Introduction
Denial and deception is a term that is frequently used to characterize a nation’s employment of a variety of information operations to achieve its goals. The attempt to suppress information that an opponent may utilize to learn some truth is denial. By definition, deception refers to a country’s attempt to persuade an enemy to believe something that is not true. Despite its highly technical nature, D&D (Denial and deception) is mostly a psychological game.
The essence of the Practice
Denial and deception are interconnected practices that are utilized as a single notion despite the fact that they are independent acts. Accurate information regarding a military development program, a doctrine, or a course of action must be suppressed or denied to the target in order to deceive an opponent about the deceiver’s genuine intentions or aims (Gentry & Gordon, 2019). Deception, or the attempt to persuade an enemy to think something is not true, can be used in conjunction with denial operations (Elkus, 2018). It comprises using leaks, planted disinformation, or decoys to provide the impression that the truth is not as it seems, creating a fake reality for the target (Caddell & Army War College, 2004). When denial and deception are used effectively, the deceiver convinces the target to accept a false tale rather than reality. The target will then respond in a way that benefits the deceiver.
Military denial and deception may be defined in simple terms using the two frames of simulation and dissimulation. To dissimulate is to conceal the truth, whereas to simulate is to expose the lie. Denial hides military capabilities and objectives from the opponent’s view, whether through tactical concealment or security operations (Elkus, 2018). Deception provides a false image through the use of camouflage, decoy, forged documents, and other tried-and-true military ruses. The two are inextricably linked and cannot be separated. Deception is often performed by supplying inaccurate information to an opponent and controlling the channels through which they obtain data through information denial (Caddell & Army War College 2004). Furthermore, denial decreases the number of information channels available to opponents, making them more inclined to trust channels controlled by the deceiver.
Principles
A practical denial and deception campaign includes numerous components according to historical experience and deductive logic. The campaign, for starters, benefits from strategic coherence. The deceiver country must have a long-term strategy in mind for achieving its goals; it must identify how the target should act and how deception will contribute to that end ahead of time (Gentry & Gordon, 2019). In addition, the deceiver must anticipate how the target would respond after both successful and unsuccessful deception. Security and concealment are frequently used in denial to keep foreign spies, photographic surveillance, electronic monitoring, and even the media from learning about sensitive diplomatic or military topics (Department of Army 1988). In addition, the deceiver’s actions must be coordinated with attempts to deny an opponent correct information and false cover tales. D&D campaigns need the cooperation, if not coordination, of several departments, agencies, or ministries (Ferrari, 2021). A denial and deception campaign is most effective when many activities are coordinated to promote a specific strategy (Whaley, 2006). Steps must be taken to prevent accurate information from reaching the target as this tainted information spreads.
When the strategic culture of the enemy is grasped, deception is improved. To be successful, the deceiver must first understand the target’s perceptual background to determine which fake world representations would look credible (Department of Army 1988). History, culture, bureaucratic preferences, and the broader economic and political environment influence the target’s perceptions (Elkus, 2018). False information should adhere to strategic and even popular culture’s peculiarities. Mistakes are quickly spotted, and the intended audience typically finds them amusing. Military activities provide the greatest danger of death or severe harm. Commanders have used denial and deception to lessen the danger of injury to themselves and transfer the expense of battle onto their enemies since ancient times (Whaley, 2006). In some instances, deception strategists must be well-versed in the worldviews of individuals they attempt to deceive and be aware of the human predisposition for self-delusion.
New technological tools will also transform deception activities. The growing diversity of sensors and media on numerous levels of engagement will provide more opportunities for deception (Gentry & Gordon, 2019). Emerging developments in materials science and nanoscience, electromagnetic technologies, information, quantum sciences, and more excellent knowledge and practical applications of psychology, biology, and the computational social sciences are all more instantly relevant to military practitioners (Elkus, 2018). Some of these technologies, such as tiny mobile and self-replicating sensor networks that can reach even prohibited destinations, will make denial more difficult.
Conclusion
Deception necessitates the establishment of communication channels with the enemy. Providing the target with diluted information in novel ways might also boost the target’s trustworthiness. Deception strategists must thus have the authority and creativity to utilize existing channels while also developing new ones during the process. Feedback systems that collect data about the target’s behavior are beneficial to a successful D&D campaign. It is crucial to determine how the target perceives the material sent to them. Cover stories, communication routes, and particular initiatives must be fine-tuned to take advantage of unexpected opportunities or issues in a deception campaign. Knowing whether a deception effort is working can be vital to achieving significant strategic goals.
References
Adam Elkus, “The Continuing Relevance of Military Denial and Deception,” Military Operations 1, no. 1 (2018): 21–24, Web.
Caddell, J. W. & Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. (2004). Deception 101. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Department of Army. (1988). Battlefield deception. Federation of American Scientists. Web.
John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects (Washington, Dc: Georgetown University Press, 2019).
John Ferrari, “Deception Is the Biggest Threat to American Security,” American Enterprise Institute, Web.
Whaley, B. (2006). Detecting deception: A bibliography of counterdeception across time, cultures, and disciplines (2nd ed.). Foreign denial and Deception committee.