King (Stanton 185). Additionally, it had stated that in order for the authorities to properly investigate the case, they would need to travel back to Guam (Stanton 185). King ignored the information in his rush to start the case (Stanton 185). According to the Navy, the ULTRA intelligence was not admitted into evidence as it was so highly classified that it essentially did not exist.
Hence, Charles B. McVay, the captain of the cargo vessel Indianapolis, is not responsible for its sinking in 1945 due to the attack. First, while the captain demanded escort for the ship, his request was rejected. Furthermore, the Navy refused to give clear information regarding the ship’s surroundings. Later, such decisions resulted in an attack from hostile submarines and the sinking of Indianapolis. Though the servicemen sent signals, the Navy refused to acknowledge the fact that they received them. Consequently, more than half of the men were either killed instantly or died from dehydration, shark attacks, delirium, or starvation. Charles B. McVay was accused since it was crucial for the Navy to find an individual responsible for the mistake.
Works Cited
Austin, Daril. “How a WWII Japanese Commander Helped Exonerate a U.S. Navy Captain.” The Seattle Times, 2021.
Newcomb, Richard F. Evening Star. [volume] (Washington D.C.), 1958. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers. Lib. of Congress.
Stanton, Doug. In Harm’s Way: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis and the Extraordinary Story of Its Survivors. 2001. Print.
Zapletal, Edward, editor. “Terror at Sea: Eleanor Roosevelt’s Lucky Escape from SS Britannic.” History Magazine, 2014.